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Chronology 
 
1526-1918: The Habsburg Empire rules the territory of the Kingdom of Bohemia. 
 
1618-1648: Thirty Years’ War 
 
1620: Battle of White Mountain 
 
1848: A Czech uprising against the absolute rule of the Habsburg Empire fails. 
 
1914-1918: World War I 
 
1918-1938: The First Czechoslovak Republic replaces the Habsburg Empire as the 
governing body of the territory. 
 
1938: The Munich Pact cedes the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany with the agreement of 
British and French leaders. The Second Czechoslovak Republic is formed. 
 
1939: The “rump” of the Second Czechoslovak Republic is invaded and occupied by 
Nazi forces, and its name is changed to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia until 
the end of World War II. 
 
1939-1945: World War II 
 
May 1, 1945: Uprisings against the Nazis begin across Czechoslovakia, marking the end 
of the Nazi occupation and the beginning of Czech actions against the German population 
of the country, including violence and imprisonment. 
 
May-August 1945: The “wild transfers” of nearly 800,000 Germans take place, keeping 
them in squalid internment and concentration camps before forcing them across the 
borders of Germany, Austria, and Poland. 
 
July 17 – August 2, 1945: A conference of American, British, and Soviet leaders accepts 
the Potsdam Agreement, which had specific stipulations for the “organized transfer” of 
German refugees from Czechoslovakia. 
 
January – October 1946: More than two million Germans are expelled from 
Czechoslovakia into the Soviet and American zones of Germany during the “organized 
transfers.” 
 
February 1948: A Communist coup overthrows the Third Republic of Czechoslovakia. 
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Introduction 
 This study began as an examination of the expulsion of the ethnic Germans from 
Czechoslovakia in the immediate aftermath of World War II. There were two main 
periods of expulsion, with the “wild transfers” taking place in 1945, followed by the 
“organized transfers” in 1946. The first period is primarily remembered for the chaotic 
violence that accompanied the expulsion, while the second was known for its 
international acceptance and more structured procedures. Both periods present fascinating 
stories, the details of which could fill a book. A simple analysis of the events of those two 
periods, though, would not be enough to get at the core of the hostility that erupted in 
Czechoslovakia after World War II. In order to do that, it is essential to look at both the 
history of Czech-German relations over the long term and the experience of the expellees 
themselves during the process of expulsion. By exploring the historical background and 
the personal memories of the people most affected by the population transfers, this study 
will explore the impact of collective memory and its influence on national identity. The 
use of firsthand accounts from expellees also lends itself to an examination of the role of 
subjectivity in history, which is so often seen as an “objective” enterprise. 
 This approach elevates this study beyond a mere examination of the events that 
took place in postwar Czechoslovakia. Examining individual accounts of the expulsions 
provides an opportunity to observe the way collective memory is formed within a group. 
The memories of individual Sudeten Germans from 1945 and 1946 have been collected 
in the postwar years to create the group narrative of the expulsions, while Czech 
memories of the same period of time present a conflicting story. The interaction of 
individual memories with the collective memory of both the group to which an individual 
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belongs and groups with differing collective memories is key to understanding the 
importance of the expulsions in Central European history since the end of the war. 
Conflicting and shifting collective memories still govern the relationship between Czechs 
and Sudeten Germans to the present day, and the development of those memories are one 
of the primary concerns of this study. 
 Furthermore, analyzing the collective memories of both the Czechs and the 
Sudeten Germans helps the reader understand the national and ethnic identities of both 
groups. Collective memory plays a huge role in uniting the members of a given group and 
defines their relationship to the world around them. The collective memories of 
persecution and victimhood on both sides of the expulsions have defined the identities of 
Czechs and Sudeten Germans for more than sixty years. Acceptance of the collective 
narrative of the expulsions has been crucial to the development of a unified identity, both 
for those who were expelled and for those who did the expelling. Both Czechs and 
Germans often interpret the history that preceded the expulsions in a way that informs the 
identity of these groups, projecting twentieth-century tensions backward onto previous 
eras. The long history of Czech-German coexistence certainly informed the events of the 
expulsions, but the tendency to assume longstanding tensions in light of the extreme 
actions taken in 1945 and 1946 is misleading. This projection of twentieth-century 
hostilities onto earlier times serves the purpose of creating a singular history for a given 
group, but it masks the complicated reality of life in the Czech lands prior to World War 
II. This study is concerned with the ways in which the long history and more recent 
memory of both the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans influenced their identities, and both 
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pieces are equally important to understanding the postwar expulsions and the group unity 
that has been largely maintained since the expulsions.  
Finally, recognizing the influence of both memory and identity on history is 
essential to understanding the expulsions. Both the collective memory and ethnic identity 
of the Sudeten Germans and Czechs have shaped the accepted histories of the events of 
1945 and 1946. Examining history in light of the emotional and individualized memories 
of specific members of an ethnic group can show historians how the history of a major 
event can be extremely subjective and how the accepted “big picture” of history is often 
more complicated than initially thought. This study is particularly focused on the 
influence of individual memories and identities on the history of events like the 
population transfers, as well as the ways in which those inherently personal attitudes 
influence the recording and teaching of history itself. That interaction is central to this 
study and is crucial to understanding why the expulsions are so significant, because it is a 
case study in the process of the creation of history, and helps explain the tension between 
Czechs and Sudeten Germans that continues to exist.  
 The first half of this study is concerned with the early interactions between 
Czechs and Germans in the region that would become known as Czechoslovakia, 
beginning with the Habsburg Monarchy and ending with the foundation of the Third 
Czechoslovak Republic after World War II. Starting with the historical background of the 
Czech-German conflict of the mid-1940s is crucial to understanding why the two sides 
have come to such different conclusions about the events of the expulsions, because it 
provides essential context for the attitudes and emotions that surrounded the transfers. It 
might be convenient to extend the ethnic tensions of the twentieth century backwards 
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onto the Habsburg period, but, for much of their history together, Czechs and German 
coexisted quite peacefully in Bohemia. Simplifying history to a mere escalation of 
centuries-long hostilities overlooks the inherent uniqueness of the population transfers of 
the postwar period. On the other hand, the background of interaction between these two 
ethnic groups informed their more hostile relationship in the mid-twentieth century, and 
the significance of that background should not be ignored. The impact of the past on 
national and ethnic identity is especially important to this portion of the analysis, because 
the evolving Czech and German collective memories of life during the Habsburg Empire, 
the interwar period, and the Nazi occupation played a huge role in determining the ways 
in which these ethnic groups formed and interacted with one another.  
 The second half of this study examines personal narratives of the expulsions, 
recorded by the expellees themselves, in an attempt to shed light on the emotions and 
experiences of the people most affected by the expulsions. Combining the broader sweep 
of history with individual experiences will illuminate the ways in which subjectivity 
should be accepted in the field of history, as well as the way collective memory can 
change both history and national identity. Czechs and Germans have very different views 
of the expulsions, but they have also come to view the longer legacy of Czech-German 
relations in distinct ways, indicating the influence of their memories of the events of the 
mid-twentieth century on their national histories of earlier periods. 
 This study argues that the history leading up to the eventual physical separation of 
the Czech and German communities is essential to understanding what happened during 
the population transfers. It also sheds light on how individual and group memories can 
impact both national identity and history itself when they are brought together in a 
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collective narrative of a given moment in time. The very nature of recording an event or 
period of time inherently imbues it with the author’s perspective. The audience for the 
written record produced by these authors will find that their points of view and 
preconceptions also shape their understanding of the events in question. There is no such 
thing as “objective” history in a case like this, and it is the goal of this study to heighten 
awareness of the roles perspective and subjectivity play in the development of this 
historical narrative. Both Czech and German perspectives will be presented, although the 
quantity of German sources means that the German point of view may outweigh the 
Czech. History in general could be described as widely-accepted collective memory, and 
looking at case studies of individual memories will show the ways in which collective 
memory has been constructed around a specific event, which is interpreted in various 
ways by different groups.  
 With all that said, this study begins with an examination of what is generally 
accepted as the history of the lands that became Czechoslovakia, with a particular 
emphasis on the relationship between Germans and Czechs in those lands. 
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I. History of Ethnic Relations in Czechoslovakia, 1526-1945 
 In order to approach an understanding of the ethnic and national conflict between 
Czechs and Germans that exploded during the population transfers of 1945 and 1946, it is 
essential to examine the history between the two groups that informed the postwar 
hostility between them. As mentioned in the introduction, it is much too simplistic to 
project the tensions of the twentieth century backwards onto the Habsburg period and 
claim that Czech-German relations have always been volatile. While there were certainly 
episodes of revolt, repression, and some ethnic tensions, the nearly four centuries of 
Habsburg rule in the present-day Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as the relative 
lack of violence during that period, indicate that there was at least some measure of 
tolerance between the two groups. What, then, provoked the extreme reaction against 
ethnic Germans after World War II? There are a number of paths one could follow to find 
an answer to this complex question. First, by tracing the history of Czech-German 
relations throughout their long coexistence, one can identify those episodes of sporadic 
violence and repression that undoubtedly did leave their mark on Czech and German 
national identities and their interactions with one another. Second, examining the 
interwar years and the Nazi occupation reveals that a relatively short history of 
interaction played a pivotal role in the eventual expulsions. The approach this study will 
follow will look at both the long legacy and recent history of Czech-German relations to 
the end of World War II and find the strands and moments that shaped the ultimate 
division between Czechs and Germans in the mid-twentieth century.  
Memories of both the centuries of interaction preceding World War I and the 
tension that built until the end of World War II undoubtedly shaped the postwar events 
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that will be covered in the next chapter, as well as the identities of both groups involved. 
Although the events described here are primarily based on information considered to be 
“fact,” there is always room for interpretation, and Czech and German historians and 
scholars have come to different conclusions about events that some might see as 
“objective” history. The history of Czech and German relations and its role in the events 
of the immediate postwar years is obviously essential to the analysis of those events, and 
therefore will be given full weight in this half of the study. By focusing on the “facts” of 
Czech-German history first, it will be even easier to see the impact of the historical 
background in light of what happened in the immediate aftermath of World War II. 
 In order to address these issues, this chapter will act as a historical overview, 
dealing with the most significant events and people who shaped Czech history, as well as 
the German role in that history. It would be entirely possible to write a book on the 
relationship between Czechs and Germans over the centuries, so this chapter is meant as 
more of a primer on the history of Czech-German interaction, both positive and negative. 
Particularly in the case of the Habsburg Empire, it will be necessary to abbreviate the 
discussion, in order to address the situation as a whole, rather than elaborating too much 
on relatively minor details.1 For this reason, this discussion of the Habsburg Empire, the 
First Czechoslovak Republic, the Nazi regime, and the Third Czechoslovak Republic will 
be limited to the moments in history that are most significant to the shared history of 
Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia. Looking at the big picture in this way should 
reveal the larger trends in German-Czech relations throughout their coexistence in 
                                                 
1
 For the purposes of the overview of the Habsburg period, Bohemia will be the focus. While Moravia and 
Silesia had different demographics and slightly different impacts on the history of the region, emphasizing 
Bohemia will not detract from the reader’s understanding of the significant events that took place in the 
Czech lands. It can be assumed that Bohemia, in many cases, will serve to stand for the Czech lands as a 
whole, if only for the sake of brevity. 
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Bohemia, although there will certainly be gaps, due simply to the fact that it is impossible 
to address every element of German and Czech cultural, political, and military interaction 
without writing a much lengthier account than this. It is my hope that these limitations 
will not detract from the readers’ understanding of these events and their long-lasting 
consequences in terms of the more specific topic of this study, which is the rejection of 
Germans from Czech culture, politics, and national identity in the postwar period. 
 
Under the Double Eagle: The Habsburg Empire 
The origin story of a nation is often one of the most significant elements in its 
collective identity, and the Czech nation is no different. When Czech nationalism grew in 
the nineteenth century, the nation needed a common origin in order to unify a vast 
population. Similar legends sprang up in many national movements, but the Czech 
legend, written by Cosmas of Prague in the twelfth century, involved the discovery of the 
Czech homeland by a leader named Čech. This land was paradisiacal, “a land subject to 
no one, filled with game and birds, flowing with sweet milk and honey.”2 The 
resemblance to the promised land of biblical times is likely intentional, particularly 
because this story, like many origin stories, was intended to establish the Czechs as a 
people with a storied and legendary past. Cosmas’ narrative was apparently effective in 
this regard, because it served its purpose of bringing the nation together in the face of the 
forces of disunity that could have torn it apart. It was written in the twelfth century, but 
its influence was especially evident during the eighteenth and nineteenth century rise of 
                                                 
2
 Hugh Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
2004) 9. 
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national consciousness, when collective memories of a legendary past assisted the 
development of distinct national groups. 
 Another early, yet essential, moment in the history of the Czech nation came 
during the Hussite rebellion against the Habsburgs in the fifteenth century. Jan Hus was a 
preacher and Czech religious reformer who was executed in 1415. His death sparked an 
uprising that lasted for decades and remains a major point of contention in Czech history. 
For the Czechs, it is hard to reconcile the violence and chaos that the Hussite wars 
brought with the ostensibly religious overtones of the original uprising. In the nineteenth 
century, Hus was venerated as an early nationalist, even though he was more concerned 
with the church than the state.3 The appeal of the Hussite movement to many different 
types of people likely contributed to Hus’ heroic status in the eyes of nationalists who 
were looking to achieve a similar goal. Regardless of how the Hussite wars are perceived, 
however, the tensions that were created and exacerbated by the Hussite wars likely 
played a role in the Bohemian period of the Thirty Years’ War, which took place two 
centuries later. Indeed, religion played both a unifying and destructive force at various 
time in Czech history, particularly once the Habsburgs, with their resolute Catholicism, 
took power. That Habsburg connection to Catholicism was part of the reasoning behind 
glorifying Jan Hus as a Czech hero, because his religious beliefs did not conform to the 
Catholicism of the Czechs’ German rulers and represented a kind of proto-Protestantism 
that the Czechs were very proud of. 
 The Habsburgs came to power in the lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in 
1526 and the imposition of imperial power over those lands held consequences far into 
the future, even beyond the end of the empire in 1918. One of the areas where the 
                                                 
3
 Agnew, The Czechs, 39. 
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Habsburgs had a positive influence in Bohemia was in art and culture, because the vast 
expanse of the Habsburg Empire allowed for the easier transfer of ideas and styles, 
particularly during the Renaissance. Italian styles spread northward and were adapted for 
Czech purposes, allowing Czech artists and architects to develop their own uniquely 
Bohemian Renaissance style.4 Czech art and literature experienced their own kind of 
renaissance, entering a “golden age” of Czech culture.5 The Czech language began to be 
used in literary works and some authors became relatively well known. This renaissance 
may have contributed to a rise in national identity, since the Czechs could see themselves 
as separate to the German administration in culture and language, although many of 
members of the higher classes used German in both their everyday lives and their 
administrative tasks. German became the “primary second language” of many Czech 
nobles and knights under the Habsburgs, and the spread of German culture was not met 
with much resistance, as might be expected if there truly had been ethnic tensions for the 
entire period of Czech-German history.6 Of course, the peaceful coexistence of Czech 
and German culture was mitigated by the rising political and religious tensions of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which eventually erupted into war in the early 
seventeenth century. 
The Thirty Years’ War began in 1618 in Prague, with the defenestration of several 
Habsburg governors through the windows of Prague Castle. Religious tensions between 
Catholics and Protestants, as well as uneven leadership by Emperor Rudolf II (r. 1576-
1611) in dealing with the issues of religious difference, erupted in this uniquely Czech 
                                                 
4
 Agnew, The Czechs, 64. 
5
 Kann, A History, 146. 
6
 Agnew, The Czechs, 63. 
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manifestation of frustration.7 Rudolf II had sent a Letter of Majesty in 1609 granting 
relatively generous freedom of religion to all “nobles, burghers, and peasants,” but his 
successors, Matthias (r. 1611-1619) and Ferdinand II (r. 1617-1637), continued the 
centralizing and Catholicizing policies of former Habsburg rulers, angering the nobility.8 
Furthermore, the Czech nobility, who preferred their own chosen king, Frederick (r. 
1619-1620), invalidated the election of the new Habsburg Emperor, namely Ferdinand, in 
August 1619 by invoking their power as electors. Frederick had the support of a large 
majority of the rebelling nobles in the region, but he became known as the “winter king” 
because he only ruled for a few brief months. The Bohemian diet had maintained the 
right to elect the king of Bohemia under the Habsburgs up to this point, and they were 
frustrated by attempts to undermine that power.9 The upstart king and his supporters were 
defeated in 1620 at the Battle of White Mountain by Ferdinand and his commander, 
Count Tilly, who achieved “one of the most decisive victories ever obtained by Habsburg 
troops against an enemy.”10 This victory was crucial to the development of the 
relationship between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia, because the Czech defeat at 
White Mountain later became a rallying point for Czech nationalism, despite the fact that 
there were Germans among the rebels as well. It is also significant that, unlike the 
Hussite wars, which appealed to many social classes, this revolution did not unite the 
                                                 
7
 Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of  
California Press, 1974) 113. The Hussite Wars also featured a defenestration, so the First and Second 
Defenestration of Prague therefore mark two major turning points in Czech-German relations in the 
fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. It should also be noted that all dates pertaining to Habsburg rulers refer 
specifically to their reign as King or Queen of Bohemia, rather than their tenure as Holy Roman Emperor or 
Archduke of Austria.  
8
 Kann, A History, 112. 
9
 Agnew, The Czechs, 57. 
10
 Kann, A History, 50. 
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people, and therefore failed due to external pressures and internal disunity.11 The cruel 
execution of twenty-seven of the nobles involved in the uprising of 1618 in Prague ended 
the Bohemian period of the Thirty Years’ War.12 Of course, the war would continue to 
rage for nearly three more decades, but with the defeat at White Mountain and the 
subsequent punishment of those responsible, the Bohemian region declined in 
significance in Habsburg foreign policy.  
The military and political victory for the Habsburgs was crucial to their continued 
dominance in the region, but also created a divide between the triumphant German rulers 
and the vanquished Czech rebels, who faced a period of repression after their failed 
uprising and the eventual signing of the Treaty of Westphalia to end the Thirty Years’ 
War in 1648. It is essential to remember that, while this event could be interpreted to 
show the growing national identity of the Czechs, the rebels were more concerned with 
the religious and political consequences of this war. The re-Catholicization of the 
Bohemian lands was done through education and religious orders, and the continuity of 
Catholic faith in Bohemia was emphasized.13  
The redistribution of noble lands was also a problem for many Czechs, as 
“slightly more than one-half of all estates changed hands, and an even higher proportion 
of large ones,” which served to take away one of the main sources of power for Czech 
nobles.14 While the Thirty Years’ War continued to rage in other parts of Europe, the 
Czechs began to adjust to the post-defeat changes to Bohemia’s position in the empire. 
After the Treaty of Westphalia, the balance of power shifted significantly towards the 
                                                 
11
 Agnew, The Czechs, 67. 
12
 Agnew, The Czechs, 69. 
13
 R.J.W. Evans, The making of the Habsburg Monarchy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 223. 
14
 Evans, The making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 197. 
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emperor within his own lands, even though the princes and nobility retained much of 
their power and the emperor actually lost some of his influence in the empire.15 The 
power of the emperor over his lands in Bohemia was made relatively secure, however, 
and the resulting peace between the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia lasted for 
several centuries.16 A major consequence of the Treaty of Westphalia and the increased 
Habsburg control over Bohemia was the introduction of a new nobility by the triumphant 
empire, which rewarded its supporters with estates that had been confiscated from 
rebellious nobles.17 This meant that the remaining Czech (and some German) noble 
families were either replaced or joined by new, Catholic nobles from other areas of 
Europe, which essentially wiped out the former Czech nobility of Bohemia. The 
introduction of these new nobles into the Bohemian lands likely assisted the Habsburgs in 
maintaining their power and contributed to the relative peace in Bohemia for about two 
centuries. 
 The changes made to administration and politics in Bohemia were significant 
after White Mountain. As Robert Kann writes, “What remained as a consequence until 
the end of the Habsburg empire was the permanent alienation of the Czechs.” This may 
be a bit of an overstatement, since the Czechs remained part of the empire until it was 
dissolved in the aftermath of World War I. It is true, however, that, even though many of 
the immediate consequences introduced by the Habsburgs faded over the years, “the 
indirect psychological ones remained.” 18 The Czech role in the Thirty Years’ War, 
though it was limited to two years of activity, and the Habsburg reaction to their 
                                                 
15
 Agnew, The Czechs, 71. 
16
 Agnew, The Czechs, 74. There was a peasant uprising in 1680, due to the excessive labor demands of the 
nobility, but there were no major revolutions or national movements until the spring of 1848. 
17
 Agnew, The Czechs, 72. 
18
 Kann, A History, 51. 
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participation were crucial in shaping the next three centuries. According to Kann, “The 
era of suppression which affected Bohemia, Moravia, and in part Silesia, strengthened the 
consciousness of national identity.” 19 If the Battle of the White Mountain can be seen as 
the origin of Czech nationalism, it is also possible to see it as the origin of German-Czech 
tensions. Without the experiences of the Thirty Years’ War, it could be argued, it might 
have taken longer for Czech nationalism to take hold. Further, if the Habsburgs had not 
reacted so strongly to the rebellion of the Bohemian lands, turning them into “a mere 
dependency of Vienna,” it is possible that Czech-German tension would not have been so 
severe.20 With the rise of nationalist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
it seems likely that a Czech consciousness would have developed anyway, but the fact 
that a relatively unified national identity was already beginning to form in the 
seventeenth century undoubtedly helped the Czechs assert themselves when they were 
finally given the chance to rule themselves in the twentieth century. The memory of the 
“German” victory at White Mountain was a powerful tool for nationalists and Czech 
politicians not only to differentiate German culture from Czech, but also to justify the 
later actions of Czechs against Germans in the aftermath of World War II. By putting the 
expulsions of the Germans in both a historical and a more immediate political context, 
the vengeful acts of the Czech guards and military against the German expellees could be 
rationalized on multiple levels by the Czech people and government. 
 After the defeat at White Mountain, “[t]he development and use of the Czech 
language among educated people…was severely restricted,” due to Habsburg fears of the 
                                                 
19
 Kann, A History, 116. 
20
 Evans, The making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 200. 
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power of Czech identity.21 The earlier “golden age” of Czech art and literature was 
largely stopped, as the Habsburgs reasserted their power over Bohemia. Because German 
had been widely used before the war, it was likely not very difficult to get the educated 
elite to revert to using German in their written work. The idea that printed language is 
more powerful than mere speech is not a new concept, and the Habsburgs are certainly 
not the only ruling group in history to suppress the printing of a minority language in 
order to maintain power.22 Habsburg fears, while understandable after the devastation of 
the Thirty Years’ War, cannot have improved Czech feelings towards their German rulers 
or their German neighbors.  
Restrictions on the use of the Czech language only lasted so long, however, 
before a new Czech renaissance took hold among the intelligentsia in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Before the Czechs could begin their cultural resurgence, though, 
they had to “revise and to rebuild their national language,” which took two generations to 
complete.23 It took time to revive an apparently lost tradition of Czech literature, and it 
was not easy for the Czechs to overcome the obstacles presented by German dominance 
over their lives. In fact, the time between White Mountain and the reforms of Maria 
Theresa (r. 1740-1780) was referred to as a “time of darkness” by many Czechs, due to 
the execution and exile of many leading Czech intellectuals after the war was over.24 
Theater, music, and history all contributed to the resurgence of Czech culture in Bohemia 
                                                 
21
 Kann, A History, 384. 
22
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and Moravia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at least until the revolution 
of 1848 was crushed and German hegemony was reestablished. 
 While the redevelopment of Czech culture appears to be a national movement to 
modern eyes, especially because it involved the reintroduction of Czech as a language of 
intellectual and artistic pursuits, it was not always perceived as an inherently nationalistic 
development by the people responsible for the revival. In fact, in the process of 
reconversion to Catholicism, Czech was often used to appeal to people who did not know 
Latin or could not speak German.25 The Habsburgs were generally more concerned with 
religious unity than linguistic uniformity, and therefore, in order to attract as many people 
as possible to the Catholic Church, Czech was spoken, particularly in rural areas where 
German and Latin would not have succeeded. The methods they used to ease 
reconversion meant that later accusations of “forced conversions” in Bohemia by Czech 
nationalists are oversimplified and inaccurate. Most Czechs rejoined the Catholic Church 
and behaved as ordinary Catholics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with little 
conflict.  
The revival of the spoken Czech language during the Baroque period was more of 
a cultural movement than a nationalistic one, since saving the language from extinction 
was a way of preserving an element of Bohemian culture that was being neglected.26 The 
elites still used German, because it was the language of the empire, which meant that 
major works were not generally written in Czech in the eighteenth century, and therefore 
led to the delay of the development of a significant vernacular literature in Bohemia until 
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the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.27 This delay was 
primarily due to the omnipresence of German in the culture of the region, as well as the 
restrictions placed upon the Czechs after the Thirty Years’ War. It is important to 
remember, however, that favoring one language over the other did not necessarily create 
noticeable tension between Germans and Czechs, despite the dominance of the 
Habsburgs and the general lack of Czech literature.28 At this point in Czech-German 
history, language was not such a contentious marker of nationality as it would become in 
later years. Nationality, too, as it was only just forming in any meaningful way, was not 
yet the primary identity of the people living in the Czech lands. 
 In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Bohemian lands were hardly 
the primary concern of the Habsburg rulers, but territorial changes in the region were 
fairly common and often had unforeseen consequences in Bohemia. For instance, the 
annexation of Silesia by Prussia in 1763 led to the loss of a large portion of the German 
population of that region, which may have created “more favorable conditions for the 
future revival of the Czech language and culture” by allowing the Czech majority in 
Bohemia and Moravia to assert itself more freely.29 The later partitions of Poland, the 
Napoleonic wars, and the policies of “enlightened absolutists” like Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II (r. 1765-1790) led to further changes in Bohemia. The partitions of Poland in 
the late eighteenth century created tensions between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, all of 
whom wanted pieces of the dismembered state, particularly when Austria was left out of 
the second partition. The partitions led directly into the Napoleonic wars, after which 
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Austria was granted the piece of Poland that it had wanted in the first place.30 The 
Napoleonic wars were a military reaction against the chaos of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon’s sudden rise to power, and defeating him in 1814 united the powers of Europe, 
even though their unity could not prevent the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire in 
the face of his coronation as Emperor of the French in 1804.31 Such unity between 
European powers would not be possible again until the outbreak of World War I, 
although that war found many of these former allies on opposite sides of the front. 
 The influence of Maria Theresa and her successors on the culture and political 
structure of Bohemia cannot be overlooked. The changes in education, administration, 
and religion were significant enough to signal the end of the “time of darkness” that had 
existed in Bohemia since the defeat at White Mountain. Compulsory elementary 
education, as well as improved secondary schools, provided equal opportunities for all 
students to learn basic reading, writing, and arithmetic, no matter their social station.32 
Most instruction was in German, but the vernacular was not entirely discounted. The 
changes in administration and economic relations were even more significant, however, 
because they centralized the administration of the empire and attempted to remove some 
of the most significant elements of social and economic inequality. For instance, Joseph 
II abolished serfdom in 1781, which freed the peasants from their landlords and allowed 
them to live more freely in the empire.33 Finally, the enlightened absolutists began to 
allow some religious dissent, instead of maintaining the adamant Catholicism of their 
predecessors. Joseph II not only granted toleration to Lutherans and Calvinists in 1781, 
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but also loosened many of the restrictions on the Jewish population, allowing them to 
leave the ghettos and stop wearing the distinctive clothing that had separated them from 
the rest of society.34 These policies were part of a rationalist and enlightened worldview 
and helped the Habsburg rulers maintain their control over the empire, especially in a 
region like Bohemia, where economic and religious tensions had previously erupted into 
rebellion.  
 The French Revolution, despite the fact that it occurred far from Prague or 
Vienna, sent shockwaves through the Habsburg Empire, and the fear that such an event 
could happen in Austria or Bohemia led to increased censorship and restrictions by the 
Habsburgs. Those restrictions did not prevent the resurgence of Czech culture that had 
begun in the seventeenth century and continued throughout the eighteenth and beginning 
of the nineteenth centuries. Despite increased scrutiny of books and newspapers produced 
in Czech, Czech came to be seen as the natural mother tongue of the Czech people, which 
helped the use of Czech in literature gain some momentum.35 The development of 
Romanticism across Europe also contributed to the rise in literature in the vernacular, due 
to its emphasis on patriotism and nationalism. Advocates of the Czech language 
attempted to assist those in the countryside in improving their Czech speech, which 
helped them become incorporated into the Czech nation. In fact, by including the 
common people, rather than the elites, who still preferred to use German, the Czechs 
were redefining the concept of who belonged to the nation. Since the common people and 
the middle classes were using Czech, and since speaking Czech had become one of the 
main requirements for determining who belonged to the nation, the idea of the nation was 
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transforming into a popular movement.36 This popular element of Czech nationalism 
would never fully fade and continued to play a huge role in the national identity of 
Czechoslovakia after its foundation. The nationalist focus on Czech language and culture 
would only grow until the spring of 1848, when numerous regions erupted in rebellion, 
advocating their own autonomy and desire to rule themselves. 
 In the 1830s, several regions around Europe began to voice their discontent, 
including Bohemia. The Bohemian nobility was unhappy with their level of autonomy, 
but nationalist movements became the real threat to Habsburg power, since they appealed 
to such a large segment of the population. The nobility linked themselves to the 
nationalist cause in order to achieve their political and constitutional goals. Adding to the 
nationalists’ complaints was the mandatory use of German, particularly in schools in 
areas that were predominantly Czech.37 Because the Czech national movement was based 
so strongly in language, the use of German was seen as an affront to their national 
identity. In order to combat the dominance of German, Czech nationalists started 
studying the history of their language, and they even “found” manuscripts that proved the 
ancient presence of Czech as a language even before German had been recorded.38 
Advocating not only the use of Czech by peasants, but also its legitimacy as a written 
language in this way reinforced Czech nationalists’ sense of the uniqueness of their 
culture and its rightful independence from German or Austrian culture. Therefore, by 
1848, when the tensions between the empire and the people of Bohemia reached their 
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breaking point, the Czechs had a defined national consciousness that they were willing to 
defend. 
 While it might seem that this development of a Czech national identity would be 
the beginning of serious Czech-German tensions and hostility, the Czechs were more 
concerned with the Habsburgs than their German neighbors. In fact, there was a sense of 
“national cooperation” in 1848, with Germans and Czech coming together to advocate 
ethnic equality in Bohemia.39 Both groups identified strongly with Bohemia and were not 
interested in separating from each other, but rather wanted to have some autonomy from 
the Habsburgs. There were, of course, differences between Germans and Czechs, 
particularly in an economic sense, since the Germans found themselves holding much of 
the capital of the country, making them much wealthier than their Czech neighbors. The 
Germans also felt that Bohemia was an inherently German land, due to its historical ties 
to the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs, and therefore assumed that it would 
remain under the control of Germans, rather than Czechs.40 Despite these differences, 
though, they were able to continue cooperating with the Czechs in pursuit of more 
autonomy and equality in Bohemia, and little tension made itself obvious at this point, 
except over the issue of uniting with Germany or keeping Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia 
separate from the German state.41 Thus, even after national identity became a major 
factor in the lives of Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, hostility did not immediately 
develop. They were able to live peacefully together for another fifty years before 
nationality became a wedge that drove them permanently apart. 
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The revolutions across Europe in the spring of 1848 could be seen as the 
inevitable consequence of nationalist movements that developed in the nineteenth 
century. After 1848, the Habsburgs made numerous changes to administration and 
political life. The dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was established in 1867 to appease 
the Hungarian rebels, but the Czechs, many of whom had remained relatively loyal to the 
empire throughout this period of upheaval, were given “unity ‘from above,’” rather than 
the constitutional union they had sought.42 For the Czechs, who saw their national 
identity as having roots as far back as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the desire 
to see their national feeling come to fruition was particularly significant, especially when 
the effort failed and they were again held under the strict control of the Habsburg Empire.  
After the failure of the revolutions, the Czechs felt unfairly treated for their 
participation in the rebellions of 1848 and blamed the Germans for the “oppressive 
character of the government.”43 This instance of laying collective blame on all Germans 
for the actions of those in power is interesting, particularly in light of the expulsions, 
during which a similar phenomenon took place. The collective guilt of the Germans 
assumed by the Czechs after World War II, as well as the collective innocence of the 
Sudeten Germans in their understanding of the events of the occupation, fundamentally 
shaped the way the two groups remember the expulsions of 1945 and 1946. Similar 
attitudes were displayed in the aftermath of 1848. Part of the reason for this application of 
collective guilt may have stemmed from the fact that the Germans were undoubtedly 
favored under the Habsburgs. While they may not have been able to do anything about 
this partiality, it is hard to believe that they would protest the preferential treatment they 
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received in comparison to their Czech neighbors. The negative feelings of the Czechs 
towards the Germans did not become violent, however, and the two groups were still able 
to coexist. Because the Habsburgs did not want to continue dealing with Czech uprisings 
or upset the Czech population further, they made “moderate concessions” to appease the 
Czechs, but these concessions did not give the Czechs the power they desired to effect 
real changes in their homeland.  
It is important to note here that before World War I, national movements within 
the Habsburg Empire were not primarily concerned with breaking away from the empire, 
but rather were looking to assert themselves within the empire.44 The continued 
maturation of the Czech national movement and Czech culture contributed to the Czech 
ability to challenge the Germans once World War I was over. It is also interesting to note 
that feelings of national tension often came from Germans, who feared the changes they 
saw in Czech culture. This fear likely sprang from the fact that the Czechs were so 
adamant about using their national language and celebrating Czech culture, so the 
Germans may have feared that Czech culture would eclipse German as the dominant 
force in the region.  
The German population of Bohemia was also generally considered to include the 
Jewish population, who were identified more strongly with German culture than Czech.45 
This identification of the Jewish population with that of the Germans would actually 
survive the Nazi occupation, with many Jews being expelled alongside the Sudeten 
Germans, despite the fact that the Jews had suffered more than any other group under the 
Nazis. Under the Habsburgs, the Jewish population was relatively integrated into Czech 
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and German culture, particularly after Joseph II opened the ghettos. Of course, the 
Habsburgs were not always especially tolerant of Jewish people, with Maria Theresa’s 
expulsion of 20,000 Jews from Prague pointing to the presence of genuine intolerance.46 
Maria Theresa did rule before Joseph, and therefore her policies were not always as 
“enlightened” as those of her successors, but the fact remains that the Jewish population 
was left somewhat removed from both Czech and German culture, even after the opening 
of the ghettos.  
There was assimilation, particularly in Prague and Vienna, but there was an 
undercurrent of anti-Semitism that made fully identifying with either the Czech or 
German population a tricky feat for a Jewish person.47 It was relatively easy before 1890 
for Jews to assimilate and move between the German and Czech communities, since 
many members of the Jewish community were bilingual, but full identification with 
either group was difficult to achieve or maintain. There were also numerous enclaves of 
Jewish communities across the Czech lands, which provided security for the Jewish 
populations that lived there, particularly after 1890, when anti-Semitism began to grow 
again. As nationalism grew, the Jews were increasingly left out of both the German and 
Czech communities, which increasingly used race as a major factor in determining 
nationality.48 There was no official sanction of anti-Semitism by the government of the 
empire, but the difficulties faced by Jewish citizens of Bohemia were very real, even 
before the Nazis invaded with their ideology of extermination. 
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 World War I brought the fall of the Habsburg Empire, with the lands that had 
once been included in the vast expanses of Austria-Hungary suddenly divided into 
sections that were intended to follow the ideal of “national self-determination.” While it 
is fairly easy to see why the victorious powers would want to dismantle one of the 
defeated states to remove its power base, they forgot that the people who had formerly 
lived under the Habsburgs had been held together by little more than the force of the 
emperor (or empress) and his central authority. While democratizing and allowing the 
people to rule themselves seemed like a good idea, most of the population had never 
considered living in a world without the Habsburgs in control. The majority-minority 
relations in the Habsburg Empire were tense, certainly, but the singular persona of the 
ruler was enough to keep things running fairly smoothly. That ruler did have other 
sources of unity in the bureaucracy, military, and Catholic Church, but the symbolic 
value of the figure of the ruler should not be ignored.49 Taking away the central power 
and splitting up the lands, seemingly haphazardly in some cases, was a recipe for disaster. 
The desire to achieve fully self-determined states in Central Europe was essentially 
impossible to achieve in reality, because of the widespread mixing of ethnic groups in the 
region that had been present for centuries.50 The establishment of the First Czechoslovak 
Republic under President Tomáš Masaryk was the work of the victorious powers, 
particularly France and the United States, and the later history between those powers 
would reflect the repercussions of the actions of these so-called Great Powers when they 
no longer wished to protect a country they were responsible for forming. 
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 Beyond even the political issues with dividing up the Habsburg lands, it is 
important to recognize the cultural shifts that took place with the establishment of borders 
and states based on “nationhood.” As Kann explains, the coexistence of Czech and 
German culture under the Habsburgs created a “mutual Czech-German cultural 
penetration, a kind of osmosis.”51 This “osmosis” linked the Czech and Sudeten German 
cultures together and made it difficult to separate one from the other. In fact, the 
nationalities of composers of pieces of music written in the Bohemian lands are difficult 
to determine, because “in Bohemian lands German or Czech names are no reliable clues 
in this respect.”52 The intertwining cultures of Czechs and Germans was one of the main 
reasons the two groups were able to coexist for such a long time, even though there were 
occasions on which the Czechs reacted violently to the preference given to Germans. 
Sometimes, those intertwining cultures could even be found within a single person. The 
violence that occurred between the two groups was more about equality than supremacy, 
however, and the dominance of German culture, while unfair to the Czechs, made sense 
in an empire that was ruled by German-speakers. The coexistence and intermingling of 
Czech and German culture helped smooth over some of the differences and both cultures 
influenced each other in ways both conscious and unconscious.  
One of the most overlooked casualties of World War I is the death of that cultural 
coexistence in the “new state in which the primacy of Czech culture was firmly 
established.”53 Again, it is understandable that the Czechs would want to use their 
newfound power to express their national culture and celebrate the artistic and literary 
creations of their countrymen. On the other hand, cutting off the “osmosis” stream 
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between Czech and German culture only added to existing ethnic tensions and may have 
contributed to the rise of the Sudeten German Party, with its emphasis on German culture 
as supreme. 
 
The Myth of National Self-Determination: The First Czechoslovak Republic 
Establishment of the First Republic 
The idea of “self-determination” for the nations that had formerly been included 
in the Habsburg Empire was a good one, in theory. In practice, however, the ethnic and 
national groups in the region were so hopelessly mixed that there was no conceivable 
way to ensure that a given state was entirely homogeneous. The centuries-long rule of the 
Habsburgs had enabled the movement of various ethnic groups throughout the former 
lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which made determining borders extremely 
delicate and contentious. The borders determined by the victorious states were imposed 
on a region that had been unified through specific institutions for centuries. Taking away 
those institutions, including the emperor and the military, allowed disputes to emerge that 
might not have been so difficult to manage in previous years. For instance, Hungary 
disputed the boundaries of the new state of Czechoslovakia, and sought to change the 
borders determined at Versailles, particularly in the case of Slovakia, which had a large 
Hungarian minority.54 This attempt was unsuccessful, but the tension between the 
established boundaries and the boundaries perceived to be “correct” by various ethnic 
groups would continue to plague the region for decades. Disputes such as this were only 
to be expected, because of the increased national consciousness that had arisen in the 
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previous century and the seemingly arbitrary assignation of certain territories to new 
states.  
Because the borders of Czechoslovakia were decided by the victorious states, 
there was little that minority groups could do, since the so-called Great Powers had the 
strength to enforce their decisions. Two decades after the end of World War I, the states 
of Central Europe would have to face the possibility that, while the Great Powers could 
defend their decisions, they might choose not to do so. Regardless of what happened in 
later years, the perception in the immediate aftermath of the war was that the states 
formed through the Treaty of Versailles, as well as all the conditions of surrender 
imposed on Germany, were inviolable. 
 Beyond even the mere coexistence of different ethnic groups, the comingling and 
combining of the cultures of those groups further confused attempts to separate unique 
nationalities from each another. As discussed in the previous section, Czech and German 
culture informed one another, and the expression of an affinity for one or the other 
language or culture was not seen, at least in this period, as a tacit rejection of the other. In 
fact, nationality was so fluid in the pre-World-War-II period that “amphibians,” or people 
who could switch nationalities in public settings, were relatively common in 
Czechoslovakia.55 These amphibians blurred the lines between German and Czech 
nationality and culture, to the point that separating the two was, in many cases, simply a 
matter of context. Amphibians saw nationality as a publicly expressed construction, 
rather than an innate identity, and it was therefore much easier in the prewar period to 
choose a nationality based on cultural signifiers, rather than other factors such as race or 
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primary language.56 Most individuals were not conflicted about their identity, because 
their culture allowed for the expression of multiple identities in the public sphere. In later 
periods, this kind of amphibian identity would be essentially destroyed by the Nazis and 
Czechs, as they attempted to impose a single national identity on people who had 
previously been able to select their own nationality based on their actions, rather than 
their genealogy. 
 Before getting to the issues of amphibians in the Nazi period and the Third 
Republic, however, it is essential to understand how Nazism was able to gain a foothold 
in Czechoslovakia and how Hitler was able to dismember the Czechoslovak state so 
easily. It could be argued that the Czechoslovak Republic was doomed from the start, 
since it was a country with such large and vocal minorities, but the original constitution 
of the First Republic and its early actions indicate that, given slightly more time and 
better leadership, Czechoslovakia could have dealt with its ethnic tensions and matured 
out of its initial difficulties. Some of those difficulties included ethnic problems, of 
course, but it is also crucial to remember that most Czechoslovakian politicians had never 
participated in their own government before. They had certainly represented their people 
under the Habsburgs, but they had “more experience in parliamentary obstruction than in 
responsible government,” which made the early government an exercise in bureaucracy 
and something of a cult of personality around the new president, Tomáš Masaryk.57  
Masaryk was a naturally charismatic leader for the new republic, and his presence 
smoothed the transition from monarchy to democracy by allowing the Czechs and 
Germans in the region to continue revering a single man, rather than jumping directly 
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into fully representative government. There was, of course, representation in government, 
but the proportional representation mandated by the constitution meant that multiparty 
coalitions were inevitable and no single party was likely to become a majority.58 
Although the democracy of Czechoslovakia remained fairly stable at the beginning of its 
existence, in spite of this possible stumbling block, Masaryk aided the transition by 
providing some continuity from the former empire to the contemporary republic.  
 Even with Masaryk uniting Czechs and Slovaks under his rule, the state 
inherently favored those groups over Hungarians, Germans, and Jews, simply because of 
its identity as a “Czechoslovak Republic.” Minorities, including the Sudeten Germans, 
were given the right to use their own language in schools and official business in areas 
where they made up more than twenty percent of the population, but “Czechoslovak” was 
the official state language, and therefore, anyone who could not speak Czech or Slovak 
likely found it difficult to work in the bureaucracy or government.59 While the insistence 
on Czech and Slovak as official languages makes sense in a nation that was still trying to 
establish itself as a legitimate state, it is also possible to see why the Germans might have 
felt threatened by the increasing infiltration of Czechs into their former linguistic and 
cultural enclaves. Czechs and Slovaks were making their voices legitimately heard in the 
political sphere for the first time, and their control of the government gave them the 
potential to control the cultural life of the population. After centuries of being the 
dominant cultural group under the Habsburgs, this transition was difficult for Sudeten 
Germans to make.  
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Much of the fear of a Czech cultural takeover was overblown, however, because 
the Czech government had shown no signs of attempting to destroy German culture, and 
had actually signed the Minorities Treaty at its inception. This treaty gave minority 
groups protection under the League of Nations and was intended to protect groups like 
the Sudeten Germans from persecution.60 It is not clear exactly how this treaty would 
have worked, particularly because it was not invoked by the Sudeten Germans in their 
quest for cultural security. The existence of this treaty as protection for the Sudeten 
Germans, however, should have given them at least some security in their new position as 
a minority. Despite the perceived threat of Czech culture, it is important to note that there 
was little unrest between Germans and Czechs during the early years of the First 
Republic. The political and cultural groups and parties that developed in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s had not yet emerged, and the Germans were far from uniting as a group. 
Indeed, the shadows of a cultural threat had not yet solidified into the propagandized 
force of unification and were little more than a slight suspicion on the part of the Sudeten 
Germans of the early 1920s. 
The First Republic got off to a relatively smooth start, benefiting from the fact 
that Germans and Czechs had coexisted for such a long time. Democracy did begin to 
take root, even if it took slightly longer than some might have liked. The real challenge 
for the new republic came with the Great Depression and its attendant misery and 
suffering, which assisted the rise of Konrad Henlein and his Sudeten German movement. 
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Konrad Henlein and the Rise of the Sudetendeutsche Partei 
 Konrad Henlein is one of the most controversial and confounding figures in the 
First Czechoslovak Republic. He can easily be portrayed as a conniving leader, an 
ineffective decision-maker, or a tool of Hitler, and it remains unclear what his “real” role 
was. He was the leader of the Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP), which claimed to represent 
all Sudeten Germans. After the annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 and the creation of 
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia the following year, Henlein was perceived as 
an active Nazi supporter who had been steering Czechoslovakia into Hitler’s grasp since 
he came to power. It is too simple to portray him as a villain, however, because, by many 
accounts, he was not a very effective leader, and he was not actively trying to destroy the 
Czechoslovak Republic from the very beginning of his organization in 1933. Rather, he 
was a Sudeten German activist who apparently got caught up in the chaos that surrounded 
him and ended up acting as an instrument to accomplish Hitler’s plans in Central Europe. 
 The roots of Henlein’s movement can be found in the worldwide Great 
Depression of the 1930s, which hit the Sudeten Germans particularly hard. Their 
industries, which often dealt with light, consumer goods, were affected “first and most 
heavily.” The challenges presented by the Depression led to increased radicalization and 
polarization in the government.61 Economic concerns, as well as the continued 
dominance of Czech culture over German, led many Sudeten Germans to feel threatened 
by the Czech state and resentful of their Czech neighbors. The political dominance of 
Czech parties only exacerbated this perceived threat, by showing how much power the 
Czechs really had. The impact of the Depression drove many Germans to search for a 
uniting force that could protect them against the economic, political, and cultural 
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onslaught they perceived in the world around them. Many of them found unity by joining 
German organizations or the Sudeten German National Socialist Party (DNSAP). The 
DNSAP was an indigenous Nazi movement in Czechoslovakia and was not originally 
directly associated with Hitler’s Nazi Party in Germany. Some members were interested 
in Hitler’s brand of politics, but the party itself was not directly related to its German 
fellow at this point. The DNSAP was dissolved, however, in 1933, and banned by the 
government, to prevent the rise of a real challenge to the republic.62 Part of the reason for 
this dissolution was probably the rise of Hitler’s Nazi Party in Germany, which had 
shown the political potential of the National Socialist movement. After the Nazi Party 
was abolished in Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans looked to a new organization to 
unite them in the face of all the challenges in their environment. That organization was 
Konrad Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront (SHF), which later became the SdP. 
 The SHF was originally an organization that focused on uniting the Sudeten 
Germans in the cultural sphere, but it was not initially focused on any Nazi ideology. The 
primary concern of the SHF, at least at the beginning of its existence, was the formation 
of a Sudeten German identity that was distinct from both the Czechs and the “Reich 
Germans.”63 In this field, the SHF was successful, as the identity of the Sudeten Germans 
is still relatively unified and their sense of belonging to a distinct group of ethnic 
Germans never disappeared, even during the Nazi occupation. The emphasis the SHF 
placed on the formation of Sudeten identity indicates that the SHF was not looking to 
secede from Czechoslovakia or join the Reich in 1933, but rather wanted to defend their 
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traditions against the perceived threat of assimilation to Czech culture. It is in this arena 
that the figure of Henlein begins to take shape as something of a puzzle. His original 
purpose was to unite the Sudeten Germans within Czechoslovakia, but he ended up 
leading them into the Reich by 1938. This image of Henlein “leading” his people into the 
Reich may actually be too generous to his leadership abilities, because, by all accounts, 
he was not a very effective or charismatic leader.64 It seems more likely that Henlein was 
an aspiring cultural leader who became part of a political movement that he did not fully 
understand before it overwhelmed him and made him practically irrelevant. Before that 
could happen, however, he became the leader of the SdP, which was essentially the SHF 
transformed into a viable political party. The idea of a Sudeten German “front” had 
frightened the Czechs, so Henlein was obliged to change the name of his organization to 
a “party” before they were allowed to participate in the political sphere.65 Thus, by 1935, 
Henlein was already leading a party that was poised to represent all Sudeten Germans in 
a completely legitimate way within the established government. 
 It would be tempting, once again, to claim that, when Henlein became the leader 
of the SdP, he was already planning to betray the Czech government and dismember 
Czechoslovakia for the sake of Hitler’s cause. In hindsight, it is also possible to see his 
speeches in the mid-1930s, including one he gave at a rally in 1934, just six months 
before the formation of the SdP, as mere tools to keep the Czechs from suspecting his 
true motives.66 It may be plausible that he was already planning the Sudeten secession 
from the republic, but it is not likely, simply because there was no reason in 1935 to 
believe that the Reich even wanted to annex the Sudetenland or risk antagonizing 
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Czechoslovakia or its allies. Instead, the Sudeten Germans were probably just looking for 
someone who represented their interests, and Henlein fit that description better than any 
of the other parties available to them.  
Henlein was, at least in 1935, primarily concerned with carrying out his mandate 
from the Sudeten Germans and doing what he could to create unity among them.67 He 
even tried to work with other parties in the government to create a coalition. When that 
effort fell through, however, the SdP essentially stopped participating in democratic 
government and separated themselves from the rest of the Czechoslovakian political 
parties. From 1935 to the annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938, the political 
participation of the SdP decreased, while its connections to Hitler’s Nazi Party grew. This 
separation may have contributed to radical calls for a real secession from 
Czechoslovakia, but such drastic action was still not a viable option at this point.68 
Henlein was left to attempt to unify his people without antagonizing the Czechs, and he 
continued to profess his loyalty to the state, even though he also began speaking against 
the policies of the state that seemed to favor Czechs and Slovaks over Germans. 
 In 1936, Henlein made an impassioned argument for the rights of the Sudeten 
Germans, claiming that, despite the fact that there were roughly half as many Germans as 
Czechs, and nearly twice as many Germans as Slovaks, in Czechoslovakia, Germans 
were treated as second-class citizens.69 On the other hand, he continued to claim that he 
and his party were loyal members of the state and that, while the Czechs had treated them 
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unfairly, “the blame” for the contemporary state of ethnic relations “rest[ed] with both 
nations.”70 This acceptance of some responsibility for the growing tensions between 
Czechs and Germans may have been a ploy to convince both the Czech government and 
the potential allies of the Sudeten Germans abroad, particularly among the British, that 
the Sudeten Germans simply felt oppressed by the government. The British government 
certainly believed Henlein when he told them of his people’s struggles in Czechoslovakia 
and trusted his claims that he was still entirely loyal to the republic. The willingness of 
the British to jump to the defense of the Sudeten Germans against perceived Czech 
tyranny may have contributed to the audaciousness of Hitler’s continued violations of the 
Treaty of Versailles. He had already successfully remilitarized the Rhineland and likely 
saw the British support of the Sudeten Germans as a way to achieve his goal of 
conquering Czechoslovakia with little resistance.71 Whether Henlein was actively 
cooperating with Hitler at this point is unclear, but it is true that, as divisions erupted in 
the SdP, Henlein began to rely on the Reich for support.72 That support may have been 
the opening Hitler later used to manipulate the SdP into becoming an extension of the 
Nazi Party into Czechoslovakia. 
 By 1937, the SdP had radicalized to the point that Henlein had only two options 
left: “elimination or cooption.”73 A large part of this radicalization came from the 
increasing influence of Hitler and the Reich Germans, particularly in terms of Heinrich 
Himmler’s Schutzstaffel (SS). Himmler used the members of his organization to infiltrate 
not only the SdP, but many ethnic German organizations, and he was therefore able to 
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gain some measure of control over their activities and ideology.74 The permeation of 
militant SS members into the SdP contributed to its radicalization as annexation 
approached, but the final step towards direct collaboration with the Nazis required 
Henlein to decide on his role in the process. Henlein chose to be co-opted by the Nazis 
and their radical allies within his own party, remaining the symbol of Sudeten unity, even 
as the party was increasingly dominated by men like Karl Frank, who were much more 
radical and loyal to Nazi ideology. In addition to the SS penetration of the SdP, the rise of 
radical Sudeten Germans like Frank hastened the escalation of ideology towards 
annexation by the Reich. Henlein’s inability to maintain control of his organization, 
despite his symbolic value, meant that he was wholly incapable of preventing this 
escalation.  
Because of his role in this period of Sudeten German history, Henlein is often 
seen as a traitor to the Czechoslovak Republic, which is, to some degree, a fair 
assessment. He did not fight for the preservation of the state, but after his many speeches 
decrying the policies of the Czech government, that sudden change of heart would not 
have made sense to anyone and could have cost him what support he still had among the 
Sudeten Germans. It is an overstatement to say, however, that Henlein was the “Führer” 
of the Sudeten Germans, because he never had that much control over what went on in 
the Sudetenland, especially after Hitler became involved.75 Henlein had never been a 
particularly effective leader, and as the radical elements in his party continued to rise in 
power, he likely felt overwhelmed and looked to a more stable leader to help him keep 
the position he held. Henlein may have seen the Reich Nazi Party as a valuable tool to 
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assist him in his attempts to create and maintain unity among the Sudeten Germans 
within Czechoslovakia. 
 Instead of using the Nazi Party to maintain his power, however, the Nazis actually 
used Henlein to advance their own goals in Central Europe. As time passed, Hitler 
continued to gain confidence that France and Great Britain would not protest the changes 
he wished to make to the political boundaries of a number of states. In March 1938, he 
successfully completed the Anschluss with Austria, which had been explicitly forbidden 
by the Treaty of Versailles, and which provoked strong feelings among both Czechs and 
Germans in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs feared being outflanked by Nazi Germany and 
the Sudeten Germans flew into a frenzy of nationalistic excitement, likely hoping that 
they would be next to join the Reich.76 By this point, annexation was certainly on the 
minds of many Sudeten Germans, largely due to the escalation of radicalism in the 
Sudeten German movement and the encouragement of that radicalism by the Nazis. It 
was certainly in Hitler’s best interest to encourage the “fifth column” of Sudeten 
Germans to express their anti-Czech feelings, although it is not certain that Hitler saw the 
Sudeten Germans as a significant base of support at this point.77 In fact, it is likely he did 
not care whether the Sudeten Germans were looking to secede, because he fully intended 
to annex the territory of Czechoslovakia regardless of the feelings of the population that 
lived there. 
 In 1938, not only was Austria annexed by the Reich, but Henlein began working 
with both Frank and Hitler directly, marking the first documented moment of his total 
complicity with the Reich Nazi Party and their plans for the annexation of the 
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Sudetenland and the later creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Henlein 
met with Hitler, who told him that “We must always demand so much that we can never 
be satisfied.”78 In terms of Henlein’s negotiations with the Czech government on behalf 
of the Sudeten Germans, this meant that he had to demand enough that the government 
could never fulfill his demands, but not so much that they would cut off negotiations 
entirely. This was essential, because everyone was concerned with preventing another 
war, but the Czechs were relatively unwilling to concede too much to the Germans, for 
fear that they would break away or become too powerful a force in Czechoslovakia. To 
achieve this delicate balance, Henlein created the Eight Demands of the Karlsbad 
Program, which appeared to simply demand German autonomy, but, if accepted by the 
Czech government, “would have been tantamount to union with Germany.”79 Because 
most European countries were primarily concerned with preventing another war, there 
was immense pressure on the Czech government simply to give in. The pressure 
eventually got to be so bad that Edvard Beneš was forced to begin giving major 
concessions to the Sudeten Germans. Beneš had taken over after President Masaryk had 
died the previous year, and his presidency before Munich was overshadowed by the 
increasing tensions between the Sudeten Germans and the rest of the state.80 The 
concessions Beneš was forced to make were so extensive that refusing to accept them 
would have destroyed Henlein’s moral authority and would have shown the Sudeten 
Germans to be unnecessarily antagonistic towards the Czechs.81 At this major turning 
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point in the proceedings, Henlein needed support from the Reich, and Hitler prepared to 
invade. 
 Hitler was ready, by 1938, to invade Czechoslovakia and fight a small war to gain 
control. His allies, however, who included Benito Mussolini in Italy, were less 
enthusiastic to enter a war.82 The rest of Europe was even less interested in fighting 
another war only twenty years after the close of World War I. Out of fear that refusal to 
compromise would provoke an attack by Hitler’s Germany on Czechoslovakia, Neville 
Chamberlain, the prime minister of Great Britain, was moved to act. He called a 
conference between himself, Hitler, Mussolini, and Édouard Daladier of France in 
Munich in September 1938. This conference was intended to prevent the outbreak of 
another war. Its actual consequences had a much longer reach and impacted people and 
territories far from the borders of the Sudetenland or Czechoslovakia. 
 
The Munich Conference and the Second Republic 
 The Munich Conference, in hindsight, was a massive mistake on the part of Great 
Britain and France. At the time, however, it was seen as the best possible approach to the 
increasingly volatile Sudetenland situation. Appeasing Hitler to prevent war was the goal, 
and both Chamberlain and Daladier believed they had accomplished that goal when they 
returned home in short-lived glory. In order to fulfill Hitler’s perceived territorial desires, 
they sacrificed the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany and forced the Czech government to 
accept an agreement over which they had no control. 
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 Perhaps this treatment of the Munich Conference seems too simplistic, but the 
fact remains that the government of Czechoslovakia played no role in the Munich 
Conference and was essentially informed that if they did not accept the agreement, they 
would be forced to fight the Nazis alone. Their former allies of France and Great Britain 
abandoned them in favor of potentially preventing World War II.83 In 1938, the diplomats 
involved in achieving this agreement obviously did not have any knowledge of what 
would transpire over the next seven years, but their willingness to desert their 
Czechoslovakian allies in their time of need showed them to be fairly weak. That 
weakness certainly must have contributed to Hitler’s increasingly aggressive foreign 
relations, since he did not think that the British or the French would act against him. In 
fact, Hitler apparently resented the fact that he had been forced into an agreement at 
Munich, when he would have much preferred to take the whole territory of 
Czechoslovakia at once.84 Therefore, while the appeasement techniques of Chamberlain 
and Daladier were intended to dissuade Hitler from using force to take any more territory, 
the reality of the Munich Conference made him even more anxious to use his rebuilt 
military to invade other states to gain territory in Central and Eastern Europe. For the 
moment, though, Hitler had to be satisfied with the Sudetenland and the increasingly 
inevitable dissolution of Czechoslovakia as a state. 
 After Munich, Edvard Beneš resigned and fled the country before the Second 
Czechoslovak Republic was born. This government ruled by decree and excluded anyone 
perceived to be a threat to the nation, including Germans, Magyars, Poles, and especially 
Jews. It is estimated that the Second Republic sent between twenty and twenty-seven 
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thousand Jews into exile, despite the fact that many of them had fled from the 
Sudetenland in the first place to avoid the Nazi regime.85 The Second Republic stood in 
stark contrast to what Czechoslovakia had tried, however unsuccessfully, to be in the 
interwar period. Whatever the faults of the First Republic, its government at least 
attempted to tolerate minorities and allow some expression of dissenting views, 
particularly from the Sudeten Germans. Because the new regime was so thoroughly 
undemocratic, it was likely viewed as fairly illegitimate in the eyes of the so-called Great 
Powers, who supported Edvard Beneš and his government-in-exile for much of the war. 
Additionally, the expulsion of tens of thousands of Jews mirrored the events taking place 
in Nazi Germany, which was becoming an increasingly obvious threat to the security of 
Europe. 
 For better or worse, the Second Republic did not last very long, as Hitler created 
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in the rump state in March 1939. Slovakia was 
left a nominally independent state, but the puppet government there answered to the 
Nazis, making it little more than a satellite of the Reich. The Protectorate, on the other 
hand, was directly under the control of Hitler and his regime, and suffered the immediate 
consequences of that control. In the creation of the Protectorate, there was no military 
conflict, because Hitler had warned the government that the Czechs could avoid “massive 
destruction” by allowing the Nazi troops to pass into Prague without opposition.86 Thus, 
by 1939, the entirety of the former Czechoslovakia was under the control of the Nazis, 
without a shot being fired. This bloodless transfer of territory and power to the Nazis was 
followed by a reign of terror and six years of bloodshed across Europe. At the time, 
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however, few, if any Europeans had any conception of the chaos that Hitler would wreak 
upon the European landscape. 
 With the conclusion of the Munich Conference in 1938 and the subsequent 
creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia the following year, the Czechs were 
left to languish in Nazi-occupied territory for the remainder of World War II. Not only 
were no shots fired during the acquisition of this large territory, but none of 
Czechoslovakia’s former allies even attempted to come to its defense. France and Great 
Britain feared that they could not yet equal Hitler’s military prowess, and the Munich 
Conference remains one of the most severe missteps in interwar diplomacy.87 The Czechs 
understandably felt abandoned by their allies and resented the relative ease with which 
Hitler took control over the lands they had once held. Their feelings of bitterness about 
the betrayal of Munich and the sense of regret and shame in Great Britain and France 
absolutely contributed to the postwar resolution of the Czech-German tensions that had 
sparked the Munich Conference in the first place. After their experiences before and 
during World War II, it is hard to blame the Czechs for being afraid of leaving the 
Germans where they were in the Sudetenland. Their demands to remove the Sudeten 
German population make sense in this context, even if the actual events of the expulsions 
remain questionable. The memory of Munich also contributed to the Allies’ willingness 
to go along with the expulsion plans, as they likely felt responsible for what had 
happened to the Czechs before and during the war. The legacy of the Nazi occupation, 
which lasted from 1939 to 1945, looms large over postwar agreements and actions, and it 
is therefore the next period that must be addressed, in order to attain a better 
understanding of how the expulsions came about. 
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The Tyranny of the Minority: The Nazi Occupation and World War II 
Life in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
The Czechs were understandably disheartened by the events at Munich and 
distraught over the prospect of living under Nazi rule. With their government destroyed 
in all but name, the Czechs living in the Protectorate were faced with oppression and 
violence at the hands of both the Reich Germans in power and the Germans already 
living in Czechoslovakia, who were given decidedly preferential treatment. Some Czechs 
were willing to resist the Nazi takeover, but “[t]he prospects for armed resistance and 
sabotage were bleak,” due to precautionary seizures of weapons and ammunition by the 
Nazis when they began their occupation of the region. The abandonment by Great Britain 
and France at Munich and the unchallenged establishment of the Protectorate had shown 
the Czechs that they could not rely on help coming from abroad, and the Nazis enforced 
their rule brutally, using the threat of arrest by the Gestapo to keep the Czechs from rising 
up.88 The beginning of the war in 1939 in Poland raised their hopes, but those hopes were 
dimmed by the subsequent fall of Poland. The only positive aspect of the collapse of 
Polish resistance was that the Czechs were reassured that accepting the Munich 
Agreement had at least spared them and their lands the destruction that Poland now 
faced.89 Thus, the Czechs sank into the occupation with few outward expressions of 
resistance.  
 The Germans, too, felt the negative side of Nazi occupation after the initial 
excitement over the annexation wore off. Germans in the Protectorate were at a distinct 
disadvantage in comparison to both the Reich Germans and their Czech neighbors. This 
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was especially true for the men who had led the Germans in Czechoslovakia during the 
First Republic, as they were largely incorporated into Reich Nazi organizations and 
transferred outside the boundaries of the Protectorate.90 Even Sudeten Germans were not 
immune to the discrepancies in the assignments given to Reich and Sudeten Germans. 
Relatively moderate former Sudeten German leaders like Henlein were replaced with 
more radical Nazis, like Karl Frank, or by Reich Germans, who took many of the top 
positions in the Protectorate after the occupation began. Another negative element of the 
occupation was that, while the Nazis were consolidating their power, it was also possible 
for Czechs in certain areas to discriminate against and harass Germans. The Czechs were 
able to come together in their hatred and resentment of their new rulers, while the 
Germans were still divided between “Reich” and “Sudeten” groups.91 Of course, that 
harassment was not tolerated once the Reich had secured Czechoslovakia, but at the 
beginning of the war, some Czechs tried to resist by attacking Germans in their 
neighborhoods. The unification of the German people, which was the ostensible goal of 
the Nazi occupation in the first place, was not apparent at the beginning of the 
occupation. The true unification of the German people never really happened, since 
Sudeten Germans and Germans of the Protectorate were still identified as separate from 
Reich Germans, many of whom had the highest ranking positions in the administration. 
 For the Jews of Czechoslovakia, the Nazi occupation was worst of all. The 
Nuremberg Laws that had started the legal anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany were the 
model of anti-Jewish legislation in the Protectorate, and many Jews began to emigrate 
from the area, since it was clear that they would never be accepted into the regime, and it 
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was becoming increasingly more dangerous for them to remain.92 As Nazi power spread, 
it became even more difficult for Jews to continue living in the Protectorate, especially as 
the ideology of anti-Semitism, racialism, and genocide that drove the Nazi movement 
played an increasingly significant role in the administration of the country. Czech fascists 
played a role in persecuting Jews in the Protectorate, developing a new category of 
Geltungsjuden, who were “people of gentile and Jewish parents, when either the 
offspring was a member of the Jewish community after 1935, or married to a Jew, or 
when he or she were born out of wedlock after 1935.”93 This new category created a 
whole group of people between ethnicities, many of whom were deported after drawing 
the negative attention of the authorities. Ordinary Czechs were also drawn into the 
process of deportation by becoming informants and denouncing their Jewish neighbors.94 
Many Jews had fled the Sudetenland to what became the Protectorate, but they were not 
safe there after occupation began.  
After the invasion of Poland and the beginning of the war in September 1939, 
persecution of the Jewish population escalated, increasing the restrictions on their 
movements and behavior, as well as rounding up their leaders to eliminate any threat of 
resistance.95 The Nazis took steps to eliminate any economic or political power the 
Jewish people still possessed. This process was known as “Aryanization,” and it entailed 
taking away any assets the Jewish population had and using them to enrich Germans.96 
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The worst aspect of the occupation was, of course, the Holocaust, which did not miss 
Czechoslovakia. Prague, which had long been a haven for Jewish intellectuals and artists, 
was hit hard by the Nazi attempts to exterminate Jews from Europe. By the end of the 
war, 77,603 Protectorate Jews, out of the 88,686 counted in the summer of 1941 had been 
shipped off to concentration camps. An estimated 77,297 of those Jews were killed by the 
Nazis.97 After the war was over, it was discovered that just over 400 Jews had survived 
the war by hiding in Prague.98 The systematized and efficient Nazi methods of killing 
millions of people completely destroyed one of the most vibrant prewar Jewish 
communities in Europe. 
 When the Nazis took control of the Protectorate, though, it was not immediately 
clear what they were planning to do, particularly in terms of the Jewish population, but 
also in terms of their strategy for dealing with the Czechs. Many Czechs simply tried to 
wait out the storm of Nazi occupation, while some actively resisted and others willingly 
collaborated. Germans, too, had a variety of responses to the Nazi regime, but it became 
very clear early in the occupation that “the line between necessary accommodation and 
treasonous collaboration” was very thin indeed.99 Throughout the war, that line continued 
to be very blurry, especially as the Nazis consolidated their power and eliminated any 
chance of rebellion among the Czechs. At the very beginning of the occupation, many 
Czechs showed their support for their formerly independent state by wearing national 
colors and participating in celebrations of Czech history. After an incident on November 
15, 1939, however, during a commemorative ceremony to honor a Czech student who 
had been killed at the hands of German police, crowds became too rowdy and overturned 
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Karl Frank’s car. This incident, while a remarkable instance of obvious Czech resistance, 
resulted in the death of nine students and the transport of over one thousand others to 
concentration camps.100 After this demonstration of Czech national unity, the Czech 
intelligentsia was targeted and the Nazis hoped to wipe out any intellectual leaders who 
might unite the Czechs again. 
 This strategy seemed to work, at least for a time, especially after Reich Protector 
Reinhard Heydrich, who had near-total control over all legislative and political matters in 
the Protectorate, arrived in Prague in 1941.101 The two years in between were marked 
with relative peace among the population of the Protectorate, as there was less violence 
against Czechs than there was against other populations, particularly in Poland and 
Yugoslavia. For a time, it did not even seem that the Czechs were extremely concerned 
about what was going on, since they knew “how to ‘deal with’ the Germans,” from their 
long history with the Habsburgs and the Sudeten Germans.102 That is not to say that the 
Czechs were happy with what was going on in their country, but they were not as 
outwardly resistant as Polish or Yugoslavian partisans, and therefore did not suffer as 
much violence as people in Poland and Yugoslavia. The unity they had felt when the 
Nazis first arrived diminished over time, leaving only national feelings that were largely 
passive and localized.103 The Czechs were losing their national unity, largely due to the 
success of the Nazis in minimizing the expression of national feelings in public spaces 
through executions, deportations, and transports to concentration camps like those that 
followed the incident in 1939 discussed above. This success on the part of the Nazis 
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made it easier for them to maintain control over the Czech population, but the end of the 
war revived the common hatred of the Germans and united the nation in that resentment. 
 The period between the beginning of the war and Heydrich’s arrival in Prague 
also saw the beginning of the “Germanization” movement in the Protectorate. Because 
there were not enough Germans in the Reich to populate the vast territories annexed by 
the Nazis, it was determined that some members of Eastern populations would have to be 
turned into Germans. The Nazis intended to “weed out” non-suitable elements from the 
population and transform the others into members of the German nation. This concept of 
“Germanization” seems counterintuitive, given the Nazis’ extreme feelings about Slavs 
and Jews, particularly in terms of mixing with Germans, but the Nazis were left with no 
choice. There was no way to replace all the Czechs with Germans, and the Nazis needed 
Czechs to continue contributing to the economy.104 It was understood that those Czechs 
who were not considered suitable for “Germanization” would be either expelled or 
executed, to prevent their infiltration of the new, “pure” German state. The prospect of 
this program coming to fruition understandably upset many Czechs, who were proud of 
their heritage and history and were not enthusiastic about the idea of giving up their 
identities to benefit their oppressors.105 The Nazis clearly did not have enough time to 
carry out all of their plans, but the idea of assimilation to a different culture was a 
common fear in Czechoslovakia, both before and during the Nazi occupation. 
 When Czechoslovakia was first established, the Sudeten Germans were 
particularly concerned with the prospect of “Czechification,” which would rob them of 
their German heritage. The perception during the First Republic was that the dominance 
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of Czechs in government, as well as the presence of Czechoslovak as the official national 
language, threatened the national identity of the Sudeten Germans. It was this “trend 
towards ‘Czechification’” that the Nazis and their Sudeten German supporters hoped to 
reverse during the occupation.106 The idea was somewhat counterintuitive, since the 
alleged “Czechification” that was such a perceived threat during the First Republic did 
not eliminate the Germans’ identity as Germans. It is therefore strange that the Nazis 
believed that the imposition of their cultural and ideological theories would 
fundamentally change the way Czechs saw themselves. This fear of transformation to 
another nationality or ethnicity may have its roots in the former ease with which people 
were able to decide their own national identity by their actions. For the Nazis, and later 
the Czechs of the Third Republic, personal choice was eliminated from the equation. 
Identity was biological and genealogical, and the government assumed the right to assign 
national identity to individuals, no matter their personal preferences.107 This assignation 
of identity was particularly significant in the Protectorate, because Czechs were seen as 
genetically closer to the ethnic Germans than other Eastern European peoples, including 
the Polish and Russian populations.  
The Czechs were selected for “Germanization” because of this perceived genetic 
connection, although Hitler was concerned that even the Czechs could not be sufficiently 
“Germanized” to benefit the state. His primary concern was with the pollution of the 
German Volk with the “unclean and contaminated” blood of “Germanized” Czechs and 
Poles.108 The contamination of “pure” German blood was a major issue for Hitler 
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throughout his life, particularly in terms of Germans mixing with Jews, but he was not 
enthusiastic about the idea of weakening the German Volk by allowing Slavs to comingle 
with Germans. On the other hand, some Nazis argued that the Czechs were particularly 
acceptable for this process because they were more “civilized” than most Slavic people, 
and they were seen to possess “that magic substance that made Germans special and 
superior.”109 The intermingling of German and Czech cultures over the centuries had 
made them ideal candidates for “Germanization.” Individuals were not going to be given 
the choice to decide whether they wanted to be considered “German” or “Czech,” 
however. That power rested with the state, and the lines between “German” and “Czech” 
were drawn more starkly than could ever be realistic. This state control of even individual 
identity was part of the Nazis’ belief that every action should benefit the state and the 
Volksgemeinschaft in some way, even if the benefit was not immediately obvious to the 
person involved. 
When Heydrich arrived in late September 1941, he intended to contribute to the 
continued dissolution of Czech national unity. He did so by imposing martial law through 
December, during which time around 400 perceived threats to Nazi rule were killed. To 
the Czech workers, however, Heydrich “delivered higher wages and better rations,” using 
workers’ benefits as a carrot to supplement the stick of violence he used on the 
intelligentsia and political activists.110 His skillful use of both threats and tangible 
benefits for the working class helped him maintain his control over the region, but it 
concerned the government-in-exile, which was led by Edvard Beneš. The Czech exiles 
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did not want the Allies to perceive the Czechs as willing collaborators, and they therefore 
had to take drastic action.  
On May 2, 1942, two parachutists sent by the government-in-exile attacked 
Heydrich, who died of his wounds on June 4. This extreme act of resistance led to 
renewed repression and new levels of violence in the Protectorate. The village of Lidice 
was razed on June 10, with all the adult men killed, the women sent to concentration 
camps, and the children shipped off to foster homes.111 The town was targeted, despite 
the fact that it had no real connection to Heydrich or his assassins. When the assassins 
were found, they were all either killed or committed suicide, and there were no further 
major acts of Czech resistance during the war.112 The crackdown that followed 
Heydrich’s assassination both prevented further resistance and provided additional 
ammunition for the government-in-exile to use in achieving its postwar goals. The 
massacre at Lidice was especially significant, because it provided Beneš and his 
comrades with a physical example of Nazi oppression and reinforced their argument that 
the Germans in Czechoslovakia should be held responsible for what happened during the 
occupation.113 After Heydrich’s death, Karl Frank was the undisputed head of the 
Protectorate, if not in name.114 He was a Sudeten German and was also essentially 
responsible for the administration of the Protectorate. He was never given the official title 
of Reich Protector, but he was essentially in control of the Protectorate until the end of 
the war. 
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By the time Heydrich was assassinated, transports had already sent tens of 
thousands of Protectorate Jews to concentration camps. Heydrich played a major role in 
radicalizing Protectorate policy towards the Jewish population, coordinating the first 
transports, which primarily went to Terezín, also known as Theresienstadt.115 The first 
transports of Jews to concentration camps began in October 1941, about a month after 
Heydrich arrived. Terezín was “a fortress town in northwestern Bohemia” that was 
transformed into a concentration camp for Protectorate Jews, as well as some Jews from 
Germany and Austria. Transports to this particular camp began in January 1942, and 
Terezín became Hitler’s “showpiece.” Its position as a “model” camp meant that its 
inhabitants were relatively better off than those in other camps, but one of the 
“privileges” they were granted was the horrific duty of selecting candidates for the 
extermination camps. This “privilege” was likely intended to demoralize the Jewish 
population still further and make them feel responsible for the deaths of their fellow 
Jews. By the end of the war, as mentioned above, more than 75,000 Jews were killed by 
the Nazis; nearly 50,000 of those victims were sent to Terezín.116  
While the human losses of the Holocaust in Czechoslovakia were nowhere near as 
horrific as those in Poland and Russia, where millions of Jews were slaughtered, the loss 
of over three-quarters of the Jewish population was a massive tragedy, which had major 
ramifications for the Czechoslovak Republic that emerged after the war. By June 1943, 
the last transport of Jews left Prague, leaving only around 400 Jews in the entire city.117 
Prague had once been a city where Germans, Czechs, and Jews could coexist, and the 
Jewish intellectuals in the lands of the former Habsburg Empire had always contributed 
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to the cultural life of the Empire and later the First Republic. After the war was over, 
however, the near-extermination of the Jewish population left a huge hole in Czech 
culture and the Jewish presence in the region was never replaced. 
The fear of the Gestapo and Nazi retaliation, particularly after 1942, prevented the 
Czechs from expressing their feelings about the Nazi regime outwardly. The practice of 
using terror’s “optical effect” was a favorite tool of Frank’s, who used publicity about 
executions and arrests to maintain his power. The sight of announcements declaring the 
detention and execution of Czechs, as well as the visual spectacle of arrests being carried 
out in broad daylight, certainly contributed to the atmosphere of fear surrounding 
resistance.118 Resistance was not only a risk for the people choosing to act against the 
regime, but also for their friends, neighbors, and families. If the experience of Lidice 
taught the Czechs anything, it was that resistance of any kind could have unexpected and 
horrific consequences. Thus, any resistance that occurred was extremely secretive and 
small-scale. Most Czechs were unwilling to risk their lives and those of their loved ones 
for the sake of an abstract idea of the nation. Survival was more important than rebellion, 
and the Czechs repressed their feelings of dissent and anger towards the Nazis and 
Sudeten Germans until the end of the war. 
Although the Czechs did not express their resentment of the Nazi regime 
outwardly in any major ways after Heydrich’s assassination, hatred of the Nazis and, by 
extension, the Sudeten Germans, grew during the occupation. The Sudeten Germans were 
held responsible not only for bringing the Nazis into Czechoslovakia in the first place, 
but also for the atrocities committed by the Nazis after they arrived. The presence of men 
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like Karl Frank in high positions in the Nazi regime certainly did not help this perception, 
especially because he was such a radical Sudeten German, rather than a Reich German.119  
The idea of expelling the pro-Nazi Sudeten Germans and eliminating the threat 
posed by their presence emerged early in the war and never went away. The Czechs were 
resentful of Nazi control of their lands and population, and were looking to express those 
resentments when the war finally ended.120 Their equation of Nazi control with German 
control was not entirely unreasonable, because the vast majority of Protectorate positions 
were held by Germans, from either the Reich or the Sudetenland. On the other hand, 
compared, for example, to their Polish counterparts, the Czechs were not suffering all that 
much. There were certainly casualties of the Nazi regime, but the numbers of dead were 
considerably lower than those in surrounding states. Much of this discrepancy came from 
the fact that the Czechs had not resisted German occupation in 1938 or 1939, as the 
Polish people had done when the Germans invaded. The Czechs had therefore saved their 
people and lands from the devastation wreaked upon Poland and the Polish population 
during the invasion. The fact that the Protectorate was not a focus for bombing until 1944 
also contributed to its relatively limited casualties, as well as its economic importance to 
the Reich. Its economic potential prevented too much oppression and violence, as the 
Nazis needed to exploit the resources and factories in the Protectorate to maintain their 
war effort.121 In all, between 36,000 and 55,000 Czechs were executed or died in 
concentration camps during the war.122 While those numbers are certainly representative 
of the suffering caused by the Nazi occupation, they are incredibly low compared to other 
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occupied territories. The line between collaborator and victim continued to be blurry, and 
the Czech government-in-exile spent much of its time in London worrying about how to 
convince the world that the Czechs were, in fact, resisting, rather than simply allowing 
the Nazis to have complete control.123 After the war, it was generally accepted that the 
Czechs had suffered under the Nazis more than they had helped them, and the Czechs 
were therefore not held responsible for the actions of the Nazi regime, but rather, were 
allowed to remove the threat posed by the Sudeten Germans and resume their democracy. 
Before they could return to some semblance of normalcy, however, the Czechs 
had to last through the remainder of the war and await the return of their government-in-
exile, which had been working for the duration of the war to ensure the territorial security 
of a new Czechoslovak Republic after the war, as well as the potential expulsion of the 
ethnic Germans in some form or another. 
 
Edvard Beneš and the Government-in-Exile 
 While the people of Czechoslovakia were languishing under the control of the 
Nazis, the former government of the First Republic was in London for much of the war, 
trying to gain international support and act as a governing body from thousands of miles 
away. The first task of Beneš and the government-in-exile was getting recognition from 
the Allies as a legitimate government. The Czech government that still existed under the 
Nazis made this step slightly more difficult, since Beneš had not been elected, but he was 
still seen as the default leader of the Czechs in exile by both the Czechs and the Allies, 
primarily because of his position as President of the First Republic before Munich. 
Moreover, he successfully obtained recognition as a legitimate political leader by Great 
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Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States by the end of the war.124 After he 
had accomplished this feat, Beneš proceeded to work for the ostensible benefit of the 
Czechs at home, including the restoration of pre-Munich borders for Czechoslovakia. The 
repudiation of Munich also worked to give his regime legitimacy, since he was a link 
between pre-Munich Czechoslovakia and the future postwar Czechoslovakia.125 His work 
in London also included calling the Czechs to rise up against their Nazi oppressors. The 
international perception of the legitimacy of the government-in-exile did not increase its 
influence in the Protectorate, though, because the Czechs felt that rising up would 
essentially be equivalent to “choosing a worthless death over embarrassing 
complacency.”126 This disconnect between the government-in-exile and the Czechs at 
home would be a major stumbling block for the new regime, unless they could counter it 
with something to unify the people. 
 Beneš and his government found a unifying point in the repressed hatred of the 
Nazis and their Sudeten German allies. With public and international support behind him, 
Beneš began to advocate for the expulsion of at least the pro-Nazi Sudeten Germans from 
Czechoslovakia. He spoke to all the Allies, including the Soviet Union, trying to get their 
support for his plan. As mentioned above, the idea of expelling the Germans came about 
early in the war, but until Beneš had the support of the Allies, the idea remained a dream 
to keep the Czechs’ hopes alive during Nazi occupation. Beneš began using the terms 
“German” and “Nazi” interchangeably in his speeches and writing, likely hoping to make 
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the two terms synonymous in the minds of the British, Americans, and Soviets.127 He was 
careful to note, however, that he did not think that all Germans were inherently bad. He 
made it very clear that there was a distinction between the “anti-European and anti-
human” Germans and those who were decidedly “human.” On the other hand, he also 
accused the Germans of possessing an “incredibly strong inclination to pass from the one 
camp to the other as soon as political circumstances make the transition advantageous.” 
This statement seems hyperbolic, but it was just inflammatory enough to appeal to the 
people suffering under the Nazi regime. By mentioning this German “inclination” 
towards evil, he implied that militarism was inherent to “Germanness.” If that concept 
was accepted as true, it made sense to eliminate the threat by removing the population, 
since they were inherently aggressive and dangerous to other national groups.  
Beneš also held the so-called “good” Germans responsible for their government, 
which was, in this case, the Nazis. He claimed that, even if a given government was 
autocratic and totalitarian, the people were still responsible for it if they “tolerate, suffer 
and obey their Government.”128 As time progressed, the concept of “good” Germans was 
eclipsed by Beneš’s plan to remove the entire Sudeten German population by force. In 
order to make his plan work, Beneš used every tool available to him, from the betrayal at 
Munich to the massacre at Lidice.129 By the end of the war, he had convinced not only the 
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Czech people, but also the victorious Allies that the Germans simply could not stay in 
Czechoslovakia if it had any hope of succeeding as an independent state. 
Whether Beneš always had a master plan to expel the Germans is as complicated 
a question as whether Henlein intended to cause the complete dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia. In both cases, it must be assumed that both men were more complex 
than their public personas and actions indicate. Accessing the psyche of a leader is nearly 
impossible, especially more than sixty years after the fact, but in both cases, the leaders in 
question acted in certain ways that indicate their attitudes. Those attitudes manifested 
themselves in the choices these men made, and those choices held massive ramifications 
for the people over whom these leaders wielded their power. Both the Czechs and the 
Sudeten Germans were permanently affected by the actions of these two men and, no 
matter their original intentions, their behavior led to outcomes that caused the suffering of 
millions of innocent civilians. 
 Before he could even consider expelling the German population, however, Beneš 
had to deal with the Czechs at home and supporting the war effort, in order to ensure that 
he and his state would have the support of the Allies in the postwar world. Since the 
Czech population was so loath to cross the vengeful Nazis, particularly Frank, it was 
always going to be difficult to convince them to rise up and fight, but Beneš knew that 
without some kind of gesture of solidarity and courage, the Czechs would have a much 
harder time finding support after the war for their plans to reconsolidate their state. There 
were Czech soldiers fighting on the Allied side of the war, but the lack of resistance at 
home made Beneš’s claims of Czech suffering and dissent difficult to support.130 Beneš 
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was desperate to maintain his position as a symbol of the nation, but he also wanted to 
use that symbolic value to promote Czech action, rather than simply inspire reverence. In 
order to go beyond his role as a symbol and consolidate his power as the undisputed 
leader of the Czech people, he had to convince the Czech people to fight the Nazis, 
without pushing so hard that the Czech public stopped supporting him. He had to balance 
his desire to maintain his popular support and his desire to show the Allies how serious 
the Czechs were about resisting Nazi rule.131 Of course, it was easy for Beneš to call on 
the Czechs at home to resist, because he did not have to live under the iron fist of 
Heydrich or Frank, or deal with the realities that hindered those resistance groups that did 
exist. There were no weapons for them to use, and the people were frightened to join an 
organized group, for fear of being sent to a concentration camp if their participation was 
discovered.132 This fear drove them to focus more on behaving morally and opposing the 
regime in private ways and on an individual level. The threat of arrest, torture, and 
execution was just too great for most Czechs to risk during the occupation, no matter 
what the government-in-exile wanted. 
 Finally, in May 1945, the Nazi regime crumbled as the war came to an end. The 
previous years had been marked with terror and violence, but the Czechs were finally 
ready to express their stored-up resentments when Nazi institutions began to look weak 
and stopped having the same ability to punish them. Furthermore, the “demonization of 
the Germans” by Beneš and his fellows had united the Czechs for the first time since 
early in the occupation, as they could all agree that they wanted the Germans expelled.133 
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By this point, all the Germans were marked for removal, including those who had lived in 
the Sudetenland for centuries. On May 1, an uprising began in Přerov and spread quickly 
through the Protectorate. It reached Prague by May 5. Some SS members kept fighting 
until May 9, when the Red Army arrived in the capital, but many Germans simply gave 
up and surrendered.134 This Rising in Prague was the moment during which the Czech 
desires to expel the Germans began to be realized. The perception that there were “good” 
and “bad” Germans essentially disappeared, which meant that the vast majority of 
Germans were seen as Nazis who needed to be removed from the country. In that light, 
the Germans were treated as worse than criminals, being beaten, burned, raped, and 
tortured by their Czech neighbors. The extreme violence that came out of the Prague 
uprising set the stage for the population transfers to come. The almost immediate 
implementation of a new government seemed likely to stem the violence, but the brutality 
of the Rising in Prague was extended through the so-called “wild transfers” that lasted 
until the Potsdam Conference between the so-called Big Three of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union late in the summer. At Potsdam, the Allies made 
the expulsions legal, although they regulated how they would be carried out. By the end 
of 1946, Beneš had successfully removed nearly three million Sudeten Germans, 
primarily through internationally accepted means, and was firmly in control of the new 
state, at least for the time being. 
 The legacy of the Nazi occupation is one of violence, terror, and hostility, 
exemplified by the brutality of the Holocaust. That legacy manifested itself in the Rising 
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in Prague and the “wild transfers” through the abuse and harassment of Germans in ways 
that mirrored Nazi attacks on Jews during their regime. Like much of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Czechoslovakia was afraid of another attempt by the Germans to take control. 
On the other hand, while the Czechs certainly lived in fear under the Nazis, their country 
was not devastated to the same extent as areas like Poland and Yugoslavia. As mentioned 
above, the primary reasons for the relative peace in Czechoslovakia were that the 
Protectorate was a major economic region for the Nazis and that the Czechs did not 
commit acts of resistance with the same frequency as populations in other countries. The 
Holocaust hit Czechoslovakia as hard as anywhere and wiped out one of the most vibrant 
capitals of Jewish life in Central Europe, leaving behind a society that was missing one of 
its key elements. One of the saddest parts of the history of the Holocaust in 
Czechoslovakia was the dispute over who could “claim” the Jewish victims of the Nazis 
as fellow victims with their national group.135 Neither the Czechs nor the Germans fought 
to protect the Jews of Czechoslovakia from Nazi aggression, but both wanted to include 
the victims of the Holocaust to portray their nation as the worst victims of the Nazis. In 
the end, the legacy of the Nazis is fairly similar to that of the legacy of Nazi rule in most 
Central and Eastern European countries, and it had similar results in most areas: the 
expulsion of ethnic Germans after the war ended. The memory of the war and the events 
which led to the Nazi occupation shaped the Czech narrative of persecution and helped 
them justify their postwar treatment of the Sudeten German population, as well as 
assisting their efforts to gain approval from the Allies for their actions. The establishment 
of the Third Republic of Czechoslovakia worked to make the expulsions efficient and 
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internationally recognized as legitimate, while attempting to unite the Czechs in a truly 
national state for the first time. 
 
The End of the “Age of Minority Rights”136: The Third Czechoslovak Republic 
 Beneš returned to Czechoslovakia after the war as a national hero, bringing with 
him all the promise of a newly democratic state that would be exclusively Czechoslovak. 
The “wild transfers” of the Sudeten Germans began almost immediately, followed by the 
“organized transfers” which were sanctioned by the Potsdam Conference. Of course, the 
administration of the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans was not the only function of the 
Third Republic, but it is the one that is clearly most essential to this study. The lasting 
legacy of the Third Republic, which only existed until a Communist coup in 1948, is that 
of the expulsions and their aftermath. 
 The “wild” and “organized transfers” played a huge role in shaping the postwar 
national identities of the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans. Both periods will be 
discussed in much greater detail in the following chapter, but looking at the Czech 
perspective of these events will provide some much-needed context for the memories of 
the Sudeten Germans recorded and analyzed below. For Beneš and the Czechs he 
represented, the removal of the Sudeten Germans was the first priority of the new state. 
The “wild transfers” began fairly spontaneously, but, while the government made some 
remarks expressing regret for the violence that accompanied this first phase of the 
expulsions, little concrete action was taken to halt the brutality until the Potsdam 
Conference later in the summer.137  
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During the early “wild transfers,” Sudeten Germans were given little to no 
warning that they were to leave Czechoslovakia permanently, and the humiliation and 
abuse they suffered on their journey did not make leaving any easier. The Czechs felt that 
the “disloyal” Germans deserved to be not only expelled, but punished for what they had 
done, but there was no easy way to determine guilt or innocence.138 The ambiguity 
surrounding guilt and innocence played a huge role in the perception of the expulsions as 
either righteous or unnecessarily harsh. The Czechs, who had come to see the Germans as 
collectively guilty for the crimes of the Nazis, saw their actions against the perceived 
enemy as completely justified. The Sudeten Germans were blindsided by the sudden 
wave of violence, primarily because there had been such little resistance during the Nazi 
occupation, and felt that they were victimized unfairly by the Czechs for the actions of 
Nazi leaders. Germans across Europe, and particularly in Germany itself, felt the same 
way, as they did not think it was just to punish an entire people for the behavior of a few 
powerful men. Again, this will all be discussed in much more detail below, but 
examining the situation on the ground is crucial to understanding the way the expulsions 
evolved from spontaneous violence to organized and efficient population movements. 
 President Beneš ruled by decree until a Provisional National Assembly convened 
in October 1945. During the time between German capitulation and the first meeting of 
the National Assembly, Beneš issued decrees that dealt with the Sudeten Germans and 
their subsequent expulsion from the state. In June, he issued the so-called “Great 
Retribution Decree,” which “placed the Germans and Hungarians beyond the law, and 
stripped them of their citizenship and of civil or even basic human rights.”139 Hungarians 
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were seen as willing collaborators with the Germans, and they were therefore punished 
just as harshly as the Germans during this period. The escalation of the rhetoric against 
the Sudeten Germans in official decrees made it easy for Beneš and the Czechoslovak 
government to justify the expulsions, by demonizing the Germans and associating them 
unequivocally with the hated Nazis.140 Even after Beneš’s rule by decree had ended, the 
National Assembly accepted his decrees and made them into law, as well as granting 
amnesty to anyone who had committed crimes between September 1939 and October 
1945, as long as those crimes had been committed for the sake of the state.141 Those 
crimes included any violence towards Sudeten Germans after the end of the war, which 
meant that the National Assembly was essentially sanctioning the excessive brutality of 
the immediate postwar period and excused Czech participation in it as an effort on behalf 
of the state. American and Soviet forces withdrew from Czechoslovakia around this time, 
leaving a government that not only condoned violence against some of its former citizens, 
but also removed them from the protection of the law, in charge of the new state. 
 By the end of 1946, nearly three million Germans had been removed from the 
Sudetenland and other areas of Czechoslovakia. Many of these Germans were expelled 
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under the Potsdam Declaration. The leaders of the Big Three agreed to the orderly 
expulsion of nearly all ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after the war, because they 
were well aware of the brutality involved in the spontaneous expulsions and did not want 
to be overrun with refugees, especially since many of the expellees during the “wild 
transfers” were completely destitute.142 Over twelve million Germans were eventually 
affected by these mass expulsions from Eastern Europe, which means that nearly a 
quarter of the ethnic Germans expelled came from Czechoslovakia.143 Of those three 
million, nearly two thirds were expelled under the regulations of the Potsdam 
Declaration. The Potsdam Declaration was crucial in stopping the violence that had 
marked the summer of 1945, because the Allies had much closer control over conditions. 
The transports were very structured, with only a certain number of people being allowed 
into Germany each week. The expellees were allowed to bring more belongings with 
them, as well as money, and their transportation was to be a higher quality than it had 
been during the “wild transfers.”144 These improvements made the “organized transfers” 
slightly easier for the Sudeten Germans, and the Czechs seemed satisfied with just 
removing the Germans without the same violence that had marked the transports of 1945. 
The end result of removing the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia overshadowed all 
other considerations, and the expulsions themselves were considered to be enough of a 
punishment for the collective crimes of the Sudeten Germans. 
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 The Third Republic fell in 1948 to a Communist coup, but not before the vast 
majority of the Sudeten German population had been removed. Although Edvard Beneš 
was certainly open to cooperation with the Soviet Union when he returned to the 
presidency, he was not explicitly a Communist. Thus, the expulsions took place under an 
ostensibly democratic government, and not an autocratic Soviet regime, as some Sudeten 
Germans, and probably some Czechs, would like to believe. At least 30,000 expellees 
lost their lives, primarily during the “wild transfers,” and millions of people were 
displaced.145 The Czechs remember this moment as the act of retribution the Germans 
deserved for their actions under the Nazis, while the Germans recall it as a traumatic and 
horrific event that came as a complete surprise. The collective guilt placed on the Sudeten 
Germans by the Czechs may have led to the collective memory of the events of 1945 and 
1946, as the individual accounts of the expulsions combined to create a group narrative 
that defines the Sudeten Germans to this day. Their memories, many of which were 
recorded in later years, will be analyzed in the following chapter.  
This historical background of Czech-German relations throughout the centuries, 
and particularly the impact of the recent past on Czech and German attitudes, should 
provide a context for the intense feelings of the people affected by the expulsions. The 
long history of Czech-German coexistence cannot be discounted, but the lens of the 
present should not be used to project more recent tensions and hostilities onto a distant 
past that does not reflect similar themes. There have been moments of tension between 
these groups throughout their history together, but those moments do not necessarily 
point to an inevitable clash, like the one that happened in 1945 and 1946. Instead, the 
events of the past should be used to enhance the more recent history of interaction by 
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showing the common elements and different reactions that mark the relationship between 
Czechs and Germans. The collective memories and accepted histories of past events 
reflect on the interpretations of the expulsions by both sides by informing both Czech and 
German attitudes towards one another. Understanding the historical context for the 
expulsions is crucial to seeing the development of collective memories surrounding the 
events of 1945 and 1946. The following chapter examines individual memories in the 
context of this historical background, and should illuminate further the reasons why 
Czech-German interaction escalated the way it did, as well as the impact the past, both 
distant and recent, had on the German and Czech experience of their present. 
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II. Memory, Identity, and History: The Forced Expulsions,  
1945-1946 
 In order to understand the impact of the expulsions on Central Europe and 
Czechoslovakia, it is essential to remember what happened, but since there are few 
scholars who study the topic and publish about it in English, it can be difficult for English 
speakers to comprehend the effects of the population transfers of 1945 and 1946. 
Fortunately, some of the expellees were able to record their memories and their stories 
provide a unique insight into the events surrounding the expulsions. Many of these 
accounts have been collected into several volumes of documents by editors, and some of 
them have been selected to be translated into English. These accounts are some of the 
remaining primary documents about the “wild” and “organized” transfers, making them 
essential to an understanding of the expulsions. Many of these authors felt, 
unsurprisingly, that they, as Germans and former Czechoslovakian citizens, were unfairly 
punished for crimes most of them did not commit. Unfortunately, individual Czech 
accounts of this period are more difficult to find, so it can be challenging to balance the 
perspectives and see both sides of the event, although the Czechs used the Nazi 
oppression described in the previous chapter as justification for the expulsions. From 
either perspective, memory, either of the Nazi regime or the expulsions themselves, plays 
a large role in the way collective history is formed and altered, and memory lays the 
foundation for the construction of a group identity in a profound way. Furthermore, 
memory is often one of the only ways to capture traumatic events like the expulsions and 
is an invaluable resource to any historian who wishes to analyze the post-war period at a 
deeper level than simple statistics and facts. 
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 In this chapter, the memories of German expellees will provide starting points for 
an analysis of the confusion and trauma of the “wild transfers,” as well as the slightly 
better administered, but still emotionally painful “organized transfers.” In the first part of 
this chapter, which deals with the “wild transfers,” I will be using one account as a 
paradigmatic example, in order to use the patterns that emerge to illuminate the ways 
memory can establish and embellish history. Following that pattern-setting account, 
additional memories of other aspects of the expulsions will complete the picture of the 
experiences of the expellees. In the second half of the chapter, which addresses the 
“organized transfers,” I will use portions of a variety of accounts throughout the entire 
section, in order to show the commonalities between many of the experiences of the 
expellees.  
Because the expulsion accounts are written from the German point of view, the 
Czech perspective will be posed as a counterargument to certain of the allegations made 
by the German transferees. Using these German accounts illuminates the inherently 
subjective nature not only of memory, but also of history in general. The “facts” assumed 
to make up historical accounts of events or periods are often based on the memories of 
people who lived through them. Therefore, whether German or Czech memories or an 
“objective” historian’s account of the expulsions are used, there will always be 
subjectivity present. Acknowledging that inherent subjectivity from the beginning is 
crucial to seeing the way both history and national identity are shaped by the distinct 
collective memories of different groups of people. Full weight will be given to the events 
described and the emotions of those involved, and it should be understood that, however 
subjective these accounts are, they represent the remembered experiences of real people.  
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The transfers of millions of people from Czechoslovakia irreversibly impacted 
their worldview and forced a shift in their collective identity and understanding of 
history. This shift, which can still be observed in this group of Germans today, is the 
most significant part of this entire study. Therefore, the analysis of each period will be 
structured around the accounts of individual expellees and will trace the progression of 
the mentality of the expelled Germans throughout the process of expulsion. Examining 
these accounts closely allows the reader to observe the creation of a unified narrative and 
understand the ways in which memory and history are inextricably linked. 
 
Expulsion from the Heimat: Popular Violence and the “Wild Transfers” of 1945 
The “wild transfers” of 1945 were the first series of semi-organized expulsions of 
Germans from Czechoslovakia, many of which were carried out with significant violence 
and hostility towards the newly-captive German populations. At this point in the 
expulsion process, according to the decrees of the President of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, anti-fascists and Communists were supposed to be protected from the forced 
migration, but they were often targeted along with the rest of the German population, 
despite the fact that they “proved their faithfulness even in times of great difficulty” and 
were persecuted by the Nazis alongside the Czechs.146 Their sacrifices during the war 
were often overlooked in favor of eliminating the Sudeten German population in its 
entirety. The Czech government and people had learned a powerful lesson from the 
Nazis: “raw power and violence won out over fundamentally democratic values of 
negotiation and compromise.”147 Rather than waiting for the international community to 
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approve these massive population transfers, the Czech government and nation acted 
unilaterally to expel the Germans and remove the perceived threat the Germans posed to 
the newly liberated state. This desire was informed by memories of centuries of 
coexistence and shared history with the Sudeten Germans, first under the Habsburg 
Empire and, more recently, under the Nazi regime of terror. While feelings of hostility 
towards the Germans seemed completely justified to the Czechs, the targets of that anger 
(namely, the Germans) were completely shocked by the apparently instantaneous change 
in attitude they saw in the Czechs around them.  
Examining firsthand accounts of the “wild transfers” illuminates the fear and 
uncertainty felt by all Germans expelled in these large and violent expulsions, as well as 
shedding some light on their conditions during the expulsions. In April, 1953, one 
German recorded his memories in the following account: 
It was striking 11 p.m. and my wife and I were just going to bed when we 
heard our name being called from the yard. I went to the open window and 
saw a Czech with some papers in his hand. I went downstairs and he 
handed me one of them. We read the heading and felt as if we had been 
stabbed by a knife, the shock made us quite speechless. It said that at 2 
a.m. on the following day (i.e. in three hours’ time) we had to be at the 
railway station in order to be expelled. Consider our situation: we had 
never heard anything about an expulsion, we had not the slightest feeling 
of guilt, in the opposite, we had hated the Nazi regime from the very 
beginning – and now, suddenly and completely without warning, we were 
to leave our home and all our beautiful and valuable property which we 
had acquired during decades, and were to go into a wholly uncertain 
future. It was a terrible position. Only 24 kilograms of luggage per person 
were allowed to be taken. We were quite unable to do anything; the clock 
struck 12 and 1 and 2 and 3, and we could not regain our composure. 
Suddenly, shortly after 3 a.m., we again heard our name being called from 
the yard. I went downstairs again and was handed another printed form 
which told us that our expulsion at 2 a.m. on 17 June 1945 had been 
rescinded. A heavy load was taken off our mind, we breathed freely again 
and our hopes began to rise.148 
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E. Wollmann, the author of this account of the “wild transfers,” represents 
millions of other Germans whose homes and livelihoods were ripped from them in the 
aftermath of the downfall of the Nazi regime. While the imagery of being “stabbed by a 
knife” with shock is unique to his account, the rapid and unexpected removal of Germans 
from their homes to other areas was all too common. In fact, in the Saaz district, which 
lay slightly farther west than Friedland, one family was apparently given only ten minutes 
during which to gather their belongings and prepare for expulsion.149 Wollmann’s 
description of the suddenness of the order captures the fear and uncertainty that plagued 
the majority of the expellees throughout their journey. They were given no advance 
warning and very little time to grasp the situation and respond to it.  
It is unclear whether the lack of advance warning was an intentional element of 
the transfers on the part of the Czechs, or simply a failure in communication that could 
not be helped in the more rural areas of the country. It is also plausible that the trauma of 
the experience led people to exaggerate the speed and surprise of the evacuation orders. 
Because of the specificity of the timeframe described by Wollmann, however, it seems 
more likely that he is telling the truth about the suddenness of his departure. In Radomír 
Luža’s book about this period, he indicates that the practice of notifying expellees of their 
impending departure only a few hours before the trains left was a common practice, and 
that Czechs may have had some knowledge of what exactly was going on.150 Whether or 
not knowledge of these events indicates complicity is a complicated matter, however, and 
it would be a mistake to assume that all Czechs knew the conditions of the transfers or 
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supported the actions of their government and neighbors. Assuming collective guilt on 
either side of this conflict oversimplifies an incredibly complex situation, and it is 
misleading to paint any ethnic conflict in such black and white terms. 
Whether or not the Czechs intended to use the hurried nature of the expulsion as a 
method to dominate the expellees, Wollmann and his wife were so shocked and scared 
that they could no longer function properly even to gather their belongings. The sudden 
change of fates contributed to their shock, because of the way their “hopes began to rise” 
when they found out that they were not, in fact, going to be forcibly removed from their 
homes. This reaction is certainly understandable under the circumstances. On the other 
hand, it seems a bit naïve of Wollmann and other Germans like him to have allowed 
themselves to “breathe[ ] freely,” since their expulsion was rescinded so abruptly and the 
decision was made apparently arbitrarily and with no warning, just as the initial decision 
had been. In their relief at the positive consequences of this new development, Wollmann 
and his wife allowed themselves to (falsely) hope that the whole situation had been 
resolved in their favor. Rather than simply taking the news at face value, the Germans 
could have partially mediated the emotional trauma of the transfers by preparing 
themselves mentally for the worst case scenario of expulsion. Instead of being prepared 
for retribution, numerous accounts of the Rising in Prague and the “wild transfers” 
express profound disbelief on the part of the expellees at the hostility exhibited by Czechs 
towards their German neighbors, as well as hope that it was not really happening, as that 
was too painful a possibility for the Germans in question to bear.  
Their genuine disbelief translated into a combination of practical and emotional 
reactions for many of the impacted Germans. For instance, Wollmann mentions the 
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restrictions placed on luggage, which is common to many accounts of this period, 
although the specific limits varied.151 During the so-called “organized transfers,” the 
Allied powers mandated a higher limit for luggage than the Czechs had originally 
allocated for each person affected by the “wild transfers,” and that change is reflected in 
accounts of the two periods. The limits also varied across the country, since the “wild 
transfers” were not officially regulated, although thirty kilograms of luggage seems to 
have been the norm. These harsh restrictions on luggage limits were only one aspect of 
the expulsions, which also provided an arena for Czechs to release their anger towards 
the Germans through physical and verbal abuse. The government, however, “took little 
direct action to halt the violence,” and left Czech soldiers and citizens to take out their 
anger on the alleged perpetrators of Nazi atrocities.152 President Beneš made a speech 
about the inhumane treatment of the Germans in June 1945, but speeches alone were not 
enough to stop the violence.153 The Czech government clearly understood that the will of 
the people involved the expulsion of the Germans, and therefore, any actions that were 
taken to prevent that result were half-hearted at best. 
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The “wild transfers” continued until the Potsdam Conference, which took place in 
the summer of 1945, and which is discussed in the previous chapter. At this conference, 
Harry S. Truman, Josef Stalin, and Winston Churchill (and later Clement Attlee), also 
known as the Big Three, debated solutions to the problems and crises in regions formerly 
occupied by the Nazis, including Czechoslovakia. The powers occupying Germany at the 
time were aware of the “wild transfers,” and were anxious to stop them, partly out of 
concern for the human rights violations (and the subsequent public reaction to those 
violations) and partly because of the demands being placed on their resources by the tens 
of thousands of refugees crossing the border every day.154 Their political and, to some 
degree, humanitarian, concerns led to the “organized transfers,” which were primarily 
supervised by the governments of Czechoslovakia, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union, and which had regulations that limited the number of expellees and monitored the 
conditions in which they lived during the transfers. The luggage limits during these 
transfers were more lenient, allowing fifty kilograms of luggage per person, to ensure that 
“the emigrants should have at least the most necessary articles for their life in 
Germany.”155  
The Allies were concerned with making conditions more humane during the 
transfers, but one also wonders if their desire for the refugees to bring more belongings 
with them also stemmed from their own interests. The Americans and Soviets could not 
have been thrilled at the prospect of supplying millions of people with the goods and food 
they would need to survive in their new homes. Regardless of their intentions, however, 
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the increased luggage allotments and the regulations on treatment of the expellees 
certainly improved the conditions of those who were subjected to the transfers. The 
“organized transfers,” with their more rigorously defined (and more uniformly enforced) 
restrictions, were less traumatic for those involved, at least in comparison to the “wild 
transfer” experiences of Wollmann and others like him, but still provoked strong feelings 
in the Germans and Czechs involved. For the Czechs, the regulation of the transfers by 
the Big Three likely stung a bit, because the Czechs felt that the Great Powers had 
betrayed them with the prewar Munich Agreement, which had allowed the occupation to 
happen in the first place.156 In the context of the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia in the name 
of appeasing Hitler, as well as the subsequent six years of Nazi occupation, it seems 
likely and somewhat understandable that the Czechs felt entitled to act as they saw fit 
once the war ended. On the other hand, removing the Germans became the primary 
Czech goal after the war, and since the regulations mandated by the Allies allowed the 
transfers to continue, the Czechs acquiesced and largely adhered to the Potsdam 
Agreement in 1946. The “organized transfers” and their consequences will be discussed 
in much greater detail in the following section. 
Returning to the account of a “wild transfer” recorded above, it is interesting to 
note that Wollmann also emphasizes the feeling of loss when he and his wife were forced 
to abandon their “beautiful and valuable property” that had taken them many years to 
cultivate and maintain. A number of Germans who recalled their experiences echo this 
sadness and nostalgia for the home country, especially in contrast with the “uncertain 
future” that loomed so frighteningly before the expellees. Many expellees faced continual 
movement and instability after crossing the border, and counted themselves lucky if they 
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were granted permission to stay in one location for a few months.157 The refugees may 
not have known the specifics about their future conditions, but in spite of (or perhaps 
because of) the lack of concrete details about where they were going and what it would 
be like, it was clear that they were reluctant to leave their homes and personal belongings. 
For example, F.P. and his family, farmers in the small town of Heinrichschlag, had 
owned their home for centuries and were understandably loath to abandon it.158 This 
abandonment of their homes often seemed to be the first truly traumatic aspect of the 
experience for many expellees, which was only compounded by further abuses at the 
hands of the Czechs and the level of destitution in which they lived during the transition 
into Germany. Even for those without a long family history in a given town or region, the 
loss of their homes was an extremely upsetting experience, since the Sudeten Germans 
were immensely attached to their homeland and were distressed to consider leaving it. 
The nostalgia of many Germans for their homeland after the expulsions is 
exemplified by the commonly-used term Heimat, which literally means “homeland,” or 
“native country.” The word is better understood, though, as a concept which embraces the 
local variation between hometowns and villages, particularly in rural areas, connecting 
them to a German identity, by showing the “local place and the region as the cradle of 
German nationhood.”159 The concept of Heimat was appropriated by the Nazis into their 
ideology of the pan-German nation, which included all areas with a German population, 
no matter how small. They emphasized the “race, blood, and soil” aspects of the term, 
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using Heimat as a justification for their expansion into areas with relatively small 
German minorities, as well as a way to bring distant localities under the umbrella of the 
German nation. This change in emphasis led to the addition of racial and cultural unity 
(and homogeneity) to the conception of Heimat and German nationhood. Additionally, 
once the Nazi regime fell, the idea of Heimat changed again, to refer to the “authentic 
German ways of life” that best epitomized the German feeling of national pride, “without 
associating it with nationalism” in the Nazi sense of the word.160 The abstract term, while 
it may not have been a major topic of concern to the Germans like Wollmann whose lives 
were being so irreversibly disrupted by the expulsions, encompassed not only the current 
and future state of the German nation, but also its heroic past.  
The memories included in the accounts of both the “wild” and “organized” 
transfers were undoubtedly influenced by the idea that experience “belongs to the people 
and their ability to remember it,” which was central to Heimat ideology.161 The history of 
the people came to be understood as a profoundly personal concept, involving the 
experience of events and an emotional attachment to a certain locality or region. Because 
many of the expelled Germans were from farming communities, their attachment to their 
land was profoundly important to their understanding of the events of 1945 and 1946. 
The emphasis on the locality of the community was essential to their understanding of 
their identity as Germans, certainly, but also to their understanding of their connection to 
history and the world at large. Additionally, the Czechs told the expellees that Germany 
was to become their “new homeland,” even though, for the Germans involved, the very 
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idea of a “new homeland” was an oxymoron.162 Because they identified so intimately and 
so specifically with the concept of their communities and homes, Germans in the post-
war period were able to disassociate themselves from the uglier parts of their recent 
history, including the Nazi regime.163 This disassociation gave them the ability to deny 
any involvement in the horrific atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis, both in Germany and 
in Czechoslovakia.  
Several Germans who recorded their memories, including Wollmann, whose own 
account was written nearly ten years after the events took place, emphasized their own 
sympathy with the Czechs and their antipathy towards Nazi rule.164 This focus on 
personal innocence, which played a large role in post-war West German culture, may 
well have been informed by Heimat ideology, as well as a real lack of understanding of 
the consequences of Nazi actions for Czechs during the occupation. While the oppression 
in Czechoslovakia was, relative to other occupied areas like Poland, not extremely 
severe, repression of Czech identity and language to elevate “Germanness” to a higher 
level of culture definitely created and exacerbated tensions between the German and 
Czech populations. The Nazi plan to “Germanize” Czechoslovakia involved the “national 
mutation” of “suitable” Czechs and the murder or exile of the rest of the population, and 
this plan was one of the main perceived threats to Czech culture that drove the expulsion 
of the Germans after the war.165 Of course, the Nazis did not achieve their goals of 
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“Germanization,” because they were defeated before they could carry out all of their 
plans, but the “brutal and unjustified severity” of the Nazi regime towards the populations 
of their occupied territories was more than enough to provoke anti-German feelings 
among the Czech people.166 During the occupation, it was both difficult and dangerous 
for Czechs to express their resentment of German dominance, but as soon as Nazi 
institutions began to crumble, that resentment became abundantly clear. Wollmann’s 
assertion that he and his wife “had hated the Nazi regime from the very beginning” may 
well have been accurate, but part of the difficulty in identifying and punishing the guilty 
parties lay in the fact that it was often nearly impossible to tell the difference between a 
Nazi supporter and an anti-fascist.  
Further complicating the situation was the fact that, in various government 
decrees written about the consequences for former Nazis and their supporters, the people 
in question were described alternately as “Germans” and “Nazis.”167 Adalbert Ehm, a 
skilled worker from Komotau, makes the distinction between those who joined the 
National Socialist Party before the occupation in 1938 from the Nazis who had held 
power for the past six years, emphasizing the loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic that 
those early Party members allegedly had.168 This difference was lost on the Czechs, who 
                                                                                                                                                 
but, while the expulsions were undoubtedly violent, the extermination of the Sudeten Germans and the 
destruction of their culture were not the motivations behind the transfers. Rather, the Czechs simply wanted 
to remove the Germans from their country to prevent them from threatening Czech national culture again. 
166
 Luža, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, 207. 
167
 Schieder, “Kaschau Programme,” 183-189; “Decree of the President of the Republic of June 1945, 
concerning the punishment of Nazi criminals, traitors and their accomplices and the Extraordinary People’s 
Courts,” 200-207; “Expulsion Notices from the year 1945,” 308-311, all in Documents on the Expulsion. In 
the Kaschau Programme, anti-Nazis and anti-Fascists were called “Germans,” but so too were former 
Nazis, blurring the line between the innocent and the guilty. In the Presidential decree, Nazis are 
specifically targeted, but by the time the expulsions began, the expellees were back to being called simply 
“Germans” once more. 
168
 Schieder, No. 90, Documents on the Expulsion, 469-472. This idea of the difference between early 
German National Socialists and the more extreme Nazis that came to the forefront after the occupation 
 82 
 
were suspicious of anyone who had ever expressed loyalty to the National Socialist Party 
in any of its incarnations. Since most Germans had been at least apathetic, if not 
outwardly supportive, toward the Nazi regime, it was extremely difficult to separate the 
anti-fascists from the Nazi supporters, so the Czechs eventually gave up, preferring to 
expel any possible threat, without distinction. Amphibians like those discussed in the 
previous chapter only added to the confusion about who could be considered a “German” 
or a “Czech,” because of their fluid sense of their own national and ethnic identity.169 To 
the Czech government, the Wollmanns, whether they actually disliked Nazi rule or not, 
represented a threat to national security, and had to be evacuated to eliminate the 
problem.  
Before the evacuation, however, the Wollmanns and their fellow Germans had to 
be notified of the second reversal in their fates, this time making the expulsion a reality. 
As mentioned in the above quote, Wollmann and his wife were apparently saved from 
expulsion at the last moment, which made them understandably hopeful that they would 
be allowed to stay in their home. Wollmann goes on to explain the confusion and 
emotions surrounding the second order of expulsion. 
This hope, however, was only to last for a few hours. It turned out that the 
first communication had stated that we were to be expelled in agreement 
with the Russian occupation authorities, and the Russians had objected to 
this. At their command the expulsion order had to be revoked. But, as I 
said, our hope was short-lived. On the same day, at 3 p.m., we were told to 
be at 6 p.m. at the station for irrevocable expulsion. A protest to the 
Russian occupation authorities was unsuccessful. This expulsion was the 
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first and, I believe, the most terrible one. It affected apparently some 800 
persons.170 
 
 One can only imagine the horror experienced by the Wollmanns, who had spent 
twelve hours hoping that the expulsions would be stopped for good, before discovering 
that they were indeed going to be “irrevocably” expelled. Wollmann and his wife were 
initially lucky in that the Soviet authorities had refused to allow them to be expelled, but, 
for reasons unbeknownst to the reader (and possibly to Wollmann himself), the order was 
reinstituted and executed in the same day. The fact that Wollmann even considered 
protesting to the Russian authorities also indicates the power they exerted as soon as they 
entered Czechoslovakia. That power would later be used to overthrow the administration 
of Edvard Beneš, but at this point, the Soviets represented a last hope for salvation from 
Czech violence, as well as an unknown and uncertain future.  
Aside from the Soviet intervention, however, Wollmann’s experience of his hopes 
being dashed by the harsh reality of the expulsions was common to several accounts of 
the expulsions.171 For instance, F.P., a farmer from Heinrichschlag, had heard rumors that 
the Germans were going to be forced to leave, but “no one believed it.” Furthermore, the 
“Czech mayor” of the town (whose presence could indicate an ethnically-mixed 
community) told the Germans that those rumors were untrue. This assurance that they 
would be allowed to stay only added to the Germans’ anguish at being forced out of their 
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homes, as it intensified their shock at their predicament.172 E.H., a civil engineer from 
Teplitz-Schönau, also experienced the pain of rumors that gave the expellees false hope 
about their fates, as rumors began to spread that the people who were removed from 
various towns were taken to camps and would later be able to return. He claims that those 
rumors were started deliberately, although who would have started them is unclear. He 
also asserts that the expellees were isolated from the other Germans, so that no one could 
know the truth about the expulsions or the underlying falsehood behind the rumor about 
refugees being allowed to return home.173 Whether the transferee’s hopes came from 
actual changes in the situation, such as Wollmann, or from rumors and hearsay, as in the 
cases of F.P. and E.H., the expellees certainly wished to be saved from their plight, and 
any source of hope in the midst of the chaos was welcome. Unfortunately, most of those 
sources of hope gave the expellees a false sense of the lasting reality of the situation and 
may have only served to increase the feelings of disbelief and shock among the expelled 
population. After the surprise of the initial order of expulsion, the possibility that the 
whole situation could be reversed was obviously appealing to the desperate expellees. 
More interesting than even the rumors and reversals swirling around the orders of 
expulsion is the way Wollmann frames his experience. He claims that “This expulsion 
was the first and, I believe, the most terrible one.” Whether or not this assertion is true, he 
establishes his experience as not only terrible for him, but the “most terrible” of all the 
expulsions. There are certainly other accounts that would seem to conflict with this 
assertion, but looking solely at Wollmann’s words from his perspective, of course he 
thinks his experiences were the “most terrible” of all. It would be surprising to find a 
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refugee from this or any other conflict who did not find his or her own personal story to 
be more harrowing and traumatic than any other. Wollmann also had the benefit of nearly 
ten years to gain perspective on his experiences before recording them, which may have 
influenced his decision to call his own expulsion the “most terrible one,” due to whatever 
personal suffering he faced after he crossed into Germany. 
The tendency to focus on one’s own experiences is understandable, but it also 
speaks to the profound way that memory influences not only personal history, but 
collective history. Personal memories of an event are inherently subjective, as they filter 
apparently objective facts through a lens of individual beliefs and opinions. Collective 
memory, on the other hand, as well as collective history, collects many of these unique 
experiences and perspectives to construct the event in the minds of a group. The 
individuals involved may have all endured the same traumas and survived the same 
ordeals, but no two accounts will ever be exactly identical. The fundamental shape of the 
event will be altered by each unique version of what appears to be the same story. In the 
case of the Sudeten Germans, who had many differing accounts of the expulsions, their 
ethnic identity continues to be inextricably linked to their collective recollection of these 
events. Their ability to draw on personal, familial, and group memories of this traumatic 
event provides them with a foundation on which to build a sense of community. Since the 
Sudeten Germans now have no concrete link to their homeland, those collective 
memories are one of the main ways the group is able to maintain its unity.  
The expulsions themselves were extremely distressing for the Germans, who 
found themselves encamped in atrocious conditions, before being forced over the border 
into Germany, Austria, and Poland. Many forced marches took place, with hundreds and 
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even thousands of primarily women and children being pushed to the border, escorted by 
armed soldiers and police, with many deaths along the way. In Wollmann’s case, he and 
his wife left their home for the “uncertain future,” without most of their belongings, but 
their trials, at least as remembered by Wollmann, were only just beginning when they 
reached the gathering point at the train station. 
In the station hall, all persons to be expelled and all their possessions were 
subjected to a strict search. This consisted in indiscriminately confiscating 
all cash, all documents, all watches, knives, razors, i.e. everything that 
could be utilized. All new or fairly new articles of clothing and shoes were 
taken away; whoever was dressed in anything that seemed new, had to 
take it off and put on old things which, if necessary were taken from other 
persons. Anyone resisting or objecting to this treatment, even if very 
shyly, was abused in the most vulgar fashion and beaten. Everybody was 
bodily searched, even female persons had to submit to the young lads. In 
the real and literal sense of the word, we left the room as beggars.174 
 
 These searches of personal belongings are the subject of near-universal 
complaints among all German expellees, including those who went through the 
“organized transfers,” as Czech guards pocketed their valuables and basic goods.175 
Because these Germans had been forced to leave the majority of their belongings at home 
to begin with, the fact that the Czechs would take what they had left seemed especially 
cruel. This looting was particularly an issue during the “wild transfers,” because there 
were no regulations on how much luggage the refugees were required to have in order to 
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cross the border, and the looting of German suitcases left them “as beggars.” The effects 
were especially acute when they were pushed over the border into a strange land that had 
few resources to support them while they attempted to restart their lives. The confiscation 
of money and documents was particularly significant, because it stripped the Germans of 
their means to replace their goods, as well as their tools of identification. For a people 
that had prided itself on its connection to its land and community, this was an extremely 
difficult reality to accept. They had also undoubtedly been influenced by the message of 
German superiority that had infiltrated their identities during the Nazi regime and felt 
entitled to their money and possessions. Instead of remaining in their homes and enjoying 
the fruits of their labors, the expellees now not only had to leave their homeland for a 
strange new country, but they had to reinvent their lives without the resources to do so. 
For the Czechs, however, it was simply a matter of taking from the Germans what they 
felt was owed to them for the trials of the previous six years of occupation. 
 The idea of taking “old things which, if necessary were taken from other 
persons,” is a particular aspect of Wollmann’s account that does not often appear in other 
recollections of the expulsions. Sometimes luggage was redistributed during the 
“organized transfers” to obtain the correct luggage weight per person to get a transport 
across the border, but Wollmann is uniquely focused on the quality of the goods he and 
his wife were allowed to keep. Others mention, of course, the theft of their belongings 
from their bags, but few, if any, refer to the replacement of their things with those of 
other expellees. This interchangeability of goods illustrates the lack of Czech respect for 
German feelings and emotions about the sudden upheaval in all spheres of their lives. 
The Germans had been taken from their homes in wild disarray, leaving behind 
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everything they knew, and faced with near-constant brutality during their journey to a 
new land. Far from being concerned with the Germans’ comfort, however, the Czechs 
seemed focused on taking what they could from the Germans and getting them out as 
quickly as possible, regardless of their health or other physical conditions. Of course, the 
instability in the author’s life did not make him particularly interested in portraying the 
Czechs in a sympathetic light, but even a Czech record of this period indicates that 
conditions for the expellees during this period were “excessively harsh.”176 From all 
accounts, German life was decidedly difficult in this period, and the people interned and 
expelled were generally left with little or nothing that they could use to support 
themselves. 
 The handling of people “resisting or objecting to this treatment” was especially 
offensive to the sensibilities of the Germans from both the Sudetenland in western 
Czechoslovakia and the eastern “linguistic islands,” although the Czechs often modeled 
their abuses on the rumored and observed actions of Nazis during the occupation. 
Because of their oppression under the Nazis, many Czechs expressed their hostility 
towards the Germans through their rough treatment of the internees and expellees. In 
order to keep the expellees under control, the guards and administrators often used 
violence and fear to enforce obedience. Men, women, and children were often beaten to 
enforce the subordination of the Germans to the Czechs after the Nazis fell from power. 
Even though such brutal treatment seems counterintuitive, especially after six years of 
similar brutality from the Nazis, the Czechs felt a certain desire to exact their revenge on 
their perceived oppressors. To some degree, perhaps this desire for retribution was 
justified. The fact that the Czechs used violence to achieve political aims, however, in 
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order to expel the Germans without international support, calls into question their whole 
approach to the situation.  
The leaders of Czechoslovakia were certainly concerned with eliminating the 
German threat to the Republic, but the fact that they were willing to tolerate human rights 
violations and outright violence against their former citizens casted doubt on their 
commitment to diplomacy and democracy. Rather than coming down against the “wild 
transfers,” the government actually gave amnesty to people who brutalized and robbed 
Germans, undermining Czechoslovakia’s credibility as a democratic, “Western” 
nation.177 While the troops and police on the ground, who were dealing directly with the 
Germans and deciding how brutally to treat them, may not have been extremely 
concerned with the international repercussions of the forced migration of millions of 
civilians, it seems odd that the government would so fully ignore those consequences too. 
Of course, the post-expulsion years were full of reasoning and rationalization, because 
once the immediate, emotional activity of the transfers was over, the rest of the world 
started questioning Czech actions and the Czechs had to answer for their behavior 
towards the Sudeten Germans, particularly during the “wild transfers.”178 All the 
explanations in the world cannot change the reality of the situation, however, and the fact 
remains that both the Czechs and the Germans have had to face their recent pasts to truly 
make progress as nations. 
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 After searches of their persons and possessions were completed, the German 
expellees found that the challenges were not yet over. Rather, they faced a difficult 
journey into Germany, where there were few resources to support them and their 
families. 
Then we were loaded into wagons. It was after midnight when our train of 
cattle trucks left, plastered with slogans ‘Heil Hitler’ and ‘Home into the 
Reich.’ The train stopped between the frontiers in the open fields, in the 
pitch darkness we had to get out accompanied by sneering laughter. Poles 
and Russians were in wait for us and if anyone had salvaged anything, it 
was taken now. Shots rang out and the night was filled with screams. Only 
a few found some shelter, most had to camp in the open. Nobody knew 
where to go the next day at the start of an uncertain future. We had arrived 
on German soil in the area of Görlitz and spent the first few months there 
– just as long as the only available food for expellees lasted, i.e. potatoes 
in stacks in the fields whose owners had not yet returned. Bread was 
unobtainable. The whole district was crowded with refugees from the east 
and the Sudetenland; it was said that they numbered up to 100,000. It was 
not surprising that we all lost our strength rapidly and that the death rate 
was very high.179 
 
 Cattle and coal wagons, like those described by Wollmann, were the most 
common means of transportation for the expellees, especially during the “wild” period, 
when there were no regulations on the necessity of heat, food, or protection from the 
elements like those established during the “organized” period.180 Often, these cattle cars 
or carts exposed their passengers to the rain and cold with little concern for their 
safety.181 Because many of the people traveling in these train cars and carts were children 
and the elderly, this exposure was particularly difficult to bear and certainly contributed 
to the death toll during this period. The people who were able to ride in the train wagons, 
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however, were relatively lucky, compared to those Germans who were forced to march 
for miles to the border, with many of the old, sick, and injured dying along the way.182 
These marches, which will be discussed further below, were often called “death 
marches,” because of the huge numbers of people who died on the journey. Even more 
than the expulsions by train, marches on foot showed the desire of the Czechs to expel 
the Germans through any means available, because they were willing to push even the 
elderly and sick to the border with whips and guns and leave them essentially helpless on 
the other side, rather than wait for trains and carts to become available. In either case, the 
Czechs were not particularly concerned with German comfort or wellbeing, as they were 
working to eliminate a perceived threat to their newly-formed state as quickly as possible. 
These harsh conditions only contributed further to the sense of disbelief felt by the 
Germans, as well as their feelings of injustice about their treatment at the hands of the 
Czechs. To the Germans, most of whom did not feel any sense of responsibility for the 
crimes of the Nazis, this harsh treatment was not only extreme and humiliating, but also 
entirely unjustified.  
 Adding to the humiliation was the barrage of insults thrown at the expellees as 
they endured their journey, which commonly either identified them as Nazis or simply 
treated them as animals like dogs and pigs. Women were singled out as “whores” and 
“sluts” by the guards, degrading and dehumanizing them still further as they progressed 
towards the border.183 The attacks that focused on the alleged Nazi loyalties of the 
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expellees clearly stuck with Wollmann, as he obviously felt uncomfortable with the 
labels of “Heil Hitler” that decorated the train carrying him into Germany. As he did at 
the beginning of his account, Wollmann defends himself against the allegations of 
Nazism by mentioning the Czech assumptions of collective guilt on the part of the 
Germans. It is not clear whether or not Wollmann was aware of the audience that would 
later read his account, but that may have influenced his portrayal of his own beliefs and 
actions before and during the expulsions. Regardless, he makes a concerted effort to 
represent himself as an anti-fascist at every possible opportunity, including at this point in 
his story, which is also one of the most significant, as it shows the expellees’ final break 
with the homeland.  
Interestingly, Wollmann’s is one of the only accounts that mention abuse that 
goes beyond simple verbal attacks, to include descriptions of physical markings on the 
sides of the cattle cars that labeled the Germans as Nazis to everyone who could see them 
on their journey. Another account, from O.F., a teacher in the Saaz district, does tell of a 
search for portraits of Hitler among the expellees and Czech threats of violence if any 
were found.184 The meaning behind this behavior could simply show the thorough 
identification of Germans with Nazis in the minds of the Czechs and their belief that all 
Germans were Nazis. On the other hand, the presence of even a few pictures of Hitler 
would seem to indicate a certain affinity for the Nazi cause among at least some of the 
expellees. O.F. unfortunately does not record the conclusion of this search, so it is 
impossible to know if any pictures were found. If there was no risk of finding any such 
pictures among the expellees’ belongings, however, threats of retribution would not have 
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been so significant that O.F. felt the need to record it over five years after her journey to 
Germany ended. 
  The end of that journey was the final trauma for the expellees, as they were 
unceremoniously abandoned, often in the countryside, with few to no belongings and 
nowhere to go. Wollmann’s account of the final theft of the expellees’ belongings is 
heart-wrenching, as it leaves the reader with a sense of the absolute destitution of the 
Germans who experienced these expulsions. Just when the expellees in his transport 
thought that they had made it safely through the searches and lootings of the Czech 
guards, they found themselves at the mercy of armed Polish and Russian soldiers, who 
were only too happy to relieve them of their few remaining belongings. The threat of 
violence still hung over the proceedings, as the bedraggled expellees were once again 
scared into submission by unsympathetic forces.  
 Even more upsetting for the expellees was the lack of shelter and opportunities to 
rebuild their lives, because they were entirely unprepared to be homeless, with little 
money and few personal belongings left to their names, if they had anything left at all. 
Wollmann does not go into great detail here about the conditions, but the fact that the 
expelled Germans were forced to resort to stealing crops from farmers’ fields clearly 
shows the quality of their lives. Without any other sources of food and few options about 
where to go, the expelled were forced to scrape by with dwindling supplies in an 
overcrowded area. It seems that Wollmann and his fellow townspeople were among a 
large number of other expellees from various areas of Czechoslovakia and Eastern 
Europe, and his estimation of 100,000 may actually be fairly accurate. He does admit that 
this number was based on hearsay, but it serves the purpose of showing the toll the 
 94 
 
expulsions took on the receiving areas in Germany, as well as the misery of the expellees 
themselves. The fact that 450,000 Sudeten Germans were loaded into trains and sent to 
Germany before July 1945 also backs up his statement.185 Wollmann, who was expelled 
in June, may well have been among 100,000 refugees concentrated in eastern Germany as 
thousands more expellees crossed the border every day. Although there have now been 
studies to determine exactly how many people were affected by the “wild transfers,” 
rumors about the expulsions among the expellees, including estimations of how many 
people were being transferred, played a major role in both shaping German 
understandings of their situation and giving them false hope that their fates might be 
reversed so that they could return home. 
 The hope of the expellees that they might be able to go back to their homeland 
was certainly fueled by the devastation they found in Germany, which had little capacity 
to accommodate the vast numbers of transferees pouring across the border every day. An 
extreme lack of supervision and coordination led to the overcrowding of certain areas and 
the high death rate Wollmann mentions. Loss of strength and increased rates of illness 
among expellees is not uncommon in the accounts of the transfers, as many people 
suffered from serious illnesses and lice due to poor hygienic facilities and abysmal living 
conditions.186 Furthermore, because of the limited availability of food, it was difficult for 
expellees to recover from their physical ordeals. They had to find a way to survive and 
many of them did so by trekking further into the interior of Germany, either alone or with 
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their family members, in an attempt to escape the crush of people that greatly reduced the 
availability of housing, employment, and supplies.  
 Wollmann’s account establishes the basic frame of the “wild transfers,” but his 
story does not address several other significant aspects of the transfers, including physical 
and sexual violence, the forced marches across the border, and suicide attempts by 
desperate expellees. Certain of these elements of the expulsions are understandably left 
out of Wollmann’s account, because of his perspective and individual experiences. For 
instance, as a man, he would have been less likely to experience sexual violence, and he 
does not report his wife as being a target of such attacks. He and his wife were also 
transported in trains, rather than forced to march, and he does not mention any suicide 
attempts, either by himself, his wife, or anyone traveling with them. These aspects of the 
expulsions left lasting impressions on those people who did experience them, however, so 
they are worth examining, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the impact these 
events had on the expellees. 
 The first element that must be considered is the targeting of women for sexual and 
physical abuse by both Czechs and the Soviet occupying forces both before and during 
the expulsion process. Part of the explanation behind their behavior may have been the 
fact that many young German men had left their families behind to fight in the war, 
which meant that the Germans left in the villages and cities of Czechoslovakia were 
generally the most vulnerable members of society: women, children, and the elderly. This 
vulnerability undoubtedly made the expulsions easier, since those groups of people were 
probably less likely to resist the harsh treatment than younger men, but it also made it 
easier to exploit the expellees and abuse them along their journey. That exploitation could 
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take the form of physical violence, often coming from mobs and specifically from other 
women, or involve rapes and sexual abuse, against which women had little to no 
protection. 
 The physical violence experienced by women in the earliest stages of the 
expulsions was often inflicted by mobs, which usually included Czech women. The 
violent men and women in these crowds do not seem to have belonged to any official 
governmental organization or been members of the military or police. These were just 
ordinary people who were unleashing their resentment and hostility towards the Germans 
by brutally attacking German women. For instance, A.L., a member of the Women’s 
Signal Corps in Prague, recounts her story as an interned German during the initial 
uprising in Prague in the spring of 1945. She describes the labor she and other “women 
without children” were forced to carry out amidst large crowds of hostile Czechs. She 
reports being beaten, having her teeth knocked out and her hair shorn off with scissors in 
the middle of the street while she and other women were working to clear barricades and 
debris from the streets of Prague. The violence did not entirely come from women, either, 
as she writes of the men and boys who kicked and beat the forced laborers, causing some 
of them to attempt to escape into the river.187 It seems that the women working to clear 
the streets of Prague, as A.L. did, were in particular danger, as Kurt Schmidt, a civil 
engineer from Brünn, reported similar violence against the women interned in his area. 
Schmidt also mentions women’s hair being cut off, but he makes it even more difficult to 
stomach the image of women being beaten and harassed when he reports that “old age 
was no protection.” Even the elderly women in these groups of laborers were not safe 
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from the vengeance of the Czech mobs.188 Any woman who was sent out to work in the 
streets could become a target for humiliation, as in the cases of women’s hair being cut 
off, or dangerous physical attacks, as in the situations where mobs formed and began 
beating and abusing these women. 
 On one hand, these stories are horrifying and represent the very real threat posed 
by the Czechs to the Germans’ very lives. On the other hand, these attacks took place 
almost immediately after the fall of the Nazi regime, when Czech national and anti-
German sentiments were at their height. Not only had the Czechs suffered through six 
years of occupation, but they were suddenly given a chance to express their frustration 
and anger before order was fully restored. The interesting part of these attacks, however, 
is not the fact that they happened, since violence against the Germans was an almost 
inevitable consequence of the power vacuum left by the Nazis, but rather that they seem 
to have been relatively focused on women, particularly unmarried women without 
families. Men were certainly victims of brutality at the hands of Czechs during the 
expulsions, but this mob violence, at least from the sources available, appears to have 
been an almost exclusively female experience. The lack of a male presence in many 
areas, due to the participation of many Sudeten German men in the Nazi war effort, may 
have contributed to the overwhelmingly female experience of beatings in the streets. The 
two stories above coincide neatly enough to assume that these cases may not have been 
anomalies. Violence against women, particularly of a sexual nature, was even more 
common than these examples would indicate, and were mentioned by numerous expellees 
as a serious concern during the expulsions. 
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 One of the most universal events in reports of the expulsions is the rape and abuse 
of girls and young women at the hands of the Czechs and Soviet forces. Numerous 
expellees, both male and female, report the widespread fear and horrific reality of sexual 
assault that were fundamental elements of the expulsion process for many women. Kurt 
Schmidt, who reported one of the above cases of physical violence against women, writes 
the following about the situation in the camp where he was interned: 
The women were completely at the mercy of the Russians and Czechs, 
everybody came and selected what suited him, and when the children cried 
about their mothers, they were brutally silenced. If any man had tried to 
protect his wife, he would have risked to be killed. The Russians, and the 
Czechs as well, often did not even trouble to take the women away – 
amongst the children and in view of all the inmates of the camp, they 
behaved like animals. During the nights one could hear the moaning and 
whimpering of these poor women.189 
 
 Schmidt describes a sort of marketplace, where Soviets and Czechs could exploit 
their captives as they pleased, which was not an uncommon practice among the guards 
and soldiers who surrounded the internment camps and accompanied the expellees on 
their journey. This indiscriminate abuse of their coercive power led to a genuine fear of 
the soldiers and guards among the expellees, and that fear was obviously not misplaced. 
Fear of the Soviets was particularly strong, as they were strangers and were seen as an 
unstoppable force against whom “no woman was safe.”190 The Czechs were not 
blameless either, though, as the report of Hermine Mückusch makes clear when she tells 
of a “makeshift slave market” where the Czechs could select girls as young as fifteen 
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years old.191 In other cases, the Czechs were merely complicit in Soviet abuses by failing 
to prevent the sexual assault by the soldiers.192 According to Schmidt, these soldiers 
“behaved like animals,” without consideration of their victims or their families and 
without any fear of retribution. Thus, the threat of rape surrounded the female expellees 
and their families and added to the trauma and stress of the expulsion process as a whole. 
The overwhelming fear of the Soviet soldiers made it nearly impossible for women or 
their families to resist this treatment or escape the “selection.” Schmidt does not go into 
details about how exactly the Soviets “brutally silenced” the children, but one can 
imagine that the threat of death hovered over everyone in the camp, regardless of age.  
 The rape of “enemy” women is not a modern phenomenon, as it has been a 
despicable aspect of war for centuries. In the case of these expulsions, however, it seems 
especially cruel, as the women selected as victims of Soviet and Czech abuse were 
among the most vulnerable possible targets. They had just been forced out of their homes 
and taken to camps or pushed towards the border, and on top of the physical violence and 
threat of death that hung over them, they also had to be constantly aware of the fact that 
they could be the next victims of sexual violence. The near-universality of the claims of 
rape by the Soviet and Czech forces would seem to indicate that it was a very serious and 
very real problem for the already overwhelmed and exhausted expellees. Even for the 
men who were present and wanted to protect their wives and daughters, it was almost 
impossible to do so, since they faced death if they resisted. The whole experience added 
to the  humiliation and emasculation of the German expellees, turning an already painful 
experience into an overwhelmingly traumatic one. 
                                                 
191
 Schieder, No. 71, Documents on the Expulsion, 453-462. 
192
 Schieder, No. 87, Documents on the Expulsion, 467-469. 
 100 
 
 During the Nazi occupation of Central Europe, rape of “enemy” women and 
coercive sexual relationships with women from occupied territories were not uncommon. 
In fact, German soldiers may have had a wide variety of sexual contacts with women 
from occupied areas, including “violent rape; contact with sexual slaves, voluntary 
brothel workers, and prostitutes on the street; and ‘prostitutional relationships’: stable 
arrangements in which the man supplied the woman with food or protection.”193 It should 
come as no surprise that soldiers, after being away from home for weeks or months at a 
time, felt the need to satisfy their sexual desires. On the other hand, the variety of forms 
of relationships between Germans and women in occupied Europe shows the way 
sexuality was used both against women and as a tool for their benefit. Rape may have 
served as a method of controlling the population through violence and humiliation. In 
fact, the German army expected that “occupied populations could be compelled to 
provide sex just as they supplied food and labor.”194 Sexual exploitation was therefore 
part of the Nazi ideology of the inherent inferiority of other peoples, and the soldiers of 
the German army were not only expected to engage in sexual liaisons with women in 
occupied territories, but to use those women as they saw fit.  
The “prostitutional relationships” some women undertook to survive during the 
occupation were little more than coerced relationships created on the basis of the 
exchange of goods or protection by the soldier for services provided by the woman. It 
could be argued that these relationships were better, somehow, than the explicit rape of 
women, but the fact that the soldiers held all the power meant that the sexual aspect of the 
relationship could never be fully consensual. Even in the cases where women used their 
                                                 
193
 Elizabeth Heineman, “Gender, Sexuality, and Coming to Terms with the Nazi past.” Central European 
History, 38, no. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 48. 
194
 Heineman, “Gender, Sexuality, and Coming to Terms,” 48. 
 101 
 
sexual contacts with German soldiers to gain material advantages and protection from 
further violence, rape was a fairly common practice during the occupation, so it is not 
very surprising that such actions would continue in the postwar period. Similar 
“prostitutional relationships” arose between German women and the Soviet soldiers who 
violated them, as German women attempted to cope with and overcome the violence they 
faced during the chaos of the postwar period.195 The existence of these relationships 
during World War II makes it easier to understand why the Soviet soldiers behaved this 
way after the war, since the structure of these kinds of coercive relationships was already 
established.  
 When women began to come forward after the war with claims of rape at the 
hands of the Red Army, the fear that Germans would be entirely perceived as victims, 
instead of remembering the Nazi past, came to the forefront. The danger of collective 
memory is that it allows majority opinions about an event to overpower individual 
memories. In this way, it can distort the public understanding of an event or period, 
potentially obscuring elements of the past that the majority wishes to forget. This 
distortion was the reason for the fear of turning German women into victims, because 
there was a sense that the collective German memory would focus on the population 
transfers and rapes, rather than the lasting consequences of Nazi rule. The resistance of 
the Germans to accept Soviet rule compounded that fear, since accounts of German 
victimhood, like those recording the “wild transfers,” could overshadow the most horrific 
events of the Nazi regime in favor of showing the horrors of Soviet life.196 The Western 
powers, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, were likely somewhat 
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expecting Soviet soldiers to rape women, because of their own prejudices against Stalin 
and the Soviet Union. There were, of course, a huge number of rapes during the 
immediate postwar period, during which the “wild transfers” also took place. In fact, it is 
possible that “one out of every three of about one and a half million women in Berlin at 
the end of the war were raped,” including the “notorious week of ‘mass rapes,’ from 
April 24 to May 5, 1945,” when the Soviets finally took over Berlin.197 It is hard to 
pinpoint exactly how many women suffered at the hands of the Soviets, because of the 
nature of the crime and its widespread nature. There is some data, but many women were 
ashamed of what happened to them or were not in a position to report the crime because 
of the unstable and violent environment surrounding them or their location in rural areas. 
For the women who were forced to migrate during the “wild transfers,” that instability 
was even greater, due to their lack of resources or protection provided by the Czech and 
Soviet forces accompanying them. 
 The fact that Nazi propaganda had long portrayed the “Red Army ‘horde’” as 
“bestial” and “animalistic” made the German people even more willing to accept their 
role as victims of Soviet violence.198 The mass rapes only reinforced the reputation of the 
Soviets as uncivilized, violent animals. In fact, German women expected the Soviet 
Army to rape and pillage as they advanced, largely due to the Nazi efforts to portray the 
Soviets as the “Red Beast” that was marching westward.199 This expectation that the 
Soviets would behave like beasts created fear among the women in both Germany itself 
and the eastern territories, and made the actual rapes that occurred easier to rationalize 
and fit into an existing sense among Germans that they were purely victims of cruelty at 
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the hands of the occupying army, rather than former supporters or beneficiaries of a 
different brand of violence in the form of Nazism. As Schmidt’s account above shows, 
the behavior of the Soviets, particularly in terms of their willingness to rape women in the 
middle of a camp full of prisoners, did little to change the image of the Soviet soldier as a 
bestial predator. The pain experienced by the women who were raped was very real, but 
the incorporation of their suffering into the existing Nazi ideology about the Soviets 
made the recording of the crimes appear more subjective than even the general accounts 
of the transfers. 
 If the expellees survived the physical and sexual abuse of the Czech and Soviet 
guards, they were often faced with the unimaginable ordeal of marching on foot to the 
border, where they would be forced out of their homeland once and for all. Some 
Germans were fortunate enough to be transported by train or car to the border, but many 
were herded towards Germany, Austria, or Poland in long columns, carrying all the 
possessions they still had. They were urged forward by the constant threat of violence 
and death that hung over them on their journey. The Czechs and Soviets also used the 
expellee’s desire to return home against them, telling them that they would be able to 
return after the expulsions were over. This mental and emotional abuse, on top of the 
other trials and difficulties the expellees faced, only increased their suffering and 
traumatized the expellees still further. Many of the so-called “death marches” took days 
and even weeks to complete, and hunger, disease, and abuse caused the deaths of many 
Germans along the way. The fact that the Germans who were marching were often 
women, children, and the elderly increased the casualties, as they were more vulnerable 
to sickness and violence.  
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 One of the most heart-wrenching stories comes from Hermine Mückusch, who 
also recorded incidents sexual violence perpetrated by the Soviets and Czechs on the 
journey. She describes this scene after several days of marching: 
It was a terrible sight which our transport now presented. The young 
mothers with their children sat on the side of the road, dirty and partly 
without shoes, thirsty and emaciated. The older children, red in their faces 
from fever and heat, lay in the grass, asking for something to drink, which 
we were unable to give them as the Czech had made no arrangements 
whatsoever to look after these transports. It seemed that they had 
deliberately omitted to supply food or drink so that people should 
perish.200 
 
 Mückusch describes, in graphic detail, the horrible conditions in which the 
Germans were forced to survive during these marches. The expellees, who were 
marching in the June heat, were left with little or nothing to eat or drink. Looking at the 
situation from the expellees’ perspective, it is understandable that they would see the lack 
of rations as an intentional act of neglect by the Czechs. It is possible that, in their hurry 
to evacuate the Germans, the Czechs simply overlooked the logistics of moving 
thousands of people safely, but if that were the case, the Czech government should have 
put a stop to the expulsions as soon as it could. Instead, the expulsions continued for 
months, resulting in further deaths and illnesses that made the transition of the expelled 
Sudeten Germans into German society that much harder. The fact that there were children 
sitting by the side of the road, “thirsty and emaciated,” as well as “red in their faces from 
fever and heat,” with no way for their parents to rectify the situation, shows how little 
concern the Czechs had for the people on these journeys. The Czechs and Soviets who 
were running the expulsions gave the expellees a “few crumbs of bread” at most every 
day, even though they were walking extremely long distances in the summer heat, with 
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many children and elderly people among their numbers.201 A few crumbs of bread were 
better than nothing, but many marches were carried out with fewer provisions than that. 
Some expellees had “no food at all,” and nothing even to give the pregnant women in 
their parties, who needed nutrients and water more than anyone.202 Indeed, the absence of 
food and water made the experience of the forced marches even more harrowing, since 
the expellees were unable to feed themselves or their children, as well as being stripped 
of their belongings and forced into unknown lands. 
 The lack of food and water given to the expellees only exacerbated their suffering 
as they were hurried towards the borders with violence and physical abuse. If anyone was 
unable to continue marching, they were harassed, beaten, and sometimes killed. 
Mückusch writes of the “shots and the cracking of whips” that chased the expellees along 
their journey, and other expellees recorded similar experiences, with guns and whips used 
by the guards as motivation for the marching columns.203 Even when they were faced 
with exhaustion, the expellees had no choice but to continue, since any slowing or 
stopping would be met with violence and death at the hands of the Czechs and Soviets. 
The sick were not spared from the brutality, as they were expected to keep up with the 
march, regardless of their health. Adalbert Ehm writes of those who could not keep up, 
who were beaten until they started moving again, or were shot when they still could not 
move quickly enough. He also describes the experience of being forced to run up a 
mountain at gunpoint, and tells of the horror of watching men die in front of him.204 
Stories such as these exemplify the terror and pain caused by the Czechs as they hurried 
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the Germans towards the borders, more concerned with the end result of total expulsion 
than the methods they used to achieve that goal. 
 Arriving in Germany, Austria, or Poland was not the end of the ordeal for the 
Germans, however, as many of them were obliged to continue their marches as they 
looked for work, food, and a place to stay. Because so many of the expellees included 
children and the elderly, it was often difficult for their families to find a suitable place to 
settle. The huge numbers of expellees pouring into the border regions only made things 
worse. Many of these refugees were “contaminated with lice, racked by fever, covered 
with boils,” and with nowhere to turn, but they had to find a way to survive.205 The 
illnesses and hunger of the expulsions did not disappear at the border, since the expellees 
were entering war-torn countries with few belongings and even fewer prospects of a 
stable life. Forced by circumstance to wander their strange new countries, some were able 
to find work and a relatively secure home, but others were reduced to begging and living 
off scraps.206 For all of the expellees, the experience was traumatic and life-changing, but 
for those who had to march across the border on their own two feet, followed closely by 
Czechs and Soviets with guns and sharp whips, it was a particularly painful trial. 
 For some Germans, the experience of the expulsions was too traumatic to bear, 
and many of them never even made it as far as the border. The combination of hostility, 
verbal and physical abuse, and the uncertainty of the future resulted in a large number of 
suicides among expellees. Those Germans who could not handle the terrible reality of the 
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“wild transfers” were desperate to escape the violence and fear that surrounded them as 
they were forced out of their homes. Many expellees witnessed suicides or heard the 
rumors swirling around as people disappeared and died around them. Even before the 
expulsions began, many Germans committed suicide upon getting the news that they 
would have to leave. Women and girls living in fear of sexual assault were particularly 
likely to commit suicide, in their desperation to escape the threat of rape and humiliation 
at the hands of the Soviets.207 Once the expulsions began, suicide was, for some 
Germans, the only method of coping with the shocking news that they were no longer 
welcome in their homeland. These Germans included an old woman who was so 
surprised she “was trembling all over and shaking her head, she could not comprehend 
what was happening.” This 80-year-old woman “preferred to leave this world by cutting 
her wrists,” rather than leaving her home in Czechoslovakia.208 In this case, the woman 
was unable to deal with the news that all the Germans were being pushed out, and 
resorted to suicide as a last resort to stay in Czechoslovakia. This is only one specific 
case, but this nameless old woman represents many other Germans who found 
themselves in similar situations. For these Germans, facing the prospect of an unknown 
future was more terrifying than death itself, because at least if they took their own lives, it 
was their choice. After examining the real conditions of the expulsions of the Germans, 
the decision of these Germans to take their own lives, while terrible, is not entirely 
surprising. Rather than face limited provisions, sexual violence, and verbal and physical 
abuse, these Germans took the only way they could to stay in their homeland and avoid 
the suffering experienced by their friends, families, and neighbors. 
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 Even though all of these elements, from the initial surprise of the announcements 
to the physical and emotional toll the expulsions took on the expellees, created an 
experience that traumatized and irreversibly altered the three million Germans involved, 
some of the expellees were able to see the positive side of their predicament. O.F., a 
teacher from the Saaz district, was able to see past the illness and hunger that met her on 
the other side of the border, even though she was “destitute” and starving. Despite all the 
trials and suffering she faced on her journey and after she crossed the border, O.F. closes 
her account on a brighter note. She focuses on the fact that she could finally live “in 
freedom,” instead of in fear.209 Her ability to maintain a positive attitude even in the face 
of extreme adversity shows the beginning of the transition into German society that took 
place after the expulsions were over. Of course, O.F. did not record her experiences until 
1951, so she may have felt a bit more positive after six years had passed and her life had 
become at least slightly more stable. The passage of time may have helped O.F.’s attitude 
towards her expulsion, but even at the time, she may have been relieved to be away from 
the threatening guards and fear of violence that constantly surrounded the expellees on 
their journey.  
 The memory of the expulsions, particularly this early period of “wild transfers” 
produced a foundation upon which the collective memory of the Sudeten Germans was 
constructed. Because this moment in history was so significant in the lives of so many 
individuals, it stands to reason that it would be crucial to the group identity of Sudeten 
Germans as a whole. Nearly every Sudeten German either experienced the expulsions or 
has relatives who did, and it is that shared experience that unites them to this day. Ethnic 
identity is, of course, more complex than simply going through a terrible event together, 
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but there are few forces that could have brought the Sudeten Germans together as a 
nation of ethnic Germans more forcefully. The shadow of the expulsions still lingers over 
Sudeten German identity and the collective memory of this period is crucial to 
understanding how the Sudeten Germans relate to one another and to other groups, 
including the Czechs and their fellow Germans living in present-day Germany. 
 After everything they went through, the German expellees had to adjust to life in 
Germany, Austria, or Poland, and live with the fact that they could not return to their 
homes. The “wild transfers” were only the beginning, however, and the majority of the 
ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia were not evacuated until the following year. The 
Potsdam Conference and the Allied Powers of Great Britain, the United States, and the 
Soviet Union were instrumental in halting the “wild transfers” and monitoring the 
“organized transfers,” which were more regulated than the expulsions of 1945, but were 
still not ideal for the expellees. These transfers were not quite as traumatic or violent as 
their “wild” counterparts, but for the Germans who were expelled, they were still life-
changing and irreversibly painful. Those Germans recorded their experiences in much the 
same way as the Germans transferred in 1945, and their accounts provide unique 
perspectives from which to examine the “organized transfers.” 
 
“The first thirst was quenched”210: The “Organized Transfers” of 1946 
 While the “wild transfers” occurred months before their “organized” counterparts, 
they represented such a significant event in the lives of Sudeten Germans that rumors 
about the “wild” period spread among all Germans. Because of the suddenness of the 
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initial expulsions, as well as the extreme brutality experienced by the expellees, stories 
and reports about the “wild transfers” spread quickly, which prompted some of the 
Germans who were expelled in 1946 to comment on the similarities and differences 
between the two periods. The reports of the “organized transfers,” even when they do not 
explicitly mention the “wild transfers,” invite comparisons between the two periods based 
on the attitudes of the Czechs involved, the desire of the Germans to leave 
Czechoslovakia, the pain of leaving home, the quality of life during the relocations, and 
the influence of rumors and the media on the experience of the German expellees. 
Overall, the German experience was improved from the “wild” period, but many 
expellees still had complaints about their treatment at the hands of their Czech and Allied 
guards. Moreover, although the Germans were significantly more eager to leave 
Czechoslovakia after nearly a year of living under Czech control, their pain is palpable 
when they describe leaving their homeland for the last time and seeing it pass by through 
the windows of a train. 
 The bittersweet quality of the “organized transfers,” as compared to the almost 
entirely negative feelings of the expellees during the “wild transfers,” helped the German 
expellees consider both the negative and positive aspects of the expulsions. For those 
who had family members involved in the “wild transfers,” the impression of the Czechs 
is overwhelmingly negative, although some expellees saw a change in the Czech attitude 
from the “wild” period to the “organized transfers. For instance, N.R., a businessman 
from Brünn, writes of his wife’s experience when their entire village was marched to the 
Austrian border and brutalized along the way. He even goes so far as to say that “This 
inhuman act will be a permanent disgrace for the Czech nation,” because of the treatment 
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of the expellees on their march.211 Others did not feel quite so strongly, but because of 
N.R.’s personal connection to the expellees, he was particularly appalled by the cruelty 
and violence of the Czechs. Dr. August Kurt Lassman, on the other hand, emphasizes the 
change over time that resulted in the increasingly humane treatment of the Germans 
during the “organized transfers.” He reports that the “general brutality of the year 1945” 
had largely disappeared, except in “isolated incidents” during 1946.212 Those “isolated 
incidents,” one of which will be discussed later in this chapter, had the potential to be 
extremely violent, but the limited scope of such incidents made them less significant in 
the narrative of the “organized transfers.” It is in Lassman’s account that the phrase in the 
title of this chapter is found, as he focused on the positive improvements from the 1945 
transfers, although he later goes on to comment on the difficulties the expellees still faced 
during their journey. 
 Those difficulties largely came from the continued negative attitude aimed 
towards the expellees by the Czechs with whom they interacted until they crossed the 
border. Sometimes, this interaction was restricted to discrimination and specific 
regulations against the Germans, emphasizing the need to remove the Germans as quickly 
as possible, or spreading rumors among the Germans to cause them additional mental and 
emotional suffering during their journey.  
In the first case, some expellees, who were provided with few or no provisions for 
their journey, found themselves unable to enter businesses to buy food with the little 
money they were able to keep. According to the same Dr. Lassman who focused on the 
positive changes in the Czech attitude in terms of violence, many businesses in his 
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hometown began to carry signs that forbade entrance to the very shops that would 
provide them with the food and supplies they needed to survive on their four-day train 
ride. Of course, this treatment is reminiscent of Nazi treatment of Jews and other ethnic 
groups during the 1930s and 1940s. Fortunately for Lassman and his family, though, he 
was able to appeal to a shopkeeper he had known before the war, who provided him with 
the provisions about which he writes, “We lived off of the things he gave us for the entire 
trip.”213 Lassman’s account is more optimistic than many of the accounts because of the 
assistance he received from the sympathetic shop owner, but his experiences are still 
relevant, since they contrast so distinctly with those of the transferees during the “wild 
transfers,” as well as with the experiences of many of his fellow Germans during the 
“organized transfers.”214 Many of Lassman’s fellow expellees were not so lucky and were 
forced to rely on the Czechs for their provisions, which were certainly better than the 
nonexistent food and care during the “wild transfers,” but were still extremely lacking, 
considering the length and difficult nature of the journey. 
 Lassman’s account of struggling with discrimination based on perceived flaws in 
his ethnicity mirrors the anti-Semitism that was so prevalent in Nazi Germany. One 
author suggests that the anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic policies of the Nazis were born out 
of the sense that non-Germans were an “undesired, yet necessary presence,” which made 
Germans in authority nervous about controlling such apparently foreign elements.215 It 
could be argued that the Czechs felt a similar sort of emotion towards the German 
population within their borders. The Sudeten Germans, as well as their fellow Germans in 
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so-called “linguistic islands” elsewhere in Czechoslovakia, made up such a large 
percentage of the population that the expulsions caused significant political and economic 
shifts within Czechoslovakia. Their presence had become much more undesired than 
necessary, and they were therefore expelled as quickly as possible. 
There are also similarities between Czech behavior during this period and Nazi 
policies of “cultural discrimination.” Even before the Nazis and the Nuremberg Laws, 
there was a long history of anti-Semitic and anti-Polish policies that excluded the Jewish 
and Polish populations of Germany from participating fully in the culture of their 
country.216 Similarly, by forbidding Germans from entering shops in their hometowns in 
Czechoslovakia, the Czechs were sending a message that the Germans were unwelcome, 
and would not be able to assimilate into the newly formed republic. Nazi policies were 
obviously focused much more intensely on the idea of racial supremacy than the orders 
and decrees that allowed for the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans, which came out of 
fear of German political and cultural power. There are still certain aspects of the 
expulsions that echo the anti-Semitic and anti-Polish policies enacted in Germany, 
however. The similarities between prewar Nazi policies and postwar Czech policies could 
be explained by the expansion of the Nazis into Czechoslovakia and the subsequent 
spread of their ideas and methods, as well as the intensely negative feelings generated by 
those ideas and methods during the Nazi occupation.  
 The negative Czech attitude towards the expellees can be seen even more clearly 
in an account that comes from Dr. Karl Grimm, a doctor working in a deportation camp 
near Brüx. He recalled a specific Czech who was credited with saying that “the only good 
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German is the evacuated German.”217 For this unnamed Czech, as well as others who 
likely felt similarly, the Germans represented a malicious force within the boundaries of 
Czechoslovakia, and it was therefore necessary to remove them from the country.218 Of 
course, the Germans were not as reluctant to leave by the time the “organized transfers” 
began, so the violent coercion of the “wild transfers” was largely unnecessary. Grimm 
also described the attitudes of the Germans as they approached their deportation. 
They had nothing more to lose, everything had gone anyhow and they 
could only hope to gain. No matter what their life held in store for them, it 
could not be worse than what they had experienced here. They had 
suffered too much for the simple fact that they were Germans, therefore 
they wanted to hold on to this last possession, they did not want to become 
Czechs and Communists, they wanted to be Germans and be free. Just as a 
patient after a serious operation, wakes up from his narcosis and shows 
first signs of life, these people, after all their terrible experiences and 
psychological depression, showed the first signs of life and of re-
awakened self-confidence, of pleasure that their lives had been spared and 
of hope in a new future.219 
 
 According to Grimm, the Germans had been so beaten down by the Czechs during 
the period between the end of the war and the beginning of the “organized transfers” that 
they could not wait to leave their suffering behind to start their new lives in Germany. As 
the accounts of the “wild transfers” and the following accounts of the “organized 
transfers” illustrate, the German plight in the postwar period was severe. Violence, 
threats, and death loomed over their everyday lives, forcing them to find hope wherever 
possible, even if it meant leaving their homeland and starting new lives in a new country. 
The Czechs certainly felt justified in expelling the Germans, as did numerous other 
nations in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Third Reich, but it is hard not 
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to sympathize with a people who were removed from their homelands and harassed on 
the journey, simply because of their identification as Germans. It is interesting in this 
account, however, to see how the attitude of the German people changed, since during the 
“wild transfers,” so many people pointed out their allegiance to the Czech nation. Here, at 
least in Grimm’s memory, the Germans are willing to accept their expulsion, since they 
no longer wish to join the Czechoslovak state or the Communist party. After their 
treatment at the hands of both the Czechs and the Soviets, it is easy to see why they 
would be so eager to leave both behind and begin anew in Germany. 
 Several accounts describe the “escape” from Czechoslovakia, and, although 
Grimm’s description of the German people as a “patient after a serious operation,” 
showing their “first signs of life” at the end of their ordeal is unique, it seems that the 
Germans were generally less reluctant to leave the Heimat behind after observing what 
their lives would be like if they stayed. Many accounts discuss the desire to take off the 
armbands the Germans were forced to wear as identification.220 The armbands 
represented their submission to the Czech government and people, and when they were 
allowed to take them off after crossing the border, the overwhelming feelings among 
many of the expellees were relief and hopefulness. Removing those armbands 
represented the freedom of the expellees, as they were no longer going to be singled out 
and excluded from the cultural life of their communities. The “hope in a new future” that 
Grimm mentions is echoed in other accounts, including that of Professor Josef Freising, 
who describes the ability of the expellees to block out their living conditions and 
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treatment by focusing on their desire to be free. Freising writes that “We only focused on 
our yearning for freedom. We all wanted to be free men,” even though the Germans in his 
group, many of whom were sick, were living in extreme squalor.221 By the time the 
Germans were expelled in the “organized transfers,” it had become abundantly clear to 
them that they were no longer welcome in the new Czechoslovak Republic, which likely 
prompted their change of heart. They did not know what to expect in Germany, but, as 
Grimm points out, they believed that nothing they faced in their new lives could be as 
bad as what they had suffered in Czechoslovakia for the past months. At least one 
expellee noticed this change of heart and, rather than claiming that the Germans had 
found hope in their new situation, asserted that they had, instead, found their current 
situation too hopeless to maintain.222  
Unlike the expellees in the “wild transfers,” these Germans knew that the 
deportations were coming, so they were better prepared for the trauma of transfer than 
previous groups. Many of the accounts that describe feelings of hope and joy about 
leaving are either undated or from the 1950s, when the world was shifting towards a Cold 
War sensibility and feelings about Eastern Europe were becoming progressively more 
negative. Professor Freising’s account was recorded in 1947, which could explain his 
emphasis on the camp environment and emotions among the encamped expellees. He was 
so close to the events during that part of the expulsion that he was uniquely able to focus 
on the specific details of encampment and the expulsion itself, rather than bringing the 
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experiences of later years into his memories of the transfer. For the others, the passage of 
time and the escalation of Cold War tensions may have colored their reflections at least 
slightly. 
 There was still, of course, a significant sense of loss when the Germans left their 
homes, because, no matter how bad things were under the Czechs, these Germans felt 
that their homeland was the Sudetenland and they still lamented leaving. Even though 
many felt a sense of hope that things could only get better, and began to show the “first 
signs of life” that Grimm pointed out, the loss of the Heimat still stung. For a people who 
had been bombarded for years with images and propaganda extolling the importance of a 
connection to a given area and culture, losing one’s home was a tremendous blow. For 
some, the experience of leaving one’s home behind, “disappearing in the twilight” as the 
train pulled out, was one of the most memorable and difficult aspects of the expulsion.223 
The memory of the “sadness in [their] hearts” at the moment of departure was extremely 
significant, as it weighed on them during their journey into Germany.224 These expellees 
often saw their hometowns and homeland for the last time while they were fading away 
as the trains sped towards the German border. For those people who felt connected to 
their homes and farms in a very real way, such an informal and permanent departure was 
inevitably extremely difficult. Even if the authors of the reports did not specifically 
mention the emotions they felt upon leaving Czechoslovakia for the last time, the bitter 
sweetness of the expulsions lingers over every account of this period. In all cases, while 
the Germans were glad to have a chance to escape the oppression they felt under the new 
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Czech regime, they were still understandably upset to be forced to leave their homes in 
order to find some peace. 
 The Czechs played on this sadness in order to counteract the feelings of “self-
confidence” and “hope” that Grimm noticed among the expellees. Since the Czechs were 
expelling the Germans in order to eliminate the perceived threat they posed to the 
Czechoslovak state, they, justifiably or not, wanted the Germans to feel badly about what 
had happened during the war and even worse that they were being expelled from their 
homeland. Grimm describes the reaction of the Czechs to the widespread relief among 
the expellees that their suffering was coming to an end. 
It annoyed the Czechs that the Germans did not leave with a heavy heart 
and that they made no attempt to conceal this. They therefore began to 
paint a black picture of Germany, saying that the country had been 
destroyed and will not recover for the next hundred years, that starvation 
ruled there and that the Germans in the Reich would not welcome the 
Sudeten Germans.225 
 
 Because the expulsions were meant to be forced and fairly unpleasant, even 
during the “organized period,” the fact that many Germans did not have a “heavy heart” 
as they left must have been distressing to the Czechs responsible for their removal. If the 
expulsions did not force the Germans to face what had happened under the Nazis and 
understand the collective guilt that was laid upon them, it is likely that the Czechs felt 
slighted. After all, they had suffered under the Nazis and certainly felt heavy-hearted 
about the repression of their national culture and language during the occupation, as well 
as the violence and brutality with which the Nazis ruled. It is certainly possible that they 
wanted the Germans to feel the same way as they were pushed across the borders. In fact, 
it would be more surprising if they had not reacted in this way, since their frustration was 
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expressed so violently during the “wild transfers.” It seems unlikely that all of that 
frustration had dissipated after only a few months, so the idea that the Czechs 
accompanying the expellees would spread rumors about the horrors in Germany is not 
difficult to believe. 
On the other hand, Grimm recorded his memories in 1950, several years after the 
expulsions ended. He was also in a unique position as a doctor in an expulsion camp, 
which exposed him to more Germans and Czechs than the average expellee. The 
combined effect of the passage of time and his continuous interaction with various groups 
of guards and expellees undoubtedly colored his memories when he was finally able to 
commit them to paper. It is likely that the Germans were, in fact, relatively happy to 
leave Czechoslovakia during the “organized transfers,” especially because there are 
several other accounts that report similar feelings. The Germans were also saddened by 
the loss of their homeland, but unlike the “wild transfers,” the “organized transfers” could 
be characterized by better preparation and increased willingness to leave the past both 
physically and mentally behind.  
Ironically, the expellees, many of whom had been enthusiastic about coming 
“Heim ins Reich” under the Nazis when the Sudetenland was incorporated into the Third 
Reich, were now leaving their homes behind to permanently come “Heim ins Reich” in 
Germany. One expellee even called Germany “our new homeland” in his account, which 
shows the eventual German acceptance of their fate, and, at least in this man’s case, the 
optimism that Germany could potentially become a new Heimat for these Germans.226 
The Czechs, in their efforts to forcibly remove the Germans from their homes, may have 
been offended that the expellees felt any kind of eagerness to cross the border and 
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therefore began to spread rumors about the horrors of Germany in order to stifle those 
feelings of hope. While they were enthusiastic about removing the Germans from their 
country, the Czechs were likely also looking to find some kind of closure through the act 
of expulsion. Both points of view are understandable, and Grimm presents an intriguing 
picture of bittersweet feelings on both sides of the border. Each side displayed a 
combination of relief and unhappiness that the coexistence of Czechs and Germans would 
soon be over. 
Part of the reason for these mixed feelings was the attitudes and emotions that 
naturally surrounded the physical act of expulsion, but the conditions and procedures 
involved in the encampment, examination, and expulsion of the remaining Germans were 
some of the most common and lingering memories among the expellees, even years after 
the “organized transfers” were over. Anna Riedl, a housewife from Komotau, presents an 
account of the living conditions she experienced during the “organized transfers.” It is 
important to remember, however, that Riedl did not record her memories until 1957, over 
ten years after the events she describes transpired. Examining her account, particularly in 
comparison to others that document the same period, will shed some light on the effects 
of individual recollections on the collective memory about an event. Riedl describes the 
experience of traveling to and settling into the camp called Michanitz, which handled 
many of the expellees during their journey. 
We traveled now with a borrowed wagon into the camp. Our luggage 
consisted of three large sacks, three rucksacks, one suitcase, a laundry 
basket, in which we carried the dishes, and a bucket full of silverware. We 
weighed our bags at home, so that we wouldn’t have more than fifty 
kilograms, even though we were never specifically told that we couldn’t 
have more weight than that. In the camp our bags were not weighed, so we 
really lucked out. We were placed in a large room. There were around 100 
people there, men and women mixed together. It was a wooden barrack, 
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which had formerly housed Russian prisoners who worked at 
Mannesmann. There was a small oven, in which one could cook.227 
  
 It is obvious from the way Riedl describes the journey that her experience was not 
as traumatic or violent as it would have been during the “wild transfers.” In fact, she is 
relatively matter-of-fact about the way she and her family packed up their belongings and 
prepared to leave. Even the luggage weight, which was such a hardship during the “wild 
transfers,” became something of a routine, as the fifty kilogram limit was apparently 
well-known. The Potsdam Agreement, which required that each expellee be allowed fifty 
kilograms of luggage, was likely publicized enough that the limit became common 
knowledge.228 Despite the relative leniency of fifty kilograms, at least compared to the 
thirty allowed during the “wild transfers,” the regulations still caused “hardship” for 
some expellees, who were more concerned about what they wanted to bring, instead of 
how much it weighed.229 For others, the desire to leave was strong enough that they were 
willing to leave with little more than the necessities. As E.H., an office worker from 
Komotau, put it, “what good are the most beautiful wine glasses if the luggage is limited 
to 70 kg per person and there are more important things to take with you?”230 
Unfortunately, the account from E.H. is undated, so it is impossible to know how time 
affected his memories about the specifics of the journey, but he and many other expellees 
distinctly remembered the searches of the luggage they were allowed to bring, as well as 
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the continued confiscation of high quality or new goods by the Czechs. Anna Riedl was 
fortunate that her bags were not examined upon her initial entrance into the camp, but she 
would later find that she and her family would not escape unscathed. 
 While the Allied forces increasingly monitored the conditions of the expulsions, 
there was still room for the Czechs to make their authority felt, often through the baggage 
searches that the expellees faced throughout their journeys. Riedl was lucky when she 
first arrived, but she later found that one of her bags had been considerably lightened 
during a search that occurred out of the sight of the expellees.231 Other expellees report 
witnessing the seizure of their goods and the goods of their neighbors in full view of 
everyone in the camp. The most commonly confiscated items included money, savings 
books, cigarettes, blankets, clothing, and other items of value such as jewelry or 
watches.232 Thefts of expellees’ belongings were nothing new, as similar actions were 
common during the “wild transfers,” but certain elements of these searches and 
confiscations were distinct from those of the previous expulsions. Since the Potsdam 
Agreement was so specific about the conditions and necessities required in order for 
transports to be accepted, the thefts of expellees’ belongings were downplayed both at the 
time and in later accounts of this period.233 Because the expellees were expecting such 
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behavior, they went out of their way to make new or high quality goods look used or 
“uninviting,” in order to maintain possession of items like bed linens and dishes.234 The 
Germans were now anticipating the searches, so they were able to prepare themselves 
better, but even with the thefts, the Potsdam Agreement stipulated that each expellee had 
to have fifty kilograms of luggage. This requirement was likely put into place to prevent 
thefts by the supervising forces, but instead of stopping them, it merely resulted in 
creative maneuvering in some cases. One expellee reports that there was “a lot of shifting 
of belongings,” in order to hit the fifty kilogram limit.235 This phenomenon is similar to 
the trading of new items for old in E. Wollmann’s account, analyzed in the previous 
section. The constant and unpredictable movement of consumer goods between and 
among Germans and Czechs was only the beginning for the expellees, however, who 
were then faced with life in the camps. Camp life was never pleasant, and for some 
expellees, this period lasted weeks or even months, particularly in the case of expellees 
who were ill or injured. 
 Anna Riedl describes a large room filled with people of both genders, which was 
fairly common in the transfer camps. In fact, her experience was relatively positive, 
considering the fact that another expellee described his accommodations as “little better 
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than a toilet,” with an estimated 500 people in a single room.236 The specifics of the 
living conditions varied from camp to camp as well as between transports. Even within a 
single camp, there were more and less comfortable barracks, although the temporary 
nature of the expellees’ stay meant that even the “better” barracks were limited in their 
appeal.237 For those in the “worse” barracks, or those who were housed in warehouses, 
conditions were often dire. One expellee called the conditions of the Jungbuch camp a 
“scandal,” because of the lack of sanitation facilities and the high number of deaths due 
to poor food and limited health services.238 For most of the expellees, the experience of 
living in the camps, especially since it was so temporary, fell somewhere between the two 
extremes of comfort and squalor. In fact, movement between camps was not uncommon, 
since there were so many expellees to process and most of the trains to Germany left 
from the camps closest to the border, so even the most horrific experiences in camps were 
generally limited to a few days or weeks. 
 No matter where the expellees were staying at the time, one of the most common 
complaints among those who recorded their stories was the food. Both the low quality 
and the scarcity of the provisions given to the expellees, as well as a number of other 
significant elements of everyday life in a deportation camp, were discussed in a number 
of accounts, including Anna Riedl’s. 
We were registered in the next few days. It was like the military: one had 
to be registered to receive food. It was mostly bread and soup, but it was 
edible. They also gave us a shower, where one could wash. The floors of 
the barracks were covered with straw sacks, but there were not as many 
bugs as in camp Michanitz. Barbed wire surrounded the camp and one 
                                                 
236
 Schieder, Nr. 109. Dokumentation der Vertreibung, 499-502. The author, N.N., a farmer, reports that the 
expellees were “packed in like herrings” and were unable to “answer the call of nature” anywhere but in 
their living quarters. 
237
 Schieder, No. 99, Documents on the Expulsion, 489-495. 
238
 Schieder, No. 102, Documents on the Expulsion, 499-500. 
 125 
 
could not get out. Later, we were sprayed with DDT, and could pick up 
our money, even though when we arrived, we had had to give up all our 
money and savings books. Now there were people who had had thousands 
of Reichsmarks, who were now given only one thousand marks each. If 
one had no money or savings books to be given, or didn’t have a thousand 
marks, he was given 500 RM.239 
 
 The distribution of food is among the most commonly mentioned aspects of camp 
life and the expulsions. This is understandable, since the expellees were often entirely at 
the mercy of the Czechs and the Allies for their food during their journey. Outside of the 
experience of Lassmann, discussed above, most of the provisions that were available to 
the expellees were given to them by the Czechs, during their stays in camps, and the 
Allies, after they crossed the border. In at least one case, the expellees were encouraged 
to bring enough food for their journey, which could take up to ten days, but this does not 
seem to have been common for most expellees.240 For Anna Riedl, the food she was 
given was at least “edible,” although it was very simple, and another expellee asserted 
that the food was “very good, since a German chef was supervising.”241 In the latter case, 
the identification of the chef as German may have contributed to the expellees’ judgment 
of the quality of the food, since they were more likely to be favorably inclined towards 
food prepared by a German over a Czech. For other expellees, the food quality varied 
from “very bad” to “very poor” to “unfit for human consumption.”242 Aside from the 
quality, the food that was given to the expellees was fairly uniform. There was generally 
a thin soup and some bread, with an occasional mention of black coffee, but everything 
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that was given to the expellees was in “small portions.”243 The expellees were often 
disappointed in the supplies and food given to them during the expulsions, but even the 
small rations they were given by the Czechs was an improvement over the near total lack 
of such provisions during the “wild transfers.” There is also a sense in at least two 
accounts that the food improved drastically after the trains crossed the border and left the 
expellees in the hands of the Allies.244 This impression may be due to the fact that both of 
these accounts were written ten years after the expulsions ended, which may have 
exaggerated the contrast between the Czech and Allied experiences in the author’s mind. 
On the other hand, the near-universal complaints about the quality of the food given to 
the expellees by the Czechs, from accounts that were recorded at various times, indicates 
that there may be some truth beneath the disparaging remarks about the quality and 
quantity of food provided to the expellees. 
  Besides the food, the accommodations in the camps and treatment of the 
expellees while they were encamped were a significant issue for many of the Germans in 
question. On the Czech side, the primitive conditions of the barracks for the Germans 
were logical, since they were only temporary and the Czechs were not generally 
concerned with making the Germans particularly comfortable. As discussed above, Anna 
Riedl was actually rather fortunate to have “straw sacks” and a relative lack of bugs. On 
the other hand, the barbed wire surrounding the camp was part of the expulsion process 
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that several accounts mention as instrumental to their sense of isolation and separation 
from the rest of the country of Czechoslovakia.  
It is understandable that the Czechs would look to hold the Germans in a way that 
would keep them from escaping their fate, because the whole motivation of the 
expulsions was to eliminate the German threat to the new republic. It could also be 
argued that this isolation and disconnection helped the Germans make the break with the 
Heimat that they needed in order to transition into Germany. If that was the case, the 
isolation of the expellees, combined with the persecution they felt during the postwar 
period, indicate that the feelings of hope for a new life and optimism about the future 
make considerable sense. Indeed, the fact that the expellees were constantly surrounded 
by barbed wire and guards, as several accounts describe, would surely not have increased 
the expellees’ sentimental attachment to the Czechoslovak Republic.245 Occasionally, the 
expellees were able to work in nearby towns or to seek medical attention outside the 
camps, but even this was often regulated and there are few instances of this behavior 
during the “organized transfers,” as it seems the Czechs preferred to keep the expellees 
contained and separate from the rest of the population.246 This isolation had physical and 
emotional consequences for the expellees and may have impacted the way they felt about 
their former fellow citizens, increasing their willingness to leave a country that so clearly 
did not want them. 
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 In addition to the isolation of the camps, the use of pesticide sprays, as well as 
violence and even searches of the expellees’ bodies, contributed to their detachment from 
Czechoslovakia. Because of the bugs, which Anna Riedl briefly mentions above, and the 
diseases that ran rampant in the camps, there was always a question about whether or not 
the expellees would be allowed into Germany. The Allies were unwilling to take 
expellees who were infested with lice, because of the health and safety concerns 
involved, which in the context of the devastation of the postwar period makes perfect 
sense. Therefore, all expellees were superficially searched and dusted with DDT before 
boarding the trains.247 The element that is most troublesome is the administration of these 
procedures. The Czechs were more concerned with processing large numbers of expellees 
than with their comfort, and some Germans reportedly felt “shy” about the examinations, 
particularly the women. The “mass examinations” provoked these feelings of 
nervousness, and the Czechs were more concerned about the results than the process, for 
fear that the Americans would refuse to accept a transport for medical reasons, such as 
lice infestations.248 The Czech concern about getting the Germans out overrode all other 
priorities, and made the experience of delousing, which was only to be expected, due to 
the bad conditions of the camps, even worse than it should have been. 
 Beyond the dehumanization of the delousing and preventative treatments of 
diseases and pests, there was still a threat of violence that lingered over the expulsion 
proceedings, despite the Potsdam Agreement and its regulations meant to prevent such 
complications. The violence and abuse that were so common during the “wild transfers” 
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were largely quelled, but isolated incidents of humiliation and brutality still occurred. In 
one such case, an expellee named Josef Kuhn witnessed a cruel game being played with 
the expellees. He reports that the transport train stopped during the night and the guards 
took advantage of the time to “torture us to complete exhaustion.” This torture took the 
form of a degrading game called “playing dogs,” in which two men would be forced to 
undress and chase each other around on all fours, biting each other as they went. Kuhn 
describes the way the men were punished if they did not do this quickly enough, with the 
guards delivering “blows with wire rods,” which were accompanied by “howls and 
obscene Russian vocabulary.”249 In this case, it is difficult to determine whether the 
guards were Czechs or Russians, but the author had been held in a Russian prison camp 
after the invasion of the Red Army, so it is possible that these guards were, in fact, Soviet 
soldiers. On the other hand, Kuhn states that this game was called “playing dogs” by the 
Czechs, so it is also possible that the guards were Czech. Kuhn’s account was also 
written eleven years after the expulsions, so it is possible that his existing negative 
opinions of the Soviets and Czechs increased with time, making his memories slightly 
blurred. Either way, the treatment of the expellees in this transport was appalling. The 
specific details Kuhn remembers also indicate that this was not an invention of his 
distorted memory, but rather an actual event that he witnessed. The fact that there are 
few, if any, other accounts that describe such violence does indicate that conditions had 
generally improved after the Potsdam Agreement, since such behavior was fairly 
common during the “wild transfers.”250 
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 In another case, an expellee was held in a camp that required a mandatory strip 
search of all expellees. In most cases, the expellees were searched, as was their luggage, 
but this is the only account in this collection that describes a mass strip search. This 
account describes the way the expellees were “herded into a room” in one large group, 
men, women, and children all together. The author of the account, who is male, is most 
offended by the treatment of the women and girls during this process. He asserts that the 
Czech guards, all of whom were male, “seemed to search the women and girls with 
particular satisfaction, looking at them in the most unbelievably shameless manner.” It is 
certainly possible, and even likely, considering the treatment of women and girls during 
the “wild transfers,” that the Czechs did exploit their power over the expellees to 
humiliate and dominate the women being searched. On the other hand, the author’s 
obviously anti-Czech feelings come out in his last sentence on the topic: “That is Czech 
morality.”251 The bitterness of the author towards his former fellow citizens is clear, and 
the fact that nine years passed between his experiences and his recording of those 
experiences likely only exacerbated his already negative emotions about the Czechs. By 
disparaging their morality, he may be making a statement about the expulsions in general, 
since, if the Czechs are so immoral as to abuse their power so blatantly, it could be 
argued that the expulsions themselves were unjust. The German memories of this event, 
clearly stated in this case, but often veiled under ostensibly objective “facts,” display the 
continued tension between the Germans and the Czechs, even a decade after the events of 
the expulsions were over. The collection of individual memories only magnifies this 
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tension and shows the way group memories can be shaped by the individual feelings of 
each person who contributes. 
 The above two cases are extreme, but to return to Anna Riedl’s more typical 
experiences, one can see the emphasis on money that is common to many expulsion 
accounts. Along with the searches and confiscations of material objects, the seizure of 
cash and savings books by camp administrators was a major concern for many expellees. 
This is reasonable, since it was understood that there would be few resources for the 
expellees when they arrived in Germany, and the expellees did not want to be at a 
disadvantage. It was mandated that each expellee have at least 500 Reichsmarks (RM) 
when they arrived in Germany, although there were some early transports that allowed 
1000RM for each expellee, including Anna Riedl’s.252 Several accounts describe the 
change over time from the relatively generous 1000RM to the 500RM that later 
transports were given, as well as the feelings of disappointment among the expellees 
when they saw their assets reduced to almost nothing.253 Although it was certainly useful 
to mandate a minimum amount of money that the expellees were required to have, the 
fact remains that any money or savings above that level were taken away, which meant 
that the expellees, who had already lost their homes and most of their belongings, were 
left truly destitute before even arriving in war-torn Germany. Interestingly, in Anna 
Riedl’s case, she reports that “If one had no money or savings books to be given, or 
didn’t have a thousand marks, he was given 500 RM,” which is unique to her account. 
These details show the extent to which the Potsdam regulations were followed by the 
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Czechs as they pushed the Germans out, since in the “wild transfers,” they probably 
would have ignored those who had nothing and expelled them anyway. Because the 
primary goal was to remove the Germans, the Czechs were willing to adhere to the 
regulations mandated by the Allies, particularly when failure to do so would have 
resulted in the rejection of transfers. This is especially true in the case of money, as well 
as in the case of the delousing and health precautions, since the Czechs did not want to 
take any chances that the Allies would not accept the German expellees. 
 A final element of the expulsions that is commonly mentioned in nearly every 
account of the “organized transfers” is the organization of the transfer trains. Almost 
every expellee who recorded their memories reports that each train carried 1200 people 
and that there were 30-40 people in each car, depending on the length of the train.254 It is 
unclear whether or not the specific details were actually memories of the authors, or if 
they derived from the well-known regulations in the Potsdam Agreement. It is certainly 
true that the Allies wanted to maintain some consistency in the number of expellees they 
were receiving in a given week, and it is possible that the expellees were either aware of 
this number during their journey or became aware of it in following years. It is 
remarkable that so many expellees were aware of the specifics, but as many of these 
accounts were recorded five to ten years after the fact, it is somewhat likely that the 
expellees’ memories changed when they received additional information after the 
expulsions were over. On the other hand, it is possible that, because of the expellees’ 
anxiousness to leave, they were acutely aware of how many people would fit in a given 
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transport, so that they could make sure that they and their families would be able to travel 
together. 
 Aside from the number of people transported in a given train, the conditions in the 
train cars were a common theme among many of these accounts as well. It is true that 
living conditions during the “organized transfers” were higher than during the “wild 
transfers,” as the Allies wanted to ensure the relative safety and comfort of the expellees, 
but the improvement was slight, at best. For example, instead of open train cars or trucks, 
the “organized transfers” generally used closed cars with small iron stoves for heat. This 
sounds like a vast improvement, but the reality was that many of these trains were so 
packed with people and luggage that the heat was either inadequate or stifling, and the 
expellees had little space to sit or move around.255 Therefore, while the “organized 
transfers” certainly improved upon the squalor of their “wild” counterparts, the expellees 
were far from comfortable during their journey. The discomfort they felt may have been 
nothing more than a side effect of the Czech desire to get the Germans out as quickly as 
possible, because packing trains with over a thousand people for each journey was 
certainly an efficient way of moving large numbers of people. It is also true that, had the 
transports violated the regulations of the Allies, the expellees would not have been 
allowed to cross the border, so responsibility for the conditions does not fall entirely on 
the Czechs. Had the Americans, British, French, and Soviets stipulated more extensive 
standards, it is nearly certain that the Czechs would have complied, due to their 
overriding concern with removing the Germans as soon as possible. The mistake of the 
Munich Agreement, which had allowed the Nazis to annex the Sudetenland in the first 
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place, may have been part of the reason that the Allies did not push for harsher 
regulations. Their guilt for attempting to appease Hitler may have influenced their 
decision to require only the most basic guidelines for the “organized transfers.” 
Therefore, while many accounts seem to find the Czechs responsible for almost 
everything that happened, one must look farther than the perspectives presented by the 
expulsion accounts to see a more complete picture of the situation at hand.  
 In fact, there are some accounts that do go farther than simply focusing on the 
Czechs, finding the Allies, particularly in terms of the occupied zones of Germany, 
essential to the experience of the expulsions. As a preface to this section, it is important 
to keep in mind that many of the accounts dealing with the “organized transfers” are from 
the 1950s, which means that they are part of the larger Cold War discourse about Eastern 
Communism and Western “freedom.” I mention this because a number of accounts deal 
with the expellees’ desire to be transferred to West Germany rather than East. On its face, 
this would seem to indicate the expellees’ desire to escape the tyranny of Soviet 
Communism, but the fact remains that, in 1946, the borders between East and West had 
not yet solidified. Therefore, the expellees who are concerned with “escaping” the 
Soviets may be informing their memories of 1946 with the 1950s mentality in the West 
towards Communism. 
 All that said, the injection of Cold War terminology and attitudes into accounts of 
the “organized transfers” presents an intriguing example of the way memories change 
history and the alteration of “factual” events through opinion and perspective. For 
instance, one account states that, even though the expellees “didn’t know anything about 
what was in the West,” “[e]veryone feared going to Russian-occupied Germany, which 
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we knew would be just like our lives at that time in Czechoslovakia.”256 This account 
details an expulsion in August 1946, so it was long after the Soviets had invaded, but the 
Czech government was still in place, so it is unclear why the author believes that the 
Russian zone would be like Czechoslovakia. In fact, this statement seems to be a clear 
indication of later opinions seeping into an account, because of the fact that, in 1946, 
most of the German ideas about the Soviets would likely still have been influenced by the 
racialist propaganda of the Nazi regime, rather than the Cold War ideology of Eastern 
tyranny. The transition between the two is obvious when comparing the accounts of the 
“wild” and “organized transfers.” Whereas in accounts of the earlier period, the Soviets 
are portrayed as an animalistic horde of beasts, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
discourse in accounts of the “organized transfers” deals primarily with the perceived 
“freedom” in the West. Indeed, there is only one account that addresses issues similar to 
those during the “wild transfers,” such as rapes and hunger, which were, in this case, 
blamed on Soviet administration. This author, Helmut Klaubert, describes the news 
coming over the radio that detailed Soviet atrocities, but because most of the Germans 
were not allowed access to the radio, this was an extremely isolated case.257 In most other 
cases, the isolation of the camps prevented the expellees from hearing about almost 
anything going on in the outside world, including what to expect in Germany. 
Because of the lack of information generally given to the expellees, several 
accounts detail the rumors surrounding each transport, particularly in terms of where each 
train was headed. Rumors of the “last transport” to the American zone were apparently 
fairly common, and, according to the authors of several accounts, such rumors provoked 
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numerous volunteers for the transports in question.258 In the same account that records the 
news of Soviet behavior coming over the radio, Helmut Klaubert also describes the 
rumors that surrounded his transport. He writes that there was widespread speculation 
about their destination until they had almost arrived. He also mentions that the Germans 
felt that they “had been cheated. Is anybody able today to imagine our bitter 
disappointment?” These feelings of being “cheated” and disappointed may have been due 
to the fact that the Czechs told the expellees that they were on the “last transport to 
Western Germany,” despite the marks of hammer and sickle on the sides of the train cars. 
On the other hand, the desire of some of the expellees to get to the West was not altered 
by the endpoint of their transport. Klaubert reports that, when nothing happened with 
regards to another transport to take willing expellees to West Germany, “some families 
took the risk and started their own journey westwards.”259 This sense of the need to get to 
the West may have been felt by those who feared Soviet brutality and alleged animalistic 
tendencies, but it seems likely that, since this account comes from 1956, there are some 
Cold War overtones infiltrating an otherwise fairly straightforward account of an 
expulsion. The desire to escape into the “freedom” of the West certainly sounds like a 
Western construction intended to show the oppression of Communism, rather than an 
impulse that would come naturally to expellees who were already exhausted from their 
long journey and were not likely looking to travel any farther. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the expulsions was the German attitude 
towards the Allies when they were mistreated. Because of the Potsdam Agreement, it was 
understood that the expellees would be safe and treated relatively well during the 
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transfers. Some expellees, however, felt that the Allies should have taken more interest in 
the conditions they experienced and shown more care towards the expellees. Hermann 
Schubert, a priest from Trautenau, had some particularly interesting comments when he 
recorded his memories of his transport’s march to the train station. 
There are old people who find it very hard to walk through the soft snow 
and little children clutching their mothers who are loaded with hand 
luggage. It is a pitiful sight. Where are the American film reporters? They 
would find material here for a new documentary film.260 
 
 It is certainly an interesting point, because the end of the war meant that the 
Germans were at the mercy of the Allies, particularly in terms of the news and media to 
which they were exposed. For instance, in Germany itself, many Germans were forced to 
watch films about the Holocaust, like The Death Mills, in order to receive rations in the 
American zone. These coerced viewings were intended to force the German people to 
deal with the horrors of the Nazi period and respond with the appropriate amount of 
shame and repentance by directly addressing the consequences of Nazi power.261 It is not 
clear how much of that same sort of treatment was present in Czechoslovakia at the time, 
but it certainly seems that the expellees felt ignored by the Allies, except for the minimal 
regulations to maintain their relative safety during the expulsions. What Schubert seems 
to be expressing is resentment about the way the Allies addressed the issue of the 
“organized transfers,” which were intended to be more “humane.” Rather than truly 
enforcing the Potsdam Agreement and ensuring that the expellees made it to Germany 
with all of their belongings and in one piece, it seems that the Allies were more 
concerned with appeasing the countries in Central and Eastern Europe who had suffered 
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so much under the Nazis. To some degree, this concern with the formerly occupied 
territories is understandable, because of the damage the Nazis had done, but it is hard to 
argue that the Allies could and probably should have done more to protect the vulnerable 
expellees. For people who had been, if not anti-fascist, at least passive towards the 
regime, the apparent blindness of the Allies to their plight was inexcusable. The “pitiful 
sight” presented by the marchers, including the elderly and small children, was, to the 
expellees, enough to justify empathy and care from the Allied powers. Moreover, because 
so many of the expellees believed in their own innocence, it was difficult for them to 
believe that they deserved to be treated in this way. 
 The “organized transfers,” while they promised to be considerably less brutal or 
traumatic for the expellees, were often remembered as painful experiences for the 
Germans in question. The loss of the Heimat and the treatment they experienced on their 
journey combined to make these expulsions, if not quite as violent as their predecessors, 
just as difficult for the expellees. Granted, the Czechs were primarily concerned with 
removing the German population from their new republic, and the Allies were looking to 
help bring peace to the region. It is also true that many of the accounts of the “organized 
transfers” were written in a Cold War context, which may have contributed to the 
exaggerations of the negative elements of the expulsions at least slightly to show the 
superiority of the Western world, as compared to Eastern Communism. Several expellees 
also report feeling anxious to leave a country that so clearly did not want them. There is 
no doubt that the expellees faced hostility and the threat of violence along their journey, 
and the Czechs were generally unconcerned with the expellee’s comfort, beyond the 
stipulations of the Potsdam Agreement. All of these elements combined to create the 
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bittersweet tone found in most of the expulsion accounts. While the expellees were 
relieved to escape Czech domination, they still longed for the Heimat and were 
emotionally (and occasionally physically) scarred by the experience of expulsion. The 
aftermath of the “organized transfers” left many expellees destitute and adrift in a new 
country. The fact that the Sudeten Germans have, as a group, continued to feel united by 
their common experiences, while still integrating into German society, is remarkable. 
Their collective memories of the expulsions, which are shaped by perspective, time, and 
personal experience, remain one of the most intriguing aspects of this period of European 
history.  
 The collective memory of this whole period continues to shape Sudeten German 
life and identity to the present day. The presence of Cold War ideology in some of the 
accounts recorded here does not delegitimize the real emotions and experiences of the 
people involved, and actually point to the incredibly subjective nature of national history. 
Rallying around their treatment during the expulsions, the Sudeten Germans have been 
able to construct a unified ethnic identity that remains, at least to some degree, more than 
sixty years after the expulsions ended. After examining the accounts of various Sudeten 
Germans involved in the “wild” and “organized transfers,” it is possible to see the ways 
their experiences coincide and separate down to the smallest details of their lives during 
this period. By combining all of these stories, the collective memory of the expulsions 
becomes clear, and the subjectivity and interpretability of these stories only increases 
their appeal as the foundation for a Sudeten German identity within the context of 
postwar Germany. 
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Conclusion 
 Summing up the previous hundred and forty pages of information is almost as 
futile a task as trying to tie up all the loose ends of the expulsions themselves. Therefore, 
this conclusion is not meant as a summation, but a continuation of the ideas and themes 
that hopefully came out in the previous chapters. The physical and emotional impact of 
the expulsions cannot be ignored, but the consequences for collective identity and history 
itself are still more interesting. 
 Coming out of the previous chapter, it can be tempting to see the expulsions as 
little more than an exercise in cruelty and revenge. If the purpose of this study was to 
recount the German side of the story, that would be an easy assumption to make. Poring 
over heartbreaking accounts of abuse, violence, and humiliation can provoke empathetic 
feelings in any reader. While the expulsion reports do provide modern readers with 
important information about the process of population transfer, however, they cannot be 
read in a vacuum. Without a proper understanding of the relationship between Czechs 
and Germans, as well at least an attempt to understand the Czech point of view, historical 
events that are already charged with emotion and tension are easy to oversimplify into 
inevitabilities or simple dichotomies of “good” and “bad.” There was nothing inevitable 
about the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans, and it does a discredit to both the Czechs 
and the Germans to present it as such. Perceptions of the events of 1945 and 1946 may 
differ and change, but it should be fairly evident by now that those differing and shifting 
perceptions are what make the expulsions so fascinating to study in the first place. 
 Taking a step back from the details of this study, several overarching themes 
make themselves obvious. First, the existence of so many individual accounts of the 
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expulsions presents historians with a unique opportunity to observe the development of a 
collective memory out of a variety of personal accounts. Second, examining the 
collective memories of both sides sheds some light on the identities of both the Czechs 
and the Sudeten Germans to the present day. Finally, the shared memories and identities 
that made this conflict so explosive can be used to show the ways in which history is 
permeated with individual perspectives and the influence memory and identity have on 
history in general. This case study can be expanded far beyond the borders of the 
Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, or even Europe, because the issues of memory, history, 
and identity are universal. The influence of one defining moment, like the population 
transfers of 1945 and 1946, can also impact perceptions of events from centuries before, 
simply by changing the frame of reference for the people involved. 
 The individual accounts of the previous chapter, to some extent, overshadow the 
first half of this study, simply because they are so intensely personal and moving. That is 
not to say that the historical context in which the expulsions took place is not important, 
because it is crucial to understanding what happened after World War II. There is a huge 
difference, though, between “established” or “fixed” history and the personal memories 
of people who lived through a historically significant event like the expulsions. When 
most people think of history, they think of the kind of information contained in the first 
part of this study, but there is a whole world of recorded memories and firsthand accounts 
that can make “normal” history that much more accessible and compelling. Collecting 
those eyewitness and participant memories creates a kind of consensus about what 
“really” happened. For instance, during the “organized transfers,” it is unclear whether 
the expellees really knew that 1200 people were allowed in each transport, or if they 
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found out later and, consciously or unconsciously, added it to the things that they 
personally remembered about the experience. Developing a consensus is made easier 
when people come from similar backgrounds and have similar opinions about what has 
happened. On the other hand, in submitting to the collective narrative, individual 
survivors or authors can find their own memories subordinated to the needs or 
requirements of the group.  
 This issue is a serious one, particularly in terms of an inherently traumatic event 
like the expulsions, as a group constructing a collective memory about a given situation 
tacitly approves overlooking some elements in favor of others. Overemphasizing the 
violence, oppression, and abuse suffered by the expellees has the potential to make the 
Sudeten Germans appear as nothing more than victims, brutalized at the hands of the 
cruel Czechs and Soviets. While no one could dispute the suffering of the expellees, 
whose lives were irrevocably changed, largely for the worse, by the expulsions, 
perceptive readers may question whether any Czechs were against the expulsions, or tried 
to help the expellees. By grouping all Czechs together under the label of “tormentors,” 
Sudeten Germans can largely avoid the tricky grey area of personal morality. Just as not 
all Sudeten Germans were Nazis, not all Czechs were Beneš supporters, rabidly awaiting 
their chance to punish the Germans for the Nazi occupation. In some accounts, individual 
Czechs did assist the expellees by giving them food or protection, but, just as Czech 
decrees inextricably linked “German” to “Nazi,” the collective memory of the Sudeten 
Germans creates a monolithic group of “Czechs,” who were entirely focused on the 
violent expulsion of the Sudeten German population. Collective memory makes such 
black and white terms possible by eliminating all subtlety or moderation. In order to 
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make a compelling narrative, collective memory must categorize, sort, and pronounce 
judgment on all elements of a given moment in history. Thus, for the Sudeten Germans, it 
may be convenient to recall the Czechs as nothing more than oppressive, violent 
attackers, while for the Czechs, the Sudeten Germans are generally remembered as Nazi 
sympathizers and perpetrators of horrific crimes. 
 The perception of complete innocence on one side and absolute guilt on the other 
is central to the interaction between Sudeten Germans and Czechs to this day. That 
interaction is complicated by the actions of members of both groups before, during, and 
after World War II. Both sides see the other as the perpetrator of a certain crime, and 
neither side is especially willing to acknowledge that the reality of the situation is much 
more complex than the collective memory would prefer to admit. The group identities of 
both the Czechs and Sudeten Germans have remained connected to this singular event in 
their shared history, even more than sixty years after the end of the expulsions. As 
Timothy W. Ryback pointed out in an article in the mid-1990s, the Czechs do not want to 
be identified with the deaths of thousands and expulsion of millions of Sudeten Germans, 
but their attempts to ignore the legacy of the population transfers only made the situation 
worse and nearly cost them membership in the European Union.262 Thus, both the Czechs 
and the Sudeten Germans have had to come to terms with the past, both recent and 
distant, in order to move forward in the modern world.  
 The connection of Sudeten Germans to the expulsions is obvious and easy to 
understand. Nearly their entire national group was uprooted and abused in 1945 and 
1946, and they continue to cling to their memories, both collective and individual, to 
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maintain their unity in their still relatively new homes in Germany. Their common history 
binds them together and prevents the stresses of living in self-perceived exile from 
disintegrating the community created by the shared suffering of the group during the 
expulsions. Even now that many of the survivors of the expulsions have passed away, 
many of their descendents still hold to the idea that there is an unbreakable bond between 
all Sudeten Germans, even those who have never seen the Sudetenland. These second- 
and third-generation Sudeten Germans have inherited the memory of the expulsions as an 
unexpected and entirely unjustified attempt to eliminate their entire group. This 
oversimplification does not capture the true motivations behind the event on the part of 
the Czechs, who had just lived through six years of Nazi occupation, which began after 
the Sudeten Germans had expressed their desire to join the Reich. It is also all too easy to 
overlook the role the Sudeten Germans played both before and after the Munich 
Conference in 1938, particularly in terms of the dismantling of the Czech state. In that 
light, the Sudeten German narrative of victimhood not only seems oversimplified, but 
also emotionally manipulative and unfair to the Czechs involved. 
 The connection of the Czechs to the expulsions is more obscured, often 
deliberately. As mentioned above, the Czechs have a self-perception of innocence that 
pervades their treatment of an admittedly difficult time in their history. They 
acknowledge that the transfers took place, and even admit to killing many Sudeten 
Germans, but that is as far as the collective memory allows many Czechs to go.263 The 
perception that the expulsions were justified, due to Nazi atrocities like the massacre at 
Lidice, is not impossible to comprehend, but it does not capture the whole story. While 
many Germans did at least passively support the Nazis, the identification of “Germans” 
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with “Nazis” was and is not entirely fair. The identification of Czechs as victims is 
manipulative in much the same way as the German narrative. Each side sees itself as the 
victim of unjust oppression, and neither side is entirely incorrect. The problem comes 
from the widespread acceptance of these distortions as “fact.” Ideally, both Czechs and 
Sudeten Germans would accept their responsibility for what took place, and both would 
acknowledge the ways in which their collective memories and national identities play a 
role in the construction of the history of this period.  
 The interaction of these conflicting collective memories creates a situation that is 
not unique to the Czech-German relationship. The nature of collective memory makes it 
inherently specific to the group that calls upon it. Even within the United States, the 
interaction between white Americans and people from other cultures, including Native 
Americans, African Americans, and Japanese Americans, to name a few, are remembered 
differently on each side. Collective memory, particularly when it is employed to support 
national identity, can allow groups of people to overlook the negative aspects of their 
group and portray every conflict as an “us” versus “them” situation. No group wants to 
admit to the darker aspects of their collective past, and it is easier to create unity among 
people if there is a sense of the morality or goodness of the group. National and ethnic 
identity, while it is no longer nearly as fluid as it was in Central and Eastern Europe 
before World War II, is still, to some degree, a matter of choice. People are generally 
more likely to choose a given identity if it benefits them or provides them with an 
explanation for why their ancestors behaved a certain way. The collective memory then 
becomes the group’s history, whether or not anyone else agrees with that given group’s 
account. External opinions are irrelevant to the internal validity of the collective memory 
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within the group. It is for this reason that the Czechs and Sudeten Germans can have 
completely different memories of the expulsions and both can see their own memory as 
entirely correct. Their group histories have been accepted within their groups, and that is 
often the only qualification for accuracy within a national group. 
 The subjectivity of collective memory is not in question here, but rather why a 
given group might accept an account of a historical event that does not match with others. 
How can anyone be sure that the history they are reading is “accurate” or “objective”? In 
reality, there is no such thing as “objective” history, especially for an event as 
controversial as the expulsions. The obvious assumption, then, is that all history is 
subjective. In many ways, this is entirely true. The author’s point of view can transform 
an account of the “facts” of an event into a politicized treatise. Furthermore, the 
audience’s preconceptions and opinions about a given moment in time can shade its 
reading of history. All of these personal perspectives can make it difficult to find 
historical sources that give at least the appearance of impartiality. Those sources, 
however, no matter how straightforward they seem, are informed by the author’s 
opinions, and may only seem impartial because the author’s opinions coincide with the 
reader’s. Deciding what to include and what to omit in an account of any historical period 
is crucial to determining its final shape, and those decisions often reflect not only the 
interests of the author, but also his or her opinions about what happened. 
 Before writing this study, I had an idea that history was subjective, but I had no 
idea just how subjective it could be. In writing the first half of this study, I discovered 
how difficult it can be to balance detail and brevity. Harder still was balancing the two 
sides of the story, particularly since so many of the sources dealt with either the Czechs 
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or the Sudeten Germans, but rarely both. I know that my opinions crept into this paper, 
although I tried to avoid partiality as much as possible. If nothing else, this study has 
given me a new perspective on history as a field and it is my hope that its readers found it 
as illuminating as I have. The collective histories of the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans 
are interpretations of the past, but so is this paper. Every time anyone attempts to capture 
a historical event on paper, interpretation inevitably winds itself around the ostensibly 
“true” “facts.” There is no such thing as absolute truth in history, and neither primary nor 
secondary sources should be expected to be “objective.” Balancing perspectives and 
finding some kind of middle ground is essential to historical research and writing, but 
complete impartiality is impossible. This impossibility of impartiality is especially 
difficult to manage when reading the accounts of the horrific conditions and brutality 
suffered by Sudeten Germans during the transfers, because it is hard not to empathize 
with other human beings who suffered for reasons that they do not understand. I may 
understand the Czech point of view, but my instincts make it extremely difficult for me 
not to identify on an emotional level with the Sudeten German expellees. 
 This study, which began as a relatively straightforward examination of the 
expulsions and their aftermath, has transformed over the past year into an exploration of 
memory, history, and the way individuals can shape both their personal memories and a 
group’s history. For the three million Sudeten Germans expelled in 1945 and 1946, the 
expulsions represent a turning point in their development into a cohesive group, as well 
as the peak of their sense of uniqueness. For the Czechs who expelled them, the 
expulsions are a dark moment in a long history of peace and coexistence that was 
shattered by the Nazi occupation and the immediate postwar period. Neither side is 
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“wrong,” but the divergence of the two groups’ collective memories and group histories 
show that the gap between the two groups has never truly been bridged since the 
expulsions occurred. Moreover, the very history of this period is tinged with emotion, as 
is the history of earlier periods of Czech-German relations now that the expulsions have 
overshadowed the centuries of interaction that preceded them.  
The collective memories and histories of the region, as well as those of the groups 
within it, provide historians a chance to see the development of relationships between 
ethnic and national groups. The rise and fall of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia 
is a unique case, but it has elements that apply not only to other groups in the region, but 
also to history in general. The trends of collective memory and group history shape the 
history of the world, and the legacy of those forces is more complex than is immediately 
obvious. The final conclusion of this study is that history is more complicated than just 
the “facts,” and understanding even a piece of it takes both context and perspective. The 
subjectivity of history is a benefit, and allows everyone to access history in a way that 
appeals to them. Thus, rather than criticizing historians for allowing their own opinions to 
seep into their work, they should be praised for opening their audiences’ eyes to new 
ideas and showing them how powerful memory and history can be, when used in 
conjunction for the benefit of the reader. 
 The legacy of the expulsions should be measured in the consequences of the 
actions of both the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs, not in the exact details of what 
happened during 1945 and 1946. The memories and histories of this period are more 
interesting than the minutiae, and they have had the longer-lasting impact on the people 
involved. Therefore, the evolution of this study from a relatively simple examination of 
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the events of the expulsions into a wider-ranging exploration of memory and history is 
understandable and will hopefully be useful in explaining the significance of these 
events.  
 With all that said, I’d like to leave this study with the words of an expellee. He 
uses only a few words to sum up the experience of the expulsions better than the 
thousands of words that make up this paper: “Ich kann es gar nicht in Worte kleiden.”264
                                                 
264
 “I cannot clothe it in words.” Schieder, No. 73 Dokumentation der Vertreibung, 375-377. 
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Appendix A: Key Names and Terms 
Names 
 
Beneš, Edvard: President of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia (1935-1938), President 
of the Third Republic of Czechoslovakia (1945-1948).  
 
Frank, Karl Hermann: Secretary of State in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 
(1939-1942), Reich Minister for Bohemia and Moravia (1942-1945), SS 
Obergruppenführer (Senior Group Leader) (1943-1945).  
 
Henlein, Konrad: Leader of the SHF (1933-1935), Leader of the SdP (1935-1938).  
 
Heydrich, Reinhard: Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia (1941-1942). Assassinated 
in Prague in 1942. 
 
Terms 
 
Heimat: Literally translated, it means “homeland,” but it carries connotations of strong 
connections to a certain region or town. It also came to mean a connection to a national 
group during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
Munich Conference: A summit between the leaders of Great Britain, France, Nazi 
Germany, and Fascist Italy in September 1938, during which those leaders decided to 
grant the Sudetenland to Adolf Hitler in exchange for his cessation of aggression in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
Potsdam Conference: A summit between the leaders of Great Britain, the United States, 
and the Soviet Union from July to August 1945, during which those leaders decided on 
the postwar division of Germany and officially sanctioned the transfers of ethnic 
Germans out of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront (SHF): A cultural group to unite the Sudeten Germans in 
the First Republic of Czechoslovakia. Founded in 1933, became the SdP in 1935. 
 
Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP): A political party for the Sudeten Germans in the First 
Republic of Czechoslovakia. Established in 1935, disbanded in 1938, after the annexation 
of the Sudetenland by Nazi Germany 
 
Sudetenland: The western border region of the present-day Czech Republic that 
contained nearly three million ethnic Germans before the population transfers of 1945 
and 1946. See maps in Appendix B. 
 
Volksgemeinschaft: Literally, it means “people’s community,” and it was central to the 
Nazi ideal of unity among the German people, even in diaspora. 
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Appendix B: Maps 
 
 
 
The Bohemian Crownlands and Habsburg Possessions in Central Europe, 
circa 1570 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reprinted from The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown by Hugh Agnew with 
the permission of the publisher, Hoover Institution Press. Copyright © 2004 by the Board 
of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. 
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Czechoslovakia in the Twentieth Century, circa 1920-1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reprinted from The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown by Hugh Agnew with 
the permission of the publisher, Hoover Institution Press. Copyright © 2004 by the Board 
of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. 
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The Czech Republic Since 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reprinted from The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown by Hugh Agnew with 
the permission of the publisher, Hoover Institution Press. Copyright © 2004 by the Board 
of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. 
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